



Regulatory

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# Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

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August 18, 1972

Mr. Angelo Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545




Subject: Dresden Units 2 and 3 Primary System Isolation  
from Reactor Vessel High Water Level

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to inform you that the high water level trip signal to the primary isolation system for Dresden Units 2 and 3 has been removed. This feature was operational in the startup/hot standby mode and was installed during the refueling outage in the spring of 1971.

The installation of this feature had been reviewed by the Station and Nuclear Review Boards prior to installation. The installation was reported in the Semi-Annual Report submitted in June 1971, and a report supplying additional information, requested by the AEC staff, was submitted on December 3, 1971.

The primary system isolation from reactor vessel high water level was added to protect the vessel from the thermal transient resulting from rapid depressurization as a result of turbine pressure regulator failure. The vessel transient resulting from such a failure was indicated in the December 3 report to be less severe than the previously analyzed loss of feedwater transient. Therefore, the transient from the failure of the pressure regulator is considered as a loss of feedwater transient for the purpose of accounting for the vessel usage factor.



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Mr. Angelo Giambusso

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
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During a reactor scram, when the reactor mode switch is taken from the run mode to the startup/hot standby mode to prevent primary isolation, variations in reactor water level are experienced. The primary isolation feature on high reactor water level results in a primary isolation when the high water level is experienced in the startup/hot standby mode and does not permit the use of the bypass valves to assist in control of the resulting pressure transient. Examples of such incidents are the December 8, 1971 Dresden Unit 3 incident and the May 4, 1972 Dresden Unit 3 incident. It is now felt that the incorporation of this isolation trip in the startup/hot standby mode results in unnecessary relief valve discharges. Therefore, the trip, having been installed as an operational aid, has now been removed.

Protection against the loss of pressure regulators transient is still desirable as an operational aid and investigations are still in progress to determine a method by which this can be accomplished.

If you have further questions, please let us know. In addition to one signed original, 39 copies of this letter are also submitted.

Very truly yours,



L. D. Butterfield, Jr.  
Nuclear Licensing Administrator