

Regulatory File Cy.

50-237
50-249


Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 767 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450



WPW Ltr. #337-73

April 27, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19 AND DPR-25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS #2 AND 3, SECTION 6.6.B.3 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the station in which on April 19, 1973, secondary containment integrity was not in effect for a period of approximately six hours, contrary to Technical Specifications Section 3.7.C.

PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

At approximately 1600 hours on April 19, 1973, unit 3 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 3-203-2B was disassembled for an inspection of the valve internals during a maintenance outage. Since the unit 3 turbine stop valves were also disassembled for inspection, opening valve 3-203-2B established a direct flow path from the turbine building into the turbine steam chest through main steam line 3-3001B-24" into the main steam line tunnel, which is part of unit 2/3 secondary containment.

The investigation revealed a turbine bypass valve and two high pressure turbine steam lines were open to the turbine building. The bypass valve flange was replaced at approximately 1730. Since the turbine steam inlet lines could not be reinstalled rapidly, a blind flange was installed on MSIV 3-203-2B.

Secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling. During the short period of time secondary containment was broken, unit #3 reactor was in the refuel mode with local power range monitor (LPRM) replacement and fuel moves in progress and unit #2 was operating at near rated power.

166.1

283D

The loss of secondary containment for this short period of time did not result in a ground level release since the air flow was into the secondary containment from the turbine building. Had an event occurred which resulted in release of radioactivity to the secondary containment and had the air flow direction been reversed, a release path would have existed from the secondary containment to the turbine building.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A blind flange was installed on MSIV 3-203-2B at 2200 hours and secondary containment was restored. A change will be made in the "Request for Equipment Out of Service" form to include a "Secondary Containment Integrity Effected" check space. This change should be completed by June 1, 1973.

Sincerely,

W.P. Worden

W. P. Worden
Superintendent

WPW:RC:jw

cc: WPW Ltr. File

166.2