


FBS Ltr. #813-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
November 12, 1974

## Regulatory Docket File

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137



SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
FAILURE OF NUMBER 4 CONTROL VALVE TO GIVE HALF SCRAM

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A


- 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: Mr. P. Johnson, 1130 hours on November 3, 1974  
Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1350 hours on November 4, 1974

Report Number: 50-237/1974-59

Report Date: November 12, 1974

Occurrence Date: November 2, 1974

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois



### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

At approximately 0230 hours on November 2, 1974, during weekly turbine surveillance, the number 4 control valve failed to give an alarm or half scram.

### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, Unit 2 was at 1460 megawatts thermal with the mode switch in the "Run" position. The unit had an electrical load of 452 megawatts.

### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

During the weekly turbine surveillance, the operator closed number 4 control valve per procedure and failed to receive an alarm or half scram. System parameters indicated the valve had closed. The valve was subsequently cycled three times and still failed to produce an alarm or half scram.

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DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Fabrication Error)

An investigation into the problem revealed that a lead had broken on the Amphenol plug from the fast acting solenoid initiating the scram function. The apparent cause of the breakage appeared to be that the pins in the plug were too small for the gage wire being used.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE


The safety of the plant and public was not in jeopardy during the failure of the number 4 control valve to give a half scram. The fast acting solenoid on control valves 1,2&3 were operable and would have caused a reactor scram on fast closure of these valves.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to test the valve and issue work request number 10378 to inspect the circuitry.

The amphenol plugs will be scheduled for replacement during the current EOC3 refueling outage depending upon the availability of materials.

Sincerely,



E. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent

BBS:ERP:do