




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Regulatory


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WPW Ltr.#802-73



**Dresden Nuclear Power Station**  
**R. R. #1**  
**Morris, Illinois 60450**  
**October 26, 1973**



**Mr. A. Giambusso**  
**Deputy Director for Reactor Projects**  
**Directorate of Licensing**  
**U. S. Atomic Energy Commission**  
**Washington, D. C. 20545**

**SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2**  
**SECTION 6.6.C.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.**  
**FAILURE OF HPCI VALVES 2-2301-48, AND 36.**

**References: Dresden Station P & ID 51**

**Dear Mr. Giambusso:**

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 2040 hours on October 17, 1973. At this time, HPCI valves 2-2301-48 and 36 failed to operate as designed. During the deviation, the reactor was in the "Run" mode and thermal power was 2283 megawatts. Reactor pressure was 991 psig and electrical load was 738 megawatts.

**PROBLEM**

At the time of the occurrence a HPCI valve operability test was in progress. During this test it was discovered that HPCI valves 2-2301-48 and 2-2301-36 had lost their seal-in capability. Both valves were still operable as throttle valves, and would operate correctly under auto initiation.

The immediate corrective action taken was to initiate an investigation into the problem. The condition was corrected by 11:45 hours on October 18, 1973.

**INVESTIGATION**

An investigation into the problem revealed that the seal-in capability failed because the connecting wires for the seal-in contacts were disconnected. The seal-in connecting wires were removed during a modification to the breaker auxiliary contacts for these valves. It is believed that the wires remained disconnected since that time. The modification was performed October 8, 1973.

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Following the modification by a contractor to the auxiliary contacts, a HPCI valve operability test was performed. It is believed that the failure was over looked at that time because the procedure for the HPCI valve test did not adequately check the seal-in capability.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION

The corrective action taken was to re-connect the wiring for the seal-in contacts. In addition, the procedure for the HPCI valve test will be changed to include steps to adequately check the seal-in capability of all valves.

#### EVALUATION

During the occurrence of this deviation, the safety of the plant and public was not in jeopardy. The failure of the seal-in feature did not prevent the valve from operating correctly from the control room. Also, the failure of the seal-in feature would in no way prevent the initiation of the HPCI system in the event of an accident. During this deviation, the HPCI system remained operable. Thus, continued operation of the plant was considered safe.

Sincerely,

*W. P. Worden*

W. P. Worden  
Superintendent

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