



Commonwealth Edison
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
Regulatory

File Cy.

50-237

WPW Ltr #705-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 September 21, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Director of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2
SECTION 6.6.C.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
LPCI VALVE 2-1501-3A FAILED TO OPEN

References: P & I D Drawing No. M-29

Dear Mr. Giambusso:


This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of Unit 2 at 0030 hours on August 26, 1973. At this time LPCI valve 2-1501-3A failed to open when operated.

PROBLEM

During torus cooling operations, the LPCI 2-1501-3A valve failed to open. At the time of the failure, the unit was in the "Run" mode and thermal power was 1880 megawatts. The unit was running at a steady state load of 578 megawatts electrical. To immediately correct the problem, an operator was sent to manually open the valve. During this operation it was discovered that once the valve was freed, it operated correctly.

INVESTIGATION

An investigation revealed that the feedback potentiometer wiper was running off the end of the resistor. When the wiper runs off the end of the potentiometer, it opens the feedback circuit and gives the valve a closed signal.



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
September 21, 1973

CORRECTIVE ACTION

To immediately correct the problem, the valve was manually opened. Additional corrective action was to adjust the potentiometer and the valve limits to prevent the potentiometer from running off the end of its resistance. Since this valve has had numerous problems, its operation has been under investigation by Station personnel. The history of this valve shows that there have been numerous causes found to account for the valve failing to open. Corrective action for each of these problems has been completed. The valve will remain under investigation until it has been proven that all problems have been corrected.

EVALUATION

During the failure of the 2-1501-3A valve the safety of the plant and public was not in jeopardy. Since the 2-1501-3A valve is the service water outlet of the LPCI heat exchanger, the cooling capability of the LPCI water would have been derated. However, the failure of the valve to open would not affect the ability of the LPCI system to inject. The Containment Cooling System is a redundant system and at the time of the failure, the redundant system was operational. Continued operation of the unit was judged to be safe because of this redundancy.



W. P. Worden
Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

WPW:ls

cc: File - AEC Corr.

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