





**Commonwealth Edison**  
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Regulatory File Cy.

WPW Ltr.#882-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R. R. #1  
 Morris, Illinois 60450  
 November 30, 1973



50-237

Mr. J. F. O'Leary, Director  
 Directorate of Licensing  
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
 Washington, D. C. 20545

**SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABILITY**

- References: 1) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
 Telephone: Mr. P. Maura, 1115 hours on November 23, 1973.  
 Telegraph: Mr. Keppler, 1300 hours on November 23, 1973.
- 2) Dresden Station drawings: M-51

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 2000 hours on November 22, 1973. At this time the HPCI system was declared to be inoperable due to a 125 volt and 250 volt ground. This malfunction is contrary to section 3.5.c.1 of the Technical Specifications which requires that the HPCI system be operable when reactor pressure is greater than 90 PSIG and irradiated fuel is in the vessel.

PROBLEM

Prior to the occurrence, maintenance was in the process of tracing down a ground on the 125 volt D.C. and the 250 volt D.C. systems. The ground was found to be present at the supply feeds to the HPCI auxiliary oil pump, and would prevent its proper operation if required. Since damage to the HPCI system was probable if operation was necessary, the HPCI system was then declared to be inoperable. The required surveillance tests were then performed.

At the time of the discovery, the reactor was in the "Run" mode with thermal power at 1693 megawatts. The unit was running steady with an electrical load of 520 megawatts.

INVESTIGATION

An investigation was conducted to determine the cause of the ground on the D.C. systems. On further tracing of the ground, it was possible to trace the ground to a junction box below the HPCI stop valve. Inspection of the junction box revealed that it had filled with water which came from a small steam leak on the HPCI stop valve.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

To correct the problem and return the HPCI system to an operational status, the condensed water was drained from the junction box and its internals dried. Draining of the junction box was accomplished by removing a plug from its bottom. Upon drying, the ground cleared and the HPCI system returned to an operational status.

The HPCI system was again declared inoperative the following morning to repair the steam leak on the stop valve. Following the repair, the drain plug was installed and the HPCI system declared operable.

In addition to the above corrective action, the station is investigating the possibility of a preventative measure to avoid a recurrence of this incident.

EVALUATION

The occurrence of the failure did not place the safety of the plant or public in jeopardy. When the HPCI system was declared inoperative, the required emergency system surveillance was performed and showed that all systems were operational. Therefore, had an accident occurred while the HPCI system was inoperative, the Auto Blowdown System would have functioned as designed. Thus the continued operation of the unit was considered safe due to the operability of the Auto Blowdown System.

After re-evaluation, the station had determined that this situation is not a reportable incident. However, to complete the reporting procedure initiated by our notifications referenced above, we are submitting this letter.

Sincerely,

*Fred S. Morris*  
for W. P. Worden  
Superintendent

WPW:do