

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I L D R S 3 | (2) 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | (3) 4 1 1 1 1 | (4) | | | (5)

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | (6) 0 5 | 0 0 0 2 | 4 9 | (7) 0 5 1 2 8 1 | (8) 0 5 2 1 8 1 | (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal operation, while inspecting safety-related hydraulic snubbers isolation  
0 3 | condenser snubbers 1 and 2 were determined to be inoperable. Per Tech. Spec. 4.6.I.1,  
0 4 | Isolation Condenser was declared inoperable and all Tech. Spec. required surveillances  
0 5 | were satisfactorily completed. No safety and health implications existed because redun-  
0 6 | dant ECCS systems were available and no seismic events requiring shock arresting capa-  
0 7 | bility of snubbers occurred. Last similar occurrence: RO #81-010/01T-0.

0 8 | \_\_\_\_\_

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | S H | (11) CAUSE CODE | E | (12) CAUSE SUBCODE | X | (13) COMPONENT CODE | S U P P O R T | (14) COMP. SUBCODE | D | (15) VALVE SUBCODE | Z | (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 1 | (21) EVENT YEAR | 8 1 | (22) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 1 3 | (23) OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 1 | (24) REPORT TYPE | T | (25) REVISION NO. | 0 |

ACTION TAKEN | C | (18) FUTURE ACTION | Z | (19) EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | (21) HOURS | 0 0 0 0 | (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | Y | (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | X | (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | I 2 0 7 | (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The snubber failures were due to loss of hydraulic fluid caused by environmental condi-  
1 1 | tions present in the pipeway which promote fluid leakage and snubber degradation. The  
1 2 | failed snubbers were replaced with new Grinnell hydraulic snubbers. The safety-related  
1 3 | snubber inspection will continue to be performed to maintain system integrity.

1 4 | \_\_\_\_\_

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | (28) % POWER | 0 9 9 | (29) OTHER STATUS | NA | (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Visual & Operational Test Observations | (32)

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED | Z | (33) OF RELEASE | Z | (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | (36)

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 0 0 | (37) TYPE | Z | (38) DESCRIPTION | NA | (39)

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 0 0 | (40) DESCRIPTION | NA | (41)

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | (42) DESCRIPTION | NA | (43)

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | (44) DESCRIPTION | NA | (45) NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT #81-013/01T-0  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT ILDRS-3  
DOCKET #050-249

In accordance with Dresden Technical Specifications 4.6.I, a visual inspection of all inaccessible safety-related hydraulic snubbers contained in Table 3.6.I was performed to verify snubber operability.

The visual inspection of the inaccessible safety-related hydraulic snubbers resulted in a total of two snubbers with inadequate fluid levels, thus requiring a bench test to verify operability. The subsequent removal and in place testing of the snubbers resulted in both snubbers failing to lock-up properly thus verifying inoperability; therefore, the additional formal bench testing of the snubbers was not required.

The snubbers are located in the Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Pipeway on the condensate return line to the reactor vessel (2-1303-12") upstream of the isolation valve and drywell penetration. Safety and health implications were not affected because there was no requirement for seismic protection during the elapsed time interval and redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) were available. In addition, the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.5.E (isolation condenser system) and 3.6.I (Shock Suppressors/Snubbers) were satisfactorily met.

The loss of hydraulic fluid is a reoccurring problem with hydraulic snubbers. Environmental conditions in the isolation condenser pipeway, such as heat, humidity, vibration and radiation, all contribute to snubber failures by promoting the loss of hydraulic fluid and snubber degradation. The snubbers were replaced with new Grinnell hydraulic snubbers to insure system and snubber operability. The failed snubbers are being dismantled, rebuilt and tested per procedure. As a final measure, the isolation condenser snubbers will continue to be inspected per procedure so as to insure isolation condenser system operability and integrity.