




Commonwealth Edison
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

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BBS Ltr.#376-74



Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 May 28, 1974



Regulatory Docket File

Mr. J. F. O'Leary, Director
 Directorate of Licensing
 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2, REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.B.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
FAILURE OF MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 2-220-2 TO OPEN.

Reference: Notification to Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations
 Telephone: Mr. F. Maura, 1350 hours on May 22, 1974
 Telegram: Mr. J. Keppler, 1417 hours on May 22, 1974

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 0400 hours on May 22, 1974. At that time, main steam line drain valve 2-220-2 failed to open. This malfunction is contrary to section 3.7.D.1 of the Technical Specifications which requires that all isolation valves listed in table 3.7.1 be operable during power operations.

PROBLEM

After performing a modification, in which the thermal overloads on MO2-220-2 were changed, the valve was functionally tested. During the functional test, the valve failed to open.

At the time of the failure, the unit was in the "Run" mode with thermal power at 2028 megawatts. Electrical load at the time of the failure was 637 megawatts.

INVESTIGATION

An investigation into the problem was initiated immediately by the station electrical department. The investigation revealed that the valve failed to open because the motor contactor failed to pick-up.

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May 28, 1974

An inspection of the motor contactor revealed that the air gap between the contactor coil and armature was too great. It was further discovered that the large air gap was caused by the loosening of the armature stop screw. The armature stop screw adjusts the air gap by preventing the armature from dropping too far open when the contactor is de-energized.

CORRECTIVE ACTION


To correct the failure, the armature stop screw was adjusted properly and a lock nut for the screw was tightened securely. During the adjustment of the stop screw, the lock nut was found only finger tight, and it is believed that the lock nut was loose since original installation.

Since this is the first occurrence of this type of failure, the corrective action taken at this time was to adjust the armature stop screw and tighten the lock nut. In addition, the adjustment and the tightness of the lock nut will be checked during subsequent breaker inspections. At this time, in view of cumulative experience, the corrective actions taken were adequate.

EVALUATIONS

During the failure of valve 2-220-2, the safety of the plant and public was not in jeopardy. When the 2-220-2 valve failed, it failed in the closed or isolated condition. In addition, the inboard isolation valve MO2-220-1 was also closed. Also at the time of the failure all safety systems were operable.

Sincerely,



B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

BBS:TEL:do

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