

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

500C Chestnut Street Tower II

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANTS A AND B - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY -
REINFORCING BAR CADWELD SPLICES (NRC HNP-B-8)

The initial report of the subject reportable deficiency was made to R. W. Wright, NRC-OIE, Region II, on August 29, 1978. The final report was submitted on September 22, 1978. This supplemental report is being provided as requested by OIE, Region II Inspector Tom Burdette for additional information and clarification to the final report. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please call Tish Jenkins at FTS 854-2014.

Very truly yours,



J. E. Gilleland
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure

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both plants. TVA supervisors documented in memoranda to their respective plant construction engineer the fact that all cadweld splices made before May 26, 1978, were done under constant QC surveillance (due to the above mentioned interpretation of SOP-4) and that splices installed since May 26, 1978, have been reinspected for alterations with the exception of the final Unit A1 reactor basemat cadwelds which had constant surveillance until their completion after May 26, 1978.

Constant Surveillance Definition

Before May 26, 1978, a QC inspector was assigned to each cadweld crew (2 men) to observe each entire cadweld installation including preparation, fitup, and ignition. After a sufficient cooling down period, the inspector then checked the cadweld for voids, slag, or any other unacceptable feature. The constant presence of the inspector during that time precluded alteration of the cadwelds.

Current Surveillance Practices of QC to Preclude Future Tampering

All cadwelds are inspected the same day they are made as required in (SOP-4 Rev. 1, Section 5.6.a). TVA does not require 100% QC surveillance during cadwelding at Hartsville Nuclear Plant and does not plan to since it is considered unnecessary. We do not believe that the failure to require constant surveillance diminishes the effectiveness of our QC program in finding alterations of this type and, thereby, preventing their inclusion into the structure of the buildings. Every QC inspector there has seen samples of altered cadwelds (cut out and kept for QC instruction) and have been given instruction similar to QC-506, Addendum 1, as previously indicated. Since 100% of the cadwelds are inspected the same day they are made, TVA does not anticipate that any similar attempts at alteration in the future could go undetected.

There have not been any cases of tampering/altering since the deficiency mentioned.