





Commonwealth Edison
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Regulatory Docket File



BBS LTR. #65-75

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois
 January 31, 1975



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
 Directorate of Regulatory Operations-Region III
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 799 Roosevelt Road
 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
2/3 CORE HEIGHT PERMISSIVE SETPOINT ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT

- References:
- 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A
 - 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
 Telephone: P. Johnson, 1445 hours on January 23, 1975
 Telegram: J. Keppler, 1550 hours on January 23, 1975
 - 3) Drawing Number: 12E2438
 - 4) Ltr. #42-75 from Stephenson to Keppler dated January 20, 1975

Report Number: 50-237/75-7

Report Date: January 31, 1975

Occurrence Date: January 22, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

The 2/3 core height water level sensor LITS 263-73B was found to have a setpoint above the Technical Specification of 257" H₂O Δp decreasing.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Dresden Unit 2 was in the refuel mode with a major refueling outage in progress. A maintenance inspection was being performed on level switch LITS 263-73B at the time the violation was discovered.

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DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1700 hours on January 22, 1975 the Instrument department was performing an inspection of LIS 263-73B. The purpose of the inspection was to determine if a generic problem of loose mercury switch mounting screws exists on this switch. The technique used was to record the "as found" setpoint of the switch, check the mercury switch mounting screws and then check the setpoint again. The initial setpoint was found to be 258" H₂O decreasing, which is 1" H₂O above the limit. After tightening one of the two mounting screws, (approx. $\frac{1}{4}$ turn) but without moving the setpoint adjustment, the setpoint moved to 254" H₂O Δp , which was within the limit. The switch was then tested several times and exhibited trippoint repeatability.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Unknown at this time. The vendor will be consulted as to a definite cause, and recommended corrective action.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The setpoint violation of LITS 263-73B had an insignificant effect on the performance of the system. The purpose of this switch is to allow the operator to select the containment spray mode of LPCI only when the 2/3 core height limit is met. The "as found" setpoint would have allowed containment spray, (if it was manually selected) one inch below the 2/3 core height limit. However, emergency procedure 1600-AN-II requires that normal reactor level be obtained before utilizing the containment cooling system. Therefore, this occurrence in no way jeopardized the safety of plant personnel or the general public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to tighten the mercury switch mounting screws. This brought the switch back into limits. In addition, "Loctite" sealant was applied to the screw heads to prevent them from loosening. An inspection will be made of all Yarways on the safety system to verify no other loose switch brackets exist.

FAILURE DATA

A similiar problem was discovered on level switch LITS 263-72B, after the abnormal occurrence report of January 20, 1975 was written. At the time of the January 20th letter the mounting screw problem had not been identified. Several other Yarway switches have been inspected, and several have been found with loose switch mounting screws.

BBS with initials
fr B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

BBS:WEH:smp

File/AEC