

LIKENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58

0	1	L	I	L	D	R	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	5
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LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

CON'T REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 1 1 2 2 7 7 1 2 2 2 7 7

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 | During surveillance DOS 6600-1, water spilled from the disassembled LPCI heat exchanger

0 3 | cooling water outlet valve M0-1501-3A into the LPCI/CS pump room. Isolating the source

0 4 | to prevent equipment damage required securing the 2/3 diesel cooling water system,

0 5 | threatening to reduce the degree of redundancy available for Unit 3. This event had

0 6 | minimal safety significance since the 2/3 diesel remained available for emergency use.

0 7 | There are no previous events of a similar nature at this facility.

0 8 |

7 8 9

S	F	A	C	H	T	E	X	C	H	C	Z
9	10	11	12	13	18	19	20	15	16	17	16

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

7	7	0	6	5	0	3	L	0	
21	22	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

X	H	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	N	Z	Z	Z	Z
33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 | The event was caused by personnel error. The related maintenance procedure requires

1 1 | the 2/3 diesel gen. cooling water pump out of service or installation of blind flanges

1 2 | over the valve body openings if repair work is extensive. Corrective action included

1 3 | installation of blind flange, demonstrating diesel operability, and reinstrucing

1 4 | supervisory personnel.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 30 44 45 46 80

H	0	0	0	NA	B	Diesel Operability			
7	8	9	12	13	30	44	45	46	80

FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

Z	Z	NA	NA			
7	8	9	11	35	36	80

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

0	0	0	Z	NA		
7	8	9	11	12	39	80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

0	0	0	Z	NA		
7	8	9	11	12	41	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION

N	NA				
7	8	9	10	45	80

**8103090660** Weidner

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-065/03L-0  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT 2 (ILDRS-2)  
DOCKET # 050-237

During surveillance DOS 6600-1 (Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests), river water spilled from the disassembled LPCI heat exchanger cooling water outlet valve M0-1501-3A into the east LPCI/CS pump room. Approximately 3.5 ft. of water collected in the room. Isolating the source to prevent possible equipment damage required securing the 2/3 diesel cooling water system. This action threatened to reduce the degree of redundancy available for Unit 3, but had minimal safety significance since the 2/3 diesel remained available for emergency use.

The event was caused by personnel error. The related maintenance procedure (DMP 255) requires "the 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water System out of service" or installation of "blind flanges over the valve body openings if repair work is extensive." Neither of these steps were performed.

Immediate corrective action was to install a blind flange on the 1501-3A valve body (50 min.). The 2/3 diesel cooling water pump was run to inspect the flange and then the 2/3 diesel generator operability test was performed.

The procedure was reviewed and found to be adequate. Supervisory personnel involved were reinstructed in the importance of strict procedural compliance and the implementation of administrative controls.

Additionally, instrumentation in the LPCI/CS pump room was recalibrated and pump motors were meggered. The ECCS jockey pump motor was replaced and the LPCI and CS subsystems were demonstrated to be operable prior to Unit 2 startup.

RECEIVED DOCUMENT  
PROCESSING UNIT

1978 JAN 4 AM 7 28



**Commonwealth Edison**  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R.R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
Telephone 815/942-2920

*D. Larson*

**REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY**

December 22, 1977

BBS LTR #1209-77



James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #77-065/03L-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(c), observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems.

*Arthur M Roberts*  
for B.B. Stephenson  
Station Superintendent  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:dlz

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
Director of Management Information & Program Control  
File/NRC

DEC 27 1977

