NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Licensee Code (9–14)	License Number (15–25)	License Type (26–30)	CAT (57–58)
0 1	I L D R S 2 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)

Line	CON'T	Report Source (60)	Docket Number (61–68)	Event Date (69–74)	Report Date (75–80)
0 1	CON'T	L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 (7)	1 1 0 2 7 7 (8)	1 2 0 2 7 7 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating
0 3 uncoupling during functional testing. It was recoupled and coupling verified in ac-
0 4 cordance with T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling has little safety significance since it
0 5 occurs only when the rod is withdrawn to position 48. This is the first uncoupling
0 6 of CRD H-5. Several CRD's have uncoupled in the past. Reportable occurrences:
0 7 50-237/77-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/76-68, 72.
0 8

Line	System Code	Cause Code	Cause Subcode	Component Code	Comp. Subcode	Valve Subcode
0 9	R B (11)	A (12)	F (13)	C R D R V E (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO Report Number	Event Year		Sequential Report No.		Occurrence Code	Report Type		Revision No.
	7 7	—	0 5 4	/	0 3	L	—	0

Action Taken	Future Action	Effect on Plant	Shutdown Method	Hours (22)	Attachment Submitted	NPRD-4 Form Sub.	Prime Comp. Supplier	Component Manufacturer
C (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	G 0 8 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 CRD H-5 (SN-773C, Model 7RDB144B) was removed, and the inner filter was found unlat-
1 1 ched when inspected. It is believed the inner filter was unlatched due to improper
1 2 installation. Prior to this outage the CRD assembly procedure was changed to have
1 3 CECO Quality Control install and verify proper installation of the inner filter.
1 4

Line	Facility Status	% Power	Other Status (30)	Method of Discovery	Discovery Description (32)
1 5	H (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	Functional Testing

Line	Activity Released	Content of Release	Amount of Activity (35)	Location of Release (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

Line	Number	Type	Description (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

Line	Number	Description (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

Line	Type	Description
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

Line	Issued	Description (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

8103090686

NAME OF PREPARER M. Parcell PHONE: 422

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-054/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT 2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET # 050-237

During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating uncoupling when withdrawn to position 48 during functional testing. CRD H-5 was recoupled and coupling verified in accordance with the requirements of T.S. 3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling has little safety significance since it occurs only when the rod is withdrawn to position 48. This is the first uncoupling of CRD H-5. Five other CRD's have uncoupled since the 1975 Unit 2 refueling outage (reportable occurrences: 50-237/1977-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/1976-68, 72).

CRD H-5 (SN-773C) was removed from the reactor vessel and during subsequent disassembly and inspection it was found that its inner filter was unlatched. An unlatched inner filter rests on top of the stop piston connector. Movement of the CRD can lift the filter off the stop piston connector decreasing the clearance between the uncoupling rod and blade coupling lock plug. When withdrawn to position 48, the CRD can uncouple when the uncoupling rod imparts enough force to push the inner filter back against the stop piston connector. With the filter back against the stop piston connector, the CRD can be recoupled.

Since the cause of CRD uncoupling is believed to be improper inner filter installation, the following changes to the CRD assembly procedure were made prior to this refueling outage to ensure proper installation.

1. Installation of the inner filter by CECO Quality Control.

2. Performance of a 20 to 30 pound pull test following installation.

3. Performance of a push-pull test to verify that the extent of inner filter travel on the stop piston connector flats is limited to approximately 1/8 inch.

Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
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Telephone 815/942-2920

D. L Lanham

December 2, 1977

BBS LTR #1109-77

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Director of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #77-054/03L-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:dlz

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC