

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	I	L	D	R	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	57	58																

LICENSEE CODE      LICENSE NUMBER      LICENSE TYPE      CAT 58

0	1	L	0	5	0	0	0	2	3	7	0	6	1	1	8	0	0	6	2	4	8	0	9
7	8	60	61	68	69	74	75	80															

REPORT SOURCE      DOCKET NUMBER      EVENT DATE      REPORT DATE

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation, an engineering evaluation of CRD scram discharge piping re-

0 3 vealed that it does not meet seismic requirements as described in the FSAR. This re-

0 4 sulted in operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analy-

0 5 ses (Tech Spec 6.6.B.1.i). This was of minimal safety significance since, it was de-

0 6 termined operability requirements were met per I.E. Bulletin 79-02 and piping stresses

0 7 are less than 0.5 of ultimate stress under OBE loading conditions. There was no effect

0 8 on public health or safety. This was the first occurrence of this type at Dresden.

0	9	R	B	B	A	S	U	P	O	R	T	B	Z
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	18	19	20				

SYSTEM CODE      CAUSE CODE      CAUSE SUBCODE      COMPONENT CODE      COMP. SUBCODE      VALVE SUBCODE

17	8	0	0	2	2	0	1	T	0	
21	22	23	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER      EVENT YEAR      SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.      OCCURRENCE CODE      REPORT TYPE      REVISION NO.

X	F	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	N	N	G	0	8	0
33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	47				

ACTION TAKEN      FUTURE ACTION      EFFECT ON PLANT      SHUTDOWN METHOD      HOURS      ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED      NPRD-4 FORM SUB.      PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER      COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the event was due to a design deficiency, in that correct seismic support

1 1 were not installed. Analyses were performed to ensure the CRD scram discharge piping

1 2 met the operability requirements of I.E. Bulletin 79-02 & 79-14. EDS Inc. is designing

1 3 seismic supports to be installed upon fabrication. The same engineering evaluation is

1 4 in progress on Unit 3.

1	5	E	0	8	5	NA	C	Engineering Evaluation	
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80

FACILITY STATUS      % POWER      OTHER STATUS      METHOD OF DISCOVERY      DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

1	6	Z	Z	NA	NA		
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80

ACTIVITY CONTENT      AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY      LOCATION OF RELEASE

1	7	0	0	0	Z	NA
7	8	9	11	12	13	80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES      DESCRIPTION

1	8	0	0	0	NA	
7	8	9	11	12	13	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES      DESCRIPTION

1	9	Z	NA		
7	8	9	11	12	80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY      DESCRIPTION

2	0	N	NA	
7	8	9	10	80

ISSUED      DESCRIPTION      PUBLICITY

800701050.5

NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-22-01T-0  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT 2 (ILDRS2)  
DOCKET #050-237

On June 11, 1980, at 0820, an engineering evaluation of the CRD scram discharge piping revealed that it does not meet seismic requirements as described in the FSAR. The reactor was in the run mode operating at 85 percent power. This resulted in operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses (Tech. Spec. 6.6.B.1.i.) It was determined that operability requirements were met per I.E. Bulletin 79-02 & 79-14, thus this event has minimal safety significance. Public health and safety were not affected. This was the first occurrence of this type at Dresden.

The cause of the event was due to a design deficiency, in that the correct seismic supports were not installed. Analyses were performed to verify the operability requirements of the CRD scram discharge piping per I.E. Bulletin 79-02 & 79-14. EDS Inc. is designing the new seismic supports, which will be installed upon completion of fabrication. An Engineering evaluation to determine if the same problem exists in Unit 3 is in progress.