




Commonwealth Edison
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Regulatory File Cy.

50-237

WPW Ltr.#520-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 July 16, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Directorate of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2,
SAR Section 6.2.4.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit in which on June 18, 1973 at 1400 hours a LPCI logic relay was found to be blocked open. The blockage of the 2-1530-184 AS relay is contrary to section 6.2.4 of the SAR. At the time of the occurrence, the unit was in the run mode with reactor power level at 1100 MWt.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

During an investigation to determine the cause of a D.C. ground on differential pressure switch DPIS-2-261-34C, it was discovered that the cover plate for relay 2-1530-184 AS was installed incorrectly. The cover plate is designed with a cut away section at one end to allow the base of the contact armature to protrude. The cut away section is such that it will allow the contact armature free movement during actuation. If as in this case, the cover plate is installed upside down, then the contact armature will be blocked in the open position.

It was also noted that the cover plate has no identifying marks to denote the top from the bottom. The shape of the cover is such that it would also allow incorrect placement to be made easily.

Relay 2-1530-184 AS will actuate when and if a line break occurs in the recirculation system. Actuation of the relay is the result of a differential pressure being sensed between the A and B loops by differential pressure switch DPIS-2-261-34C. The 2-261-34C differential pressure switch is one of four switches designed to monitor the pressure differential between the two loops. The four switches are arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice logic, and therefore would have required a second failure to affect the operation of the LPCI loop select logic. The failure of one switch degrades the logic circuitry, but does not affect operability due to circuitry redundancy. Had a line break occurred while the 2-1530-184 AS relay was blocked open, the system would have operated as designed.

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With the redundancy incorporated into the system, the safety of the general public nor the plant was jeopardized as a result of the relay failure.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action taken was to install the cover plate correctly. With the cover plate installed properly, the relay operated as designed. However, due to the possibility of the problem reoccurring, the station will inspect all relays of this type to verify correct placement of covers, in addition to permanently marking each cover to denote the top from the bottom. Corrective action as stated was satisfactory since this was the first occurrence of this type.

The above corrective action will substantially minimize the reoccurrence of incidents of this nature.

Sincerely,

Fred J. Morris

for W. P. Worden
Superintendent

WPW:do