




Commonwealth Edison
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Regulatory


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WPW Ltr. #693-73



Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 September 18, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Director of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, SECTION 6.6.C.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. FAILURE OF LPCI VALVE 2-1501-20B.

References: P&ID Drawing M29

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 1700 on August 20, 1973. At this time LPCI valve 2-1501-20B was started open and its supply breaker tripped. The 1501-20B valve is one of two valves in one of the LPCI flow test lines. This malfunction is contrary to section 3.5.B.1 of the Technical Specifications.

PROBLEM

While preparing to lower torus water temperature using A and B LPCI pumps, valve 2-1501-20B was started open and its breaker tripped. At the time of the breaker trip, the unit was in the "Run" mode with reactor power at 1569 thermal megawatts. The unit was running at steady state with an electrical load of 470 megawatts.

INVESTIGATION

The investigation into the breaker trip produced no probable cause for the problem. The magnetic trip settings for the valve were checked and found to be at the manufacturer's suggested setting. Therefore, since the initial breaker trip conditions were eliminated due to the manual operation of the valve with the breaker subsequently reset, the problem could not be duplicated.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action taken was to manually free the valve, and reset the breaker trip. Once reset, the valve was cycled several times without difficulty.

Additional corrective action will be to keep the operation of the 2-1501-20B valve under surveillance. If the problem reappears, the cause of the problem will be determined prior to the manual operation of the valve.

SAFETY EVALUATION

During the period when the 2-1501-20B valve would not operate, the plant and public safety was not in jeopardy. Had the valve failed in the open position, the 2-1501-38B valve would have closed securing flow to the torus during a LOCA. The 2-1501-38B valve is the redundant isolation valve up stream of the 2-1501-20B valve. With flow secured to the torus by the 2-1501-38B valve, the LPCI system would have functioned as designed.

Continued operation of the unit was judged to be safe because of the operable redundant LPCI system and the operable second valve in series with this valve.

Sincerely,

Fred S. Morris
for W. P. Worden
Superintendent

WPW:do

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