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WPW Ltr. #475-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 June 22, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Directorate of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

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Regulatory

File Cy.



SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, SECTION 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.


Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit in which on June 14, 1973 at 2000 hours, two low vacuum scram bypass switch settings were found to have drifted. Pressure switches PS-2-263-51A and B settings were found to be 619 PSIG and 613 PSIG respectively. These settings are above Technical Specification limits of 600 PSIG or less, as described in Section 3.1. At the time of the incident, the reactor was in the "run" mode, and thermal power was 2400 megawatts. This condition was related to Mr. F. Maura of Region III Regulatory Operations on June 15, 1973 at 1500 hours.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

During surveillance inspection of the low vacuum scram bypass switches, the setpoints of Meletron pressure switches PS-2-263-51A and B were found to have drifted. Pressure switch 2-263-51A had drifted to a setting of 619 PSIG and switch 2-263-51B had drifted to a setting of 613 PSIG. The pressure switches were previously checked on December 19, 1972, and were found to be within Technical Specification limits at that time.

The purpose of the pressure switches is to detect when reactor pressure has reached 600 PSIG. When reactor pressure reaches 600 PSIG, the PS-2-263-51A and B switches are designed to open. If condenser vacuum has not reached 23 inches of mercury prior to the opening of the pressure switches, a reactor scram will occur. When reactor pressure is below 600 PSIG, these switches bypass the low condenser vacuum reactor scram.



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With the pressure switches set above 600 PSIG, it would allow the reactor operator to raise pressure above 600 PSIG without sufficient condenser vacuum. Under these conditions a scram should occur, however, with both switches set above 600 PSIG a scram would not take place until one of the switches trips. Since the switches are arranged in a one out of two logic, the scram would not have occurred until the pressure setting of the PS-2-263-51B switch was reached. The 51B switch would have opened first since its setting was 613 PSIG and the 51A switch had a higher setting of 619 PSIG. Since these switches were open in the safety system circuits, they could not have prevented a scram. Consequently, the continued operation of the unit was safe.

An investigation into the problem was conducted but the cause for the drift could not be determined. This type of pressure switch has had a history of setpoint drift. (Reference Incident letter dated May 31, 1973). The switch drift problem has been under investigation by the manufacturers as well as the station instrument department, and at this time the cause still remains unknown.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action taken was to recalibrate the switches within Technical Specification limits. Future corrective action will be based on the results of the investigations. When the cause of the drift problem has been determined, your office will be notified.

Sincerely,

Fred S. Morris

for W. P. Worden
Superintendent

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