




Commonwealth Edison
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690


50-237

WPW Ltr #691-73

Regulatory Docket File



Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 September 14, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Director of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2
SECTION 6.6.C.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
LPCI VALVE 2-1501-3A BREAKER TRIP

REFERENCES: P. & I.D. DRAWING M29

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of Unit 2 at about 1300 hours on August 17, 1973. At this time LPCI valve 2-1501-3A failed to operate as designed. This malfunction is contrary to Section 3.5.B.1 of the Technical Specifications.

PROBLEM

During routine torus cooling on Friday, August 17, 1973, an attempt was made to open LPCI valve 2-1501-3A. During this attempt the supply breaker for the valve tripped. At the time of the breaker trip, the reactor was in the "Run" mode, and thermal power was 1878 megawatts.

A second attempt was made to operate the 2-1501-3A valve early on Monday, August 20, 1973. During this attempt the supply breaker again tripped.

INVESTIGATION

An investigation of the malfunction on the 20th of August revealed that the magnetic trip setting of the breaker for the 2-1501-3A valve was too low. The trip setting for this motor operated valve was set at position 3, which represents a 12 ampere setting. It has been found that this setting should be changed to position 6, which represents a 20 ampere setting. This change in settings resulted from an investigation by station personnel into similar breaker trips. Inspections of the breakers for

180.1

L 7010

8103030625

September 14, 1973

the other identical valve on Unit 2 and the two identical valves on Unit 3 revealed their trip settings were correct.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action taken was to reset the breaker and manually lift the valve off its seat. Additional corrective action was taken on August 20, 1973. At that time the breaker magnetic trip setting was changed from position 3 to position 6. Also, the breaker problems which have been experienced have led to a complete re-evaluation by Commonwealth Edison. The breaker problems are presently under investigation by the company engineering department, and any additional actions will be based on their findings.

EVALUATION

Public and plant safety was not in jeopardy during the failure of the 2-1501-3A valve. At no time during the failure was the LPCI system declared to be inoperable. The containment cooling system was not declared to be inoperable because this valve could be operated manually at any time. In the case of a LOCA, there would be adequate time to operate this valve manually.

The failure of this valve to open would cause a partial loss of cooling of the torus water by one of the two redundant Containment Cooling Service Water System loops, but would not affect the capability of the LPCI system to inject water into the vessel. If the 2-1501-3A valve had failed closed, it would have insured high pressure on the service water side of the heat exchanger. Also, since the Containment Cooling Systems are redundant and the second Containment Cooling System was operational at the time of the failure, continued operation of the unit was considered safe.

Fred J. Morris

for W. P. Worden
Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

WPW:ls

cc: File/AEC Corr. Cat I

180.2