




Commonwealth Edison
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Regulatory

50-237

WPW Ltr.#44-74

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 January 17, 1974



Mr. J. F. O'Leary, Director
 Directorate of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, 2/3 CORE HEIGHT LEVEL SENSOR OUT OF CALIBRATION.

- References:
- 1) Letter from W. P. Worden to J. F. O'Leary dated November 19, 1973 concerning same subject on Dresden #3.
 - 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations. Telephone: F. Maura 1150 hours on January 9, 1974. Telegram: J. Keppler 1350 hours on January 9, 1974.
 - 3) Dwgs. P & ID M-26


Dear Mr. O'Leary:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 1545 hours on January 8, 1974. At this time, the 2/3 core height water level sensors LITS 2-263-73A and B were found to have setpoints above the Technical Specification limit of $\leq 257'' \text{H}_2\text{O} \Delta P$ decreasing.

This malfunction is contrary to Table 3.2.2 of the Technical Specifications which requires that the containment spray system be interlocked to prevent operation if reactor water level is at or below 2/3 of the core height.

PROBLEM

During routine monthly surveillance of the 2/3 core height containment spray interlock levels sensors, LITS 2-263-73A and B were found with setpoints of 267 and 262'' H_2O dp, respectively. The Technical Specification requires that these sensors operate at $\leq 257'' \text{H}_2\text{O}$ dp. The sensors were immediately reset to 254.5 and 255'' H_2O dp.



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INVESTIGATION

The sensors in question are Yarway number 4418E0 devices. Past surveillance history indicates that they are normally very reliable devices. This is the first occurrence of a Technical Specification violation by these sensors, although violations have occurred from similar sensors on Unit #3.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The corrective action for this occurrence will be based on the corrective action outlined in Ltr.#862-73 (Reference 1). That action consisted of consulting the manufacturer of the sensor, and analyzing the procedure used to set the sensor. On January 2, 1974, Mr. William T. Reid of Yarway Corporation, visited the station and was briefed on the problem. Yarway Corporation will investigate sensor characteristics which may influence drift. The investigation into the procedures used by the station to calibrate the sensors is presently being performed. The approach will be to observe a sensor calibration by each instrument mechanic who would normally do the calibration and analyze the results.

EVALUATION

Normal setpoint of these sensors is 96/144ths core height. The out of specification trip points would have been 86/144ths and 91/144ths core height. The function of the sensors is to provide a permissive to allow the use of the containment spray system. The as found settings would have allowed containment spray at 91/144ths of core height.

Station abnormal procedures state that the reactor vessel level be normal prior to utilizing the LPCI system in the containment cooling mode. Even though the setpoint was low, the operator would have verified the vessel level before manually initiating the containment cooling. Therefore, this situation did not present a safety hazard to either plant personnel or the general public.

Sincerely,

W. P. Worden AR

W. P. Worden
Superintendent

WPW:do

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