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Regulatory


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WPW Ltr.#460-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 June 15, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Directorate of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545



SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, SECTION 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit, in which on June 6, 1973, the isolation condenser inlet valve 1301-1 was found to be inoperable. This condition was reported to Mr. Fred Maura of Region III Regulatory Operations via telephone at 1515 hours on June 7, 1973. Mr. Boyce Grier, also of Region III Regulatory Operations, was informed of this condition in a telegram at 1600 hours on June 7, 1973.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION (Reference P & ID M-28)

On June 6, 1973 at approximately 1820 hours, with the reactor shutdown and while conducting a quarterly primary isolation valve timing test, valve 1301-1 would not close because its thermal overload had tripped. Subsequent investigation revealed that the trip had occurred on May 14, 1973 when the valve had been cycled in conjunction with isolation condenser high condensate/high steam flow isolation tests. The valve had apparently tripped in the open position on the last cycle of the tests and had failed to reset. The valve breaker and thermal overload had been removed and shop tested in April, 1973 as a result of a breaker malfunction reported in our letter dated April 13, 1973. When the breaker and overload were reinstalled, a small spring which changes the thermal overload reset mode from manual to automatic, was inadvertently omitted. Since the thermal overload was in the manual reset mode and the valve indicating lights in the control room are in parallel with the overload, valve 1301-1 was not known to be inoperable until an attempt was made to close it for the valve timing tests. Consequently, Technical Specifications Section 3.7.D.2 was exceeded in that the other isolation valve (1301-2) in the isolation condenser inlet line was not placed in the mode corresponding to an isolated condition during the time when valve 1301-1 was inoperable.

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EVALUATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The thermal overload trip for valve 1301-1 was placed in the automatic reset mode by replacing the reset spring. An inspection of the overload and electrical breaker for valve 1301-1 revealed no abnormal conditions. The valve was tested and performed satisfactorily. These actions were completed at approximately 2000 hours on June 6, 1973, thereby bringing valve 1301-1 into compliance with the Technical Specifications.

The function of the 1301-1 valve is to isolate the reactor from the isolation condenser in the event of an isolation condenser steam line break. Had a steam line break occurred in the relatively short length of pipe between the 1301-1 and 1301-2 valves, no isolation protection would have been available. However, the 1301-2 valve would have provided protection for downstream line breaks and since valve 1301-1 failed in the open position, the operability of the isolation condenser was not affected.

To prevent this type of problem from recurring, a modification has been engineered and approved for implementation during the next major outage. The modification will rewire all Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) motor operated valve thermal overloads in series with their respective control room indicating lights. The modification covers both Units 2 and 3 and when installed will allow immediate indication of a valve overload trip.

Because of previous problems associated with motor operated valve breakers and overloads, plans are underway to perform a complete evaluation of PCIS and ECCS valves for proper operator sizing, and correct trip and overload settings.

In addition, maintenance personnel have been cautioned to be more careful in the future to ensure that equipment is properly and completely assembled prior to releasing the equipment for operation. The applicable maintenance procedures will be reviewed and changes made as necessary.

Sincerely,

Fred S. Morris
for W. P. Worden
Superintendent

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