

Commonwealth Edison Company
Dresden Generating Station
6500 North Dresden Road
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Tel 815-942-2920



October 19, 1998

JMHLTR: #98-0257

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-2001

Subject: Response to Notice of Violation
NRC Report Number EA 96-493
NRC Office of Investigations Reports 3-96-036 and 3-96-036(S)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3
NRC Docket Numbers 50-237 and 50-249

Reference: William T. Travers Letter to Oliver D. Kingsley, dated September 18, 1998, transmitting NRC Report EA 96-493 and Notice of Violation

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) Company's reply to the Notice of Violation transmitted in the referenced letter. Specifically, the violation resulted from the actions of two applicants for NRC operator licenses engaging in activities that compromised the integrity of an NRC examination required by 10 CFR Part 55.

The response to the Notice of Violation is contained in the Attachment to this letter. As a result of this response, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is making no new commitments.


I affirm that the content of this transmittal is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

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Please direct any questions regarding this matter to Frank Spangenberg, Dresden
Regulatory Assurance Manager at (815) 942-2920 extension 3800.

Sincerely,


J. M. Heffley
Site Vice President
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in the State of Illinois, this

19 day of OCTOBER, 1998.


Notary Public



Attachment

cc: Regional Administrator, Region III
Senior Resident Inspector, Dresden Nuclear Power Station

ATTACHMENT
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
EA-96-493

VIOLATION:

10 CFR 55.49 provides that applicants, licensees, and facility licensees shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by 10 CFR Part 55, "Operators' Licenses."

Contrary to the above, on June 29, 1996, two applicants for NRC operator licenses at the Dresden Station (one was an applicant for a reactor operator (RO) license and the other was an applicant for a senior reactor operator (SRO) license) engaged in activities that compromised the integrity of an NRC examination required by 10 CFR Part 55. This examination was scheduled to be administered by the NRC beginning on July 8, 1996. Specifically, on June 29, 1996, the applicants, both employed by the facility licensee, found keys to desks and cabinets in which instructional materials for licensing operators were stored. Using those keys they unlocked a desk, found the NRC examination, and copied the exam for their use.

REASON FOR VIOLATION:

Although the measures to secure the NRC exam were in accordance with station procedure and consistent with the guidelines of NUREG 1021 Rev. 7 for licensed operator re-qualification exams, the security measures were inadequate to defeat the action of the SRO and RO trainee to deliberately breach exam security.

On Friday, June 28, 1996, a Dresden instructor locked the NRC exam material in his desk. This action was in accordance with station procedure and consistent with the NUREG guidelines for exam material in effect at the time. The special guidelines of NUREG 1021 Rev. 8 for handling initial licensing exam material were not promulgated until after this event.

On Saturday, the SRO trainee and RO trainee searched the instructor's work area and located the NRC exam after unlocking the instructor's desk with a spare key obtained from the administrative assistant's unlocked desk. They made two copies of the exam and returned it to the file cabinet.

The exam compromise was discovered the following Monday, when a partial copy of the exam was found in the copier by a Dresden instructor.

During an investigation subsequent to the exam theft, the RO trainee stated that the SRO trainee and he had reviewed an alarm printout for the simulator related to the NRC exam which one trainee had recovered from a trash can. Furthermore, the RO trainee stated that the SRO trainee and he had, as early as late 1995, searched instructors' locked desks and filing cabinets for ComEd exam material used in the initial licensing class. The SRO trainee denied ever illegally obtaining any exam material with the exception of the NRC examination.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED:

Dresden Management and the NRC were immediately notified when the NRC exam material was found in the copier. The exam was indefinitely postponed and investigations initiated by ComEd corporate security and the NRC Office of Investigations. In addition, the station initiated a root cause investigation of the event. As a result of the investigations, the two trainees who had compromised the exam were identified. Both individuals subsequently plead guilty in U. S. District Court to criminal charges related to the exam compromise.

Comprehensive, corrective security measures were put in place by ComEd at all stations to prevent exam compromise.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION:

Following this event, ComEd instituted comprehensive, technically sound security procedures for licensed operator examinations which are applicable to all stations. These measures include:

- NRC exam materials (when not in the physical possession of an authorized person) are maintained in a dedicated room with a unique locking device.
- Two physical barriers, the room door and a lockable storage area, are provided for all hard copy and removable electronic versions of exam material.
- The exam bank is password protected (second physical barrier).
- A dedicated computer, copier, shredder and printer are maintained in the room.

- Simulator printout is shredded; chart recorders are advanced.
- Access to the simulator is posted and locked
- Simulator process computer history is deleted; simulator playback capability is inhibited.
- Computer link to outside networks is severed.
- Video and audio recordings are prohibited.
- A security checklist is invoked for the simulator.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

Full compliance was achieved in August of 1996.