NRC ORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7.77) CENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK (1)(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 4 2 2 00 LID 0 CON'T REPORT 3810 1 0 0 2 3 7 7 1 1 0 3 SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 7 7 (.9) DOCKET NUMBER 68 60 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) Following corrective maintenance on the turbocharger, Unit 2/3 diesel generator was 0 2 declared operable. However, it should have remained out of service until the auto 0 3 start relay, which had also been worked on during the maintenance, was functionally $\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$ Consequently surveillances on other D/G's, CS, LPCI, and CCSW required by tested. 0 5 T.S.4.5.F.1 were not done for a 15 hour period. Safety significance was minimal be-06 cause Unit 2 and Unit 3 D/G's were operable and the relay was later tested to be 0 7 operable. This is not a repetitive occurrence. 0 8 80 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE SUBCODE CAUSE COMP. VALVE. SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE CODE E E (11) (12) C (13) 9 Z **Z**. Ζl Ζİ Z Z (14) Z (15) Z | (16) Α 18 19 OCCURRENCE REVISION SEQUENTIAL REPORT EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE IER/RO NO. (17) REPORT 7 0 1 51 5, 0 3 \mathbf{L} 0 22 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 EFFECT ON PLANT ACTION FUTURE ATTACHMENT SHUTDOWN METHOD NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT HOURS (22) FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER <u>Y</u> (23) (21) (18)<u>H</u> <u>Z</u> (25 (20) 0 Λ n 0 <u>N</u> (24) a CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Station management is reviewing the procedures used to return equipment to service. 1 0 A (follow-up) report will be submitted when the corrective action is identified to pre-1 1 vent recurrence. 12 1 3 1 4 8 9 80 METHOD OF FACILITY OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER (31) <u>Operator Discovery</u> 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT 45 46 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED_OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 6 NA 10 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 80 DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE 0 0 0 37 Z 38 7 NA 11 12 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80 DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 (40) 0 NA 11 12 9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) 80 TYPE DESCRIPTION 9 Z (42) NA 10 80 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) ISSUED N (44) 917-92 NA 68 69 80 9068% J. Chan 222 NAME OF PREPARER. PHONE:

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-055/03L-0 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE) DRESDEN UNIT 2 (ILDRS-2) DOCKET # 050-237

On October 30, 1977, Unit 2/3 diesel generator was taken out of service for a routine surveillance test, in which the turbo-charger was found to be damaged (Reportable occurrence #50-237-77-51). While Mechanical Maintenance was working on the turbo-charger, Electrical Maintenance took the opportunity to replace the coil of the auto start relay. The equipment outage for the relay work was cleared on November 2 before the completion of the turbo-The functional test on the relay proved relay operability charger maintenance. could not be performed at that time. After completion of the turbo-charger maintenance (about 0300 November 2) it was also found that the air start motor was damaged (Reportable occurrence #50-237-77-51), thereby further delaying the relay test until Mechanical Maintenance replaced the air start motor. The inexperienced Electrical Maintenance Foreman responsible for the relay coil replacement was conscientiously concerned about misplacing the work package and did not deliver it to the Shift Engineer when the equipment outage was cleared. The air start motor was replaced shortly afterwards and the operability test on the diesel generator was performed successfully. The diesel generator was then declared operable but the relay functional test had been neglected.

Surveillance tests on the other two diesel units, core spray systems, LPCI and CCSW systems as required by Tech Spec (T.S.4.5.F.1) were performed daily during this maintenance outage. When the diesel generator was declared operable, these surveillance tests were suspended. The following morning (Nov. 3) when the electrician came back, he realized that the relay functional test had not been performed. Consequently, the diesel should not have been declared operable the previous evening. The functional test on the relay was immediately performed and proved to be operable. However, surveillance tests of the containment cooling systems that should have been performed the previous night were over due.

At the time this event occurred, Unit 2 was in a refueling outage and Unit 3 was at steady-state operation. Safety significance of this event was minimal because both Unit 2 and Unit 3 diesel generators were operable, and also the auto start relay was functioning properly. This is not a repetitive occurrence.

This event was caused by personnel error. The electrical foreman has been instructed to ensure that work packages are delivered to the Shift Engineer when equipment outages are cleared as required by the Quality Assurance Pro-

gram.

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O. Lanham

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December 2, 1977

BBS LTR #1122-77

James G. Keppler, Regional Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Interim Report" #77-055/03L-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(c), observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in engineered safety feature systems.

Stephenson

Station Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:dlz

Enclosure

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cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement Director of Management Information & Program Control File/NRC

