


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


# Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS


Address Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 767 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690



Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450

April 3, 1971



Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director  
Division of Reactor Licensing  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 2, SECTION 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Dear Dr. Morris:

This is to report a condition relating to operation of the station in which, on March 27, 1971, core spray discharge valve, MO-2-1402-24B failed to open during a routine surveillance test.

Problem, Investigation and Corrective Action:

On March 27, 1971, at 4:15 p.m., daily surveillance of the core spray system was being performed due to the LPCI system being out of service for testability modifications. During the surveillance test the core spray discharge valve MO-2-1402-24B could not be opened electrically. The surveillance test was last completed satisfactorily on March 26, 1971. Core alterations were terminated upon failure of the surveillance test.

Investigation of core spray valve MO-2-1402-24B indicated that the valve could still be operated manually. The valve was manually opened and left open to allow the core spray system to be considered operable. Core alterations were then resumed.

Core alterations were terminated on March 29, 1971, and the core spray system was taken out of service to repair MO-2-1402-24B. It was found that a switch stack in the Limitorque operator had broken. Failure of the switch stack prevented the electrical operation of the valve. The switch stack was replaced and the valve operated satisfactorily.


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The cause of the broken switch stack is believed to be due to a water hammer which probably occurred during pump operability checks performed subsequent to the valve operability check on March 26, 1971, resulting in a mechanical shock to the valve operator. The water hammer was discussed with AEC Region III Compliance and will be the subject of a thirty-day letter in accordance with Section 6.6.C of the Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,



H. K. Hoyt  
Superintendent

HKH:LDB:dmc