

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95					
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.			
FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2					DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000237		PAGE (3) 1 OF 5			
TITLE (4) SRO Absent From the Main Control Room Due to Loss of Focus on Interim Duties.										
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME Dresden, Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER 05000249
02	26	97	97	-- 006 --	01	09	12	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)						
POWER LEVEL (10)		099		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71(b)
				20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(c)
				20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		OTHER
				20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
				20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
				20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										
Name: Ralph M. Fenili, Operations Staff ext.2917								Phone: (815) 942-2920		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).				X NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1945 hours on February 26, 1997 while providing an interim relief for the Unit 3 Unit Supervisor in the Main Control Room, the OOS Supervisor became distracted from his interim duties, resulting in his exit from the Control Room to obtain additional technical documents. His absence was recognized by the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor, who immediately took action to correct the Technical Specification non-compliance. The Unit Supervisors short absence from the Control Room (approximately 6 minutes) had minimal affect on safety. Corrective actions include counseling of the individual and training on the Administrative Section (Section 6) of the Upgraded Technical Specifications. An additional corrective action was specified by the original LER to implement security badge egress control from the Main Control Room. This action was intended to prevent future violation through positive controls, but the complexity of the corrective action prevented timely implementation and consequently the event recurred. As a result, this action has been cancelled.

This event was reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), operation prohibited by Technical Specification.

9709170085 970912
PDR ADOCK 05000237
S PDR

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)	
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2		05000237		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
				97	-- 006 --
				REVISION NUMBER	PAGE (3)
				01	2 OF 5

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - boiling water reactor - 2527 MWt rated core thermal power.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX] and are obtained from IEEE Standard 805-1984, IEEE Recommendation Practice for System Identification in Nuclear Power Plants and Related Facilities.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

SRO Absent From the Main Control Room Due to Loss of Focus on Interim Duties.

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 2 (3) Event Date: February 26, 1997 Event Time: 1945
 Reactor Mode: 1 (1) Mode Name: Run (Run) Power Level: 099 (067)
 Reactor Coolant System Pressure: 1000 psig (992 psig)

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During 1996, Dresden prepared for the implementation of the Technical Specification Upgrade Project (TSUP) implementation, revising station procedures and providing training to assure the smooth transition to the Upgraded Tech Specs. As a result of Unit outages, concurrent with the station focus for continued cultural improvement, implementation was deferred until January 13, 1997. About January 3, 1997 (prior to TSUP implementation), a Senior Licensed individual identified a discrepancy on the shift manning requirements stated in the Upgraded Technical Specifications as compared to the current Tech Specs. The Current Technical Specifications, Table 6.1.1, stated that two Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) were to be within the Control Room, but one was able to leave the Control Room for periods up to ten minutes as long as the other remained within the Control Room. The Upgraded Technical Specifications changed from a table format to a narrative explanation of the Control Room manning requirement, T.S. 6.2.B, but the change referenced "Unit" Staffing rather than "Control Room" staffing. Regulatory Assurance was contacted and confirmed that TSUP did require two SRO's within the Control Room but added that it was not a deliberate action to increase the number of required SROs above the requirements of 10 CFR 50.45.m. Regulatory Assurance stated that if Operations requested, amendment of the requirement would be sought after completion of TSUP implementation. With the upcoming requirement for two SROs within the Control Room as long as fuel was present in the reactors, Operations utilized the Operations Daily Orders to increase awareness of this requirement. On January 13, 1997, TSUP implementation occurred at Dresden Station.

NRC FORM-366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95							
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.							
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2		05000237	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>YEAR</td> <td>SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</td> <td>REVISION NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>97</td> <td>-- 006 --</td> <td>01</td> </tr> </table>		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	97	-- 006 --	01	3 OF 5
YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER									
97	-- 006 --	01									

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

On February 26, 1997 at approximately 1900 hours, the Unit 3 Unit Supervisor [Licensed Senior Reactor Operator] made a request to the Out Of Service (OOS) Supervisor [Licensed Senior Reactor Operator] to enter the Control Room to provide him a temporary relief. The Unit 3 Unit Supervisor required the temporary relief to attend a previously scheduled meeting with the Operations Manager. The OOS Supervisor agreed to provide relief and take command as the Unit 3 Control Room Senior Licensed Operator. The OOS Supervisor entered the Control Room at approximately 1926 hours and upon completion of turnover activities, advised the NSO's that he was the Unit Supervisor in command of Unit 3. During this period of relief, a discussion was held in the Control Room with the Shift Manager, Unit 2 Unit Supervisor and the Unit 3 OOS Supervisor in relief. The discussion was related to operability concerns involving an Instrument Maintenance (IM) procedure referencing Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Select Logic. Their discussion concluded with the determination that the operability concern would require ENS notification. The Shift Manager and the Unit 3 Unit Supervisor in relief stepped away from the Center Desk to review IM procedures and drawings related to their concerns. The Unit 3 Unit Supervisor in relief advised the Shift Manager that he would be able to locate other needed source documents which would provide additional guidance relative to their concerns. These documents were located in the Central File office. In agreement that these documents would be needed to resolve their questions, the Unit 3 Unit Supervisor in relief and the Shift Manager proceeded to exit the Control Room at approximately 1945 hours. By the Supervisor's action of exiting the Control Room, this left only one Supervisors (SRO) in the Control Room, contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.B.2.

In response to the operability concerns, the Unit 2 Supervisor was about to initiate the ENS notification when he realized that the Unit 3 Unit Supervisor in relief had exited the Control Room and immediately contacted the Work Execution Center (WEC) to locate the SRO. The Unit 3 Unit Supervisor in relief answered the phone call from the WEC and as a result of their conversation recognized that his exit from the Control Room placed the station in violation of the TSUP shift manning requirements. He immediately returned to the Control Room, with the total duration for Technical Specification non-compliance was less than 6 minutes. The Shift Manager was notified of this event.

This event is in violation of the Technical Specification 6.2.B.2, which requires that one SRO remain in the MCR for each unit when one or more of the operating units is in operating mode(s) 1,2,3 or 4.

This event is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), operations prohibited by Technical Specifications.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The Primary cause was determined to be the OOS Supervisor losing focus to his interim responsibilities (NRC Cause Code A, Personnel Error), during the performance of SRO duties within the Main Control Room. His action of exiting the Control Room to obtain documents for resolution of an operability concern directly resulted in noncompliance to Technical Specification 6.2.B.2.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95							
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.							
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2		05000237	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>YEAR</td> <td>SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</td> <td>REVISION NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>97</td> <td>-- 006 --</td> <td>01</td> </tr> </table>		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	97	-- 006 --	01	4 OF 5
YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER									
97	-- 006 --	01									

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Contributing to the event was the Shift Manager's failure to utilize a questioning attitude to assure adequate Control Room staffing upon exiting with the OOS Supervisor. With the Shift Manager having the ultimate responsibility for Station compliance to the Technical Specifications, his action of exiting the Control Room with the OOS Supervisor, without challenging him, placed the Shift Manager in non-compliance with Departmental Standards.

Also contributing to this event is the change in the technical requirement between the Technical Specifications and the Upgraded Technical Specifications, which created manning requirements beyond that stated in 10 CFR 50.54.m, in conjunction with the identified lack of training on the Upgraded Technical Specifications, Section 6. Operations identified the increased manning requirement during a review of the Technical Specifications, which under other conditions could have resulted in the noncompliance going unnoticed.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

This event had minimal effect on plant or public safety since during the short absence of a licensed SRO from the MCR, the other Unit SRO remained available within the Control Room to perform SRO related duties. Additionally, the Control Room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54.m were met during this event.

E.1. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. Counseling of the involved individual has been performed. The Supervisor now understands his responsibility to adequately self check his actions when performing duties. Operations has taken the appropriate disciplinary actions in accordance with station guidance. (Complete)
2. Regulatory Assurance will hold discussions with all Licensed Operations personnel during an upcoming Operations Continuing Training cycle. This discussion will increase Operator awareness to the content of Technical Specification Section 6 content by performance of a comparison between the previous Technical Specifications and the Upgraded Technical Specifications. (2371809700601)
3. Regulatory Assurance will pursue an amendment of the Upgraded Technical Specifications to correct the station manning requirements, making them consistent with 10 CFR 50.54.m. (2371809700602)
4. The Operations Manager performed counseling of the Shift Manager to assure he understands his responsibility to assure Technical Specification compliance. The Operations Manager took the appropriate actions in accordance with station guidance. (Completed)

E.2. The following corrective actions have been cancelled:

1. Security will implement a change to the Security Badge Control system, preventing any SRO from exiting the Main Control Room when manning levels decrease to 2 active SRO within the Main Control Room.

NRC FORM-366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95							
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.							
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)							
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2		05000237		<table border="1"> <tr> <td>YEAR</td> <td>SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</td> <td>REVISION NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>97</td> <td>-- 006 --</td> <td>01</td> </tr> </table>		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	97	-- 006 --	01
YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER									
97	-- 006 --	01									
				PAGE (3)							
				5 OF 5							

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

2. Operations will identify and implement the appropriate process to ensure that Security's listing of active SROs, qualified to perform Unit Supervisor duties, is updated quarterly.

The cancelled corrective actions from the February 1997 event were aimed at assuring Technical Specification manning compliance through Control Room access control, but the complexity of the controls delayed implementation, permitting recurrence of the event. New corrective actions which can be implemented in a timely manner are described in LER 97-014/05000237.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

<u>LER/Docket Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
95-007/05000237	SRO Absent From the Main Control Room Due to Judgement Error in Badge Usage.

This event was found to differ in the methodology which resulted in the non-compliance to the Control Room manning requirement. For this event, the individual did not utilize his security badge with the intent of exiting the Control Room, instead he opened the door to pass station documents to Work Execution Center personnel. Personnel from this event remained cognizant of their Control Room responsibilities at all times, but having utilized their security badge to attain successful and documented Control Room exit, Dresden decided to (conservatively) report the event.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Not applicable.