

INCIDENT EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [][][][][][][][] ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0 1] [I] [L] [D] [R] [S] [2] ② [0] [0] [-] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [-] [0] [0] ③ [4] [1] [1] [1] [1] ④ [][][][][][][][] ⑤

CON'T [0 1] REPORT SOURCE [L] ⑥ [0] [5] [0] [0] [0] [2] [3] [7] ⑦ [1] [1] [0] [9] [7] [7] ⑧ [][][][][][][][] ⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

[0 2] During modification test of condenser pit Hi water level circ. water pump trip, wiring
[0 3] was found not to conform to ESS separability. The circuit would have functioned
[0 4] properly if required so there were minimal safety consequences. This is not a repeti-
[0 5] tive event.
[0 6]
[0 7]
[0 8]

[0 9] [H] [F] ⑪ [A] ⑫ [C] ⑬ [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] ⑭ [Z] ⑮ [Z] ⑯
⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [7] [7] ⑲ [0] [6] [2] ⑳ [0] [3] ㉑ [L] ㉒ [0] ㉓
ACTION TAKEN [F] ㉔ FUTURE ACTION [Z] ㉕ EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] ㉖ SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] ㉗ HOURS [0] [0] [0] [0] ㉘ ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] ㉙ NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [N] ㉚ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [X] ㉛ COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [Z] [9] [9] [9] [9] ㉜

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ⑳

[1 0] The misrouted cables were rerouted under WR 8850. The functional test required for
[1 1] this work proved that the cables were rerouted in accordance with the original instal-
[1 2] lation requirements.
[1 3]
[1 4]

[1 5] FACILITY STATUS [H] ㉔ % POWER [0] [0] [0] ㉕ OTHER STATUS [NA] ㉖ METHOD OF DISCOVERY [C] ㉗ DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [Functional Logic Test] ㉘
[1 6] ACTIVITY CONTENT [Z] ㉙ RELEASED OF RELEASE [Z] ㉚ AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] ㉛ LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] ㉜
[1 7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0] [0] [0] ㉝ TYPE [Z] ㉞ DESCRIPTION [NA] ㉟
[1 8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [NA] ㊱ DESCRIPTION [NA] ㊲
[1 9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] ㊳ DESCRIPTION [NA] ㊴
[2 0] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N] ㊵ DESCRIPTION [NA] ㊶

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-062/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT 2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET # 050-237

The Dresden Unit 2 Technical Specifications require that a logic system functional test be performed each refueling outage on the condenser pit level switches that trip the circulating water pumps. Following replacement of the HFA relays that actuate this trip, a functional test was performed that disclosed that the condenser pit level switches assigned to the #1 engineered safeguard system (ESSI) were wired to actuate the ESSII relays. This cable routing was not in accordance with the required routing for the modification under which it was installed, and was not discovered during initial modification testing, which did verify the trip of each circulating water pump and actuation of the proper control room alarm.

In all the tests that were performed, the circulating water pumps tripped, and the control room alarm was received when the water level switches were activated. The cable routing, however, did not comply with IEEE 279 which requires that the ESS sensors and associated cabling be separated to prevent a fault in one system from disabling the logic associated with the other ESS system.

Upon discovery of the cable misrouting, WR 8850 was initiated to route the cables correctly. This work has been completed along with the tests to prove that the ESSI sensors actuate ESSI relays. Although the cables were misrouted, the trip circuitry for the circulating water pumps operated correctly, thus the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.

Action item 12-77-304 was issued to check the corresponding circuitry on Dresden 3 to see if a similar problem exists.

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PROCESSING UNIT

1977 DEC 16 PM 2 35




Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

D. Lankam

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

December 9, 1977

BBS LTR #1135-77



James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #77-062/03L-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(c), observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems.

B.B. Stephenson
B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:d1z

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

DEC 12 1977

