



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

July 10, 2017

Mr. Marty Richey
Site Vice President
First Energy Nuclear Operating Company
Beaver Valley Power Station
P. O. Box 4
Shippingport, PA 15077-0004

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION – PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2017008 AND
05000412/2017008

Dear Mr. Richey:

On June 22, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

In all of the areas reviewed, the NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

M. Richey

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This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and the NRC's Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Silas R. Kennedy, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000334/2017008 and 05000412/2017008
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION – PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2017008 AND 05000412/2017008 DATED JULY 10, 2017

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.: 50-334 and 50-412

License Nos.: DPR-66 and NPF-73

Report Nos.: 05000334/2017008 and 05000412/2017008

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)

Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Shippingport, PA 15077

Dates: June 5, 2017 through June 22, 2017

Team Leader: S. Shaffer, Senior Project Engineer

Inspectors: S. Horvitz, Resident Inspector
Andrey Turilin, Project Engineer
D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer

Approved by: Silas R. Kennedy, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000334/2017008 and 05000412/2017008; 06/5/2017 – 06/22/2017; Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Units 1 and 2; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.

This NRC team inspection was performed by two regional inspectors, one headquarters inspector and one resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors concluded that FENOC was effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. FENOC personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with their safety significance. FENOC appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences.

The inspectors concluded that FENOC appropriately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to BVPS's operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that FENOC's self-assessments and audits were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues.

Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described FENOC's corrective action program at BVPS. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and FENOC's procedure NOP-LP-2001, "Corrective Action Program." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended multiple Management Ownership and Alignment meetings; Management Review Committee meetings; and Corrective Action Review Board meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, operator logs, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as emergency diesel generators, auxiliary feedwater pumps, and security structures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that FENOC entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of condition reports issued since the last NRC biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in June 2015. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution.

The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors reviewed FENOC's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed FENOC's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with selected NRC Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) and findings to verify that FENOC personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years for issues related to the Unit 2 power operated relief valves.

Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that FENOC identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. FENOC staff at BVPS initiated approximately 13,000 condition reports (CRs) between June 2015 and May 2017. The inspectors observed supervisors at the Management Ownership and Alignment meetings; Management Review Committee meetings; and Corrective Action Review Board meetings appropriately questioning and challenging condition reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that FENOC trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in condition reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In general, inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, FENOC personnel initiated condition reports and/or took immediate action to address the issues.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors determined that FENOC appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. FENOC screened condition reports for operability and reportability, categorized the condition reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The condition report screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.

Based on the sample of condition reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by FENOC corrective action program implementing procedures was sufficient to ensure consistency in the categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were performed when conditions warranted, and the evaluations generally supported the conclusions. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, FENOC identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective. However, the inspectors did identify one instance for which a corrective action (CA) for an NRC NCV was not implemented prior to closure of the CR.

Specifically, FENOC did not implement one of the CAs in CR 2015-00267 identified by the station after evaluating the cause for NRC NCV 05000334/2014005-01. The inspectors concluded that to date the apparent cause that led to the unplanned extended yellow risk, had not been adequately addressed or corrected. The inspectors did not identify any other recent occurrences of inadequate or non-implemented RMAs resulting in additional time in elevated risk at BVPS. The inspectors determined that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality was a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The inspectors independently evaluated this issue for significance in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," and determined this issue was of minor significance, and, as a result, was not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. BVPS personnel acknowledged the inspectors' observations and entered this deficiency into their corrective action program as CR 2017-06611.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether FENOC appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to BVPS and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that FENOC adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.

Assessment

The inspectors determined that FENOC appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Management Ownership and Alignment meetings and pre-job briefs.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if FENOC entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether FENOC initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.

Assessment

The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal FENOC assessments were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that FENOC personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. FENOC completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. The station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at BVPS. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns.

The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that FENOC entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.

Assessment

During interviews, BVPS staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On June 22, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Richey and other members of the BVPS staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Richey, Site Vice President
R. Bologna, Plant Manager
C. Battistone, Oversight Supervisor
R. Boyle, Site Projects Manager
E. Crosby, Radiation Protection Manager
A. Donectrovich, Regulatory Compliance
M. Enos, Outage Manager
M. Fox, Site Protection Manager
B. Kremer, Regulatory Compliance Manager
R. Kurkiewicz, Work Week Manager
E. Lueheon, Maintenance Manager
M. Mertens, Work Week SRO
J. Miller, Fire marshal
R. Miller, Performance Improvement
P. Pauvlinch, Design Engineering Manager
D. Salaera, Chemistry Manager
S. Sawtschenko, Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Shurbaugh, Operations Manager
E. Stalnecker, Performance Improvement
T. Steed, Performance Improvement Director
E. Thomas, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
D. Wacher, Regulatory Compliance
B. Winters Ph.D., Chemistry

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened and Closed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 40A2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Audits and Self-Assessments

MS-C-15-11-24, Emergency Preparedness Audit, 12/4/2015
 MS-C-15-02-22, Corrective Action Program
 MS-C-16-01-13: Design Control / Engineering Programs / ASME
 MS-C-16-03-01, Operations Audit, 4/29/2016
 MS-C-16-05-07, Maintenance/Work Management Audit
 MS-C-16-08-02: Chemistry and Environmental Programs
 SA-BN-2016-0014, Review of RP Instrumentation Program
 SA-BN-2016-0023, Chemical Control Focused Self-Assessment
 SA-BN-2016-0251, Pre-PI&R NRC Inspection Assessment
 SA-BN-2016-0331, Radiation Protection Assessment Report 2016
 SA-BN-2017-0372, Engineering Change Package Quality in the second-half of 2016
 SN-SA-2015-0207, Mechanical Maintenance Vertical Review Board – 2015
 SN-SA-2015-0243, 2015 2nd Quarter Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Meeting
 SN-SA-2015-0248, Monthly Chemical Control Inspection for First Half of 2015
 SN-SA-2015-0284, 2015 Semi-Annual EPlan Health Physics Drill #1-6/23/15
 SN-SA-2015-0343, 2015 Unannounced Activation Drill, 11/09/2015
 SN-SA-2015-0374, Mixed Operating Crews and the Effect on Operations' Error Rate,
 12/29/2015
 SN-SA-2015-0520, Radiation Area Access Controls
 SN-SA-2016-0732, Chemistry TEEW on Conduct of Chemistry / Effective Communication
 SN-SA-2016-0755, 2015 Radioactive Material/Contamination Control RP AFI Effectiveness
 SN-BN-2015-0089, RWP, ALARA and Air Sampling

Condition Reports

CR-2017-11767	CR-2016-14253	CR-2016-05975
CR-2017-06782	CR-2016-14063	CR-2016-05850
CR-2017-06781	CR-2016-14055	CR-2016-05659
CR-2017-06780	CR-2016-13475	CR-2016-03900
CR-2017-06611	CR-2016-13266	CR-2016-03836
CR-2017-06225	CR-2016-13071	CR-2016-03092
CR-2017-05876	CR-2016-12799	CR-2016-03010
CR-2017-05862	CR-2016-12018	CR-2016-02078
CR-2017-05678	CR-2016-11659	CR-2016-01710
CR-2017-05672	CR-2016-10916	CR-2016-01324
CR-2017-05616	CR-2016-10451	CR-2016-00884
CR-2017-05544	CR-2016-09527	CR-2016-00279
CR-2017-05501	CR-2016-09525	CR-2016-00052
CR-2017-05470	CR-2016-09524	CR-2015-16779
CR-2017-05045	CR-2016-08671	CR-2015-16365
CR-2017-03198	CR-2016-08585	CR-2015-16299
CR-2017-02997	CR-2016-08490	CR-2015-16001
CR-2017-02685	CR-2016-08308	CR-2015-15759
CR-2017-02682	CR-2016-08238	CR-2015-15730
CR-2017-02517	CR-2016-08198	CR-2015-15523
CR-2017-02053	CR-2016-07775	CR-2015-15393
CR-2017-01121	CR-2016-07600	CR-2015-15319
CR-2017-00917	CR-2016-07197	CR-2015-15083
CR-2016-14656	CR-2016-06745	CR-2015-14741

CR-2015-14647	CR-2015-08591	CR-2015-03308
CR-2015-14552	CR-2015-08263	CR-2015-03245
CR-2015-14426	CR-2015-08205	CR-2015-02850
CR-2015-14183	CR-2015-08083	CR-2015-02065
CR-2015-14131	CR-2015-07484	CR-2015-02050
CR-2015-14097	CR-2015-07482	CR-2015-02019
CR-2015-13972	CR-2015-07481	CR-2015-02000
CR-2015-13896	CR-2015-07469	CR-2015-01968
CR-2015-13440	CR-2015-07338	CR-2015-01746
CR-2015-13121	CR-2015-07270	CR-2015-01708
CR-2015-12868	CR-2015-07077	CR-2015-01167
CR-2015-12772	CR-2015-07073	CR-2015-00510
CR-2015-12699	CR-2015-07059	CR-2015-00395
CR-2015-12265	CR-2015-07058	CR-2015-00267
CR-2015-12189	CR-2015-06651	CR-2014-17014
CR-2015-11731	CR-2015-06636	CR-2014-07964
CR-2015-11653	CR-2015-06635	CR-2014-07368
CR-2015-10753	CR-2015-06499	CR-2014-07156
CR-2015-10739	CR-2015-06340	CR-2014-01887
CR-2015-10546	CR-2015-06064	CR-2014-01887
CR-2015-10459	CR-2015-05740	CR-2014-01587
CR-2015-10458	CR-2015-05291	CR-2014-01395
CR-2015-10416	CR-2015-05116	CR-2013-15843
CR-2015-09859	CR-2015-05088	CR-2013-03532
CR-2015-09028	CR-2015-03718	CR-2011-90177
CR-2015-08947	CR-2015-03450	
CR-2015-08828	CR-2015-03420	

Operating Experience

AME-2015-0062, BACC Boric Acid leak found on #2 ECCS ceiling
 AME-2015-0087, AFW Turbine Exhaust Missile Barrier Degradation
 CR-2015-08923, EPRI issued part 21.21 letter re: pressurizer nozzle inner radius UT Exams
 OE-2015-0257, SG PORV Block Valve failed to close
 OE-2015-0416, IN 15-07 Temporary Suspension of e-QIP system to affect pending background investigations
 OE-2015-0663, NRC Information Notice 2015-12, Unaccounted for Error Terms Associated with The Irradiation Testing and Environmental Qualification of Important-to-Safety Components
 OE-2016-0182, IN 16-05, Operating Experience Regarding Complications from a Loss of Instrument Air
 OE-2016-0352, Beaver Valley SOER Effectiveness Review; IER L2-12-14, Design Vulnerability
 OE-2016-0383, IN 2016-11, Potential for Material Handling Events to Cause Internal Flooding
 Part 21 Report on Wyle Laboratories Test Report Nos. 45700-1 Revision A, dated November 21, 1988 and 45700-2 Revision A dated November 21, 1988, Submergence Test Of Gems Liquid Level Transmitter

Non-Cited Violations and Findings

FIN 05000334/2014005-01, Failure to Implement Adequate Risk Management Actions
 FIN 05000334/2015007-01, Unanalyzed Condition Resulting from Unfused Direct Current Control Circuits
 FIN 05000334/2015008-01, Failure to Initiate a Condition Report for an Adverse Condition
 FIN 05000334/2016002-03, Failure to Appropriately Utilize Multiple and Diverse Indications Results in Plant Transient
 FIN 05000412/2015002-01, Failure to Utilize Respiratory Protection as Specified by the Radiation Work Permit
 FIN 05000412/2015002-02, Failure to Perform Maintenance in Accordance with Licensee Maintenance Process
 NCV 05000334/2015004-01, Inadequate Maintenance Rule Monitoring of the Auxiliary Feedwater System
 NCV 05000334/2016001-01 and 05000412/2016001-01, Failure to Properly Evaluate Control Room Envelope Test Results
 NCV 05000412/2016002-01, Procedure Change Results in Failure to Maintain the Design Basis for the Service Water System
 NCV 05000412/2016002-02, Inadequate Compensatory Measures to Ensure the Effectiveness of an EAL
 NCV 05000334/2016003-01 and 05000412/2016003-01, Failure to Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality Leads to Inoperable Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Relays
 NCV 05000334/2016004-01, Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Inoperable 'A' River Water Train

Procedures

1/2-ADM-0500, Reactor Containment Entries, Revision 14
 1/2-ADM-0500, Reactor Containment Entries, Revision 15
 1/2-ADM-1106, Drill/Exercise Scenario Development, Preparation and Conduct, Revision 29
 1/2-ADM-1900, Beaver Valley Power Station, Revision 38
 2OM-7.4.AM, Mixed Bed/Deborating Demineralizer Operation, Revision 21
 2OST-6.8, Pressurizer PORV Stroke Test, Revision 19
 3BVT-1.44.05, Control Room Envelope Air In-Leakage Test, Revision 5
 BVBP-RP-0020, RP Job Coverage General Guidance, Revision 22
 NOBP-ER-3101, Large Transformers, Revision 6
 NOBP-ER-3914, Measured Maintenance Data (MMD) Program Requirements, Revision 0
 NOBP-LP-2001, FENOC Self-Assessment and Benchmarking, Revision 26
 NOBP-LP-2003, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 4
 NOBP-LP-2008, FENOC Correction Action Review Board, Revision 21
 NOBP-LP-2011, FENOC Cause Analysis, Revision 20
 NOBP-LP-2018, Integrated Performance Assessment and Trending, Revision 12
 NOBP-LP-2029, Conducting Corporate Assessments, Revision 11
 NOBP-LP-2100, FENOC Operating Experience Process, Revision 15
 NOBP-LP-2501, Safety Culture Assessment, Revision 18
 NOBP-LP-2502, Safety Culture Monitoring, Revision 12
 NOBP-LP-4014, Managing Regulatory Interface, Revision 5
 NOP-ER-1001, Continuous Equipment Performance Improvement, Revision 5
 NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program, Revision 39
 NOP-LP-5011, Emergency Response Drill and Exercise Program, Revision 8
 NOP-OP-1007, Risk Management, Revision 20
 NOP-OP-1007, Risk Management, Revision 23

Work Orders

200664604	601051401
200669959	601093369
200697759	601105269
600913360	601106640
601016615	

Miscellaneous

Procedure Approval Form NOP-SS-3001-02, Revision 10
 RWP 114-1030, Revision 0
 RWP 116-1025, Revision 3
 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Current Open Impairments Regulatory Basis Report, June 7, 2017
 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fire Watch Patrol Logs, June 7, 2017

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACE	Apparent Cause Evaluation
ADAMS	Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
BVPS	Beaver Valley Power Station
CA	corrective action
CFR	Title 10 of the <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CR	Condition Report
FENOC	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
RMA	Risk Management Action