




Commonwealth Edison
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

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
Regulatory

File Cy.

WPW Ltr #703-73



Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 September 21, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso
 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
 Director of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2,
 SECTION 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
 FAILURE OF MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOLATION VALVE MO-2-220-2
 TO OPERATE

- References: 1) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
 Telephone: Mr. Maura, 1145 hours on September 17, 1973
 Telegram: Mr. Grier, 1145 hours on September 17, 1973
- 2) Dwg: P & I D M-12

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 1200 hours on September 15, 1973. At this time while trying to open the main steam line drain isolation valve MO-2-220-2, the overload tripped. The valve was given an open signal several more times and each time the overload would trip. This malfunction is contrary to Section 3.7.D.1 of the Technical Specifications.

PROBLEM

At this time the reactor was shutdown and all rods were inserted. The main steam isolation valves were open and the main steam line drain isolation valves were being opened to drain the lines prior to startup. While opening the MO-2-220-2 valve, its overload tripped. During subsequent attempts to open the valve, it tripped each time.

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September 21, 1973

INVESTIGATION


An investigation revealed that the valve was open when control room indication showed it was closed. It was found that two 1/4 inch square keys holding the valve stem in the yoke bushing were missing. The keys are to prevent the stem from rotating and allow the motor operator to position the valve disc. Operation of the valve in the as found condition would have allowed the stem to rotate and thus prevent valve disc travel. The overload tripping can be explained by the continuous running of the motor operator because the open indication was not received in the control room.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The corrective action included replacing the two keys, repacking the valve, and adjusting the limit switch for control room indication. The maintenance was completed and the valve returned to service at 0523 hours on September 16.

EVALUATION

This valve failure did not jeopardize the public health or safety because another valve in the same line could have been placed in the isolated condition. Since the valve was satisfactorily timed at approximately 1730 hours September 14 it was in this condition for less than 24 hours. This is the first time this type of valve problem has occurred. It consequently is believed to be an isolated problem and will not recur. Continued operation was considered to be safe because there is a redundant valve in this line and there is no history of this type of malfunction.



W. P. Worden
Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

WPW:ls

cc: File - AEC Corr.

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