

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000249

PAGE (3)
1 OF 7

TITLE (4)
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Instrumentation and Auxiliary Equipment Problems

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	02	96	96	015	00	10	31	96	None	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)				
		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71(b)
		20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
POWER LEVEL (10)	84	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(4)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Douglas S. Smith, System Engineer Ext. 3087	(815) 942-2920

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 2, 1996, at 1315, with Unit 3 in the Run Mode at 84% rated core thermal power the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was placed in a planned 7 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) per Technical Specification 3.5.C.2.a for the performance of HPCI system testing. During performance of the testing, the HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector indication exceeded 120 degrees F and the HPCI system was declared inoperable as required by Dresden Operating Surveillance Procedure (DOS) 2300-03 "High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operability Verification." Operations personnel verified there were no steam leaks or other adverse conditions contributing to the high temperature indication and the testing was safely completed. While preparing to shut down the HPCI system, it was noted that the auxiliary oil pump (AOP) was not operating. The AOP tripped off during the HPCI system warm fast initiation test. The AOP was started manually from the control room and the HPCI turbine was shut down. While returning the HPCI system to a standby lineup the emergency oil pump (EOP) failed to start remotely from the control room or locally. Based upon all three problems, the HPCI system remained inoperable and an ENS event notification was made at 1651 on October 2, 1996. Corrective actions included repair of the problems. The safety significance was minimal.

9611130461 961031
PDR ADOCK 05000249
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	05000249	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 7
		96	-- 015 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - boiling water reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX] and are obtained from IEEE Standard 805-1984, IEEE Recommendation Practice for System Identification in Nuclear Power Plants and Related Facilities.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

High Pressure Coolant Injection system inoperable due to instrumentation and auxiliary equipment problems.

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3 Event Date: 10/02/96 Event Time: 1330
 Reactor Mode: N Mode Name: Run Power Level: 84%
 Reactor Coolant System Pressure: 998 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Notification of the event was performed pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) at 1751 (EDT) on October 2, 1996 through Emergency Notification System (ENS) number 31083.

On October 2, 1996, at 1315, with Unit 3 in the Run Mode at 84% rated core thermal power the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] system was placed in a planned 7 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) per Technical Specification 3.5.C.2.a. This was for the performance of HPCI system warm fast initiation testing in accordance with Dresden Operating Surveillance Procedure (DOS) 2300-03 "High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operability Verification." At approximately 1330, during performance of the testing, the HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) indication exceeded 120 degrees F on control room temperature recorder TR 3-1631-01 (Steam Leak Detection Recorder). Step G.7 of DOS 2300-03 requires that the HPCI system be declared inoperable if this or any one of three other HPCI room area detectors exceed 120 degrees F. Operations personnel verified there were no steam leaks or other adverse conditions contributing to the high temperature indication and the testing was safely completed. A maximum temperature of 122.6 degrees F was reached at this detector during the test while the other 3 HPCI room area detectors reached a maximum of approximately 95 degrees F.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	05000249	96	-- 015 --	00	3 OF 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

At 1345 while preparing to secure the HPCI system, the HPCI auxiliary oil pump (AOP) was not operating as required. The AOP normally continues to run once the HPCI turbine is at normal operating speed and oil is being supplied by the turbine driven lube oil pump. The AOP apparently tripped off during the HPCI system warm fast initiation test. The AOP was started manually from the control room and the HPCI turbine shut down was completed.

At approximately 1400 while returning the HPCI system to a standby lineup the emergency oil pump (EOP) failed to start remotely from the control room or locally. The EOP breaker thermal overload button was reset and had no impact on the inability to start the EOP. HPCI turbine cooldown was completed using the AOP per Dresden Operating Procedure (DOP) 2300-02 "HPCI System Turning Gear Operation."

Following completion of the HPCI system testing, operations personnel measured the local area temperature in the HPCI room and verified that the HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) indication was indicating correctly. Following completion of the HPCI turbine cooldown, an unsuccessful attempt was made to start the EOP automatically by securing the AOP. Based upon (1) the HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) indication exceeding 120 degrees F, (2) the AOP malfunctioning during the HPCI testing, and (3) the inability to start the EOP, the HPCI system was considered inoperable and an ENS event notification was made at 1651 on October 2, 1996.

The Unit 3 HPCI system satisfactorily completed a flow test at rated pressure and a warm fast initiation test per DOS 2300-03 on October 4, 1996. Following testing, the Unit 3 HPCI system was declared operable at 1315 and the LCO was exited. The total LCO time was 48 hours.

No other maintenance activities or operations were in progress at this time that are related to this event. No inoperable structures, systems, or components contributed to the cause of this event.

HPCI Room Temperature Detector Discussion

Subsequent investigation of the high temperature indication on the HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) revealed that the detector was located in close proximity to the HPCI turbine casing, thereby giving an inaccurate representation of the true ambient conditions in the HPCI room. A review of previous HPCI surveillances showed this detector reached approximately 119 degrees F. An Engineering Request (ER #9604426) has been initiated to relocate the temperature detector to a more suitable location.

Review of DOS 2300-03 revealed that the requirement in step G.7 to declare HPCI inoperable if "any" of the four HPCI room area detectors indicate greater than 120 degrees F is based on recommendations in Chron Letter #198404 (ECCS Room Cooler Operability Requirements Based On The NFS Room Cooler Studies; dated 2/3/93) stating that the ambient temperature in the HPCI room must be maintained below 130 degrees F in order to meet room cooler operability requirements. Step G.7 of DOS 2300-03 has been revised to require declaring HPCI inoperable if the "average" of the four HPCI room area detectors exceeds 120 degrees F.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3		05000249	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
			96	-- 015 --	00
					4 OF 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Auxiliary Oil Pump Discussion

Based on a review of HPCI system functional requirements and Dresden Instrument Surveillance Procedure (DIS) 2300-13 "HPCI Turbine Lubrication System Pressure Switches Calibration," it was determined that the AOP tripped off as a result of HPCI lube oil system pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4 (HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Start Permissive and Trip) opening. Pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4 was set to open and trip the auxiliary lube oil pump when the lube oil system low pressure header reaches between 73.0 to 77.0 psig. This pressure switch's original function was to shut off the auxiliary oil pump once the HPCI turbine was up to rated speed and lube oil pressure was being supplied by the turbine driven pump. The design of the HPCI lube oil system has since been changed to permit the AOP to run continuously during HPCI system operation. Therefore, the AOP was expected to continue running throughout the warm fast initiation testing. Since the HPCI lube oil system low pressure header is maintained at 68 to 72 psig by a modulating relief valve, having PS 3-2303-PS4 set to open at 73.0 to 77.0 psig increasing lube oil pressure resulted in the AOP tripping due to normal lube oil system pressure surges from the turbine driven oil pump while the HPCI turbine was coming up to and stabilizing at rated speed during the HPCI system warm fast initiation test. Further investigation revealed that PS 3-2303-PS4 had recently been calibrated and was reset from an "as found" opening pressure of 86 psig back to 76.0 psig as required, thereby explaining why this problem was not experienced during previous HPCI surveillances.

It was noted that the corresponding Unit 2 pressure switch PS 2-2303-PS4 was set to open at a higher pressure of 93 to 97 psig increasing by DIS 2300-13. A review of the change history for DIS 2300-13 revealed that the difference between the Unit 2 and Unit 3 setpoints was the result of an administrative oversight in 1992 while revising DIS 2300-13. In January of 1992 a Setpoint Change was made to Unit 3's PS 3-2303-PS4, raising its setpoint to open at 73.0 to 77.0 psig increasing and to close at 64.0 to 68.0 psig decreasing. This change was made for 250 VDC battery load considerations to ensure that the AOP, which is supplied by the 250 VDC batteries, operated continuously during a HPCI actuation. Following this, in 1992, the pressure of the HPCI lube oil low pressure header for both Unit 2 and Unit 3 was increased to 68 to 72 psig to enhance turbine control, since the low pressure header supplies oil to the various operating cylinders and pilot valves in the turbine's speed governor and control system. In December of 1992 a Setpoint Change was made to Unit 2's PS 2-2303-PS4 as a result of the increase in the pressure of the HPCI lube oil low pressure header, raising its setpoint to open at 93.0 to 97.0 psig increasing and to close at 84.0 to 88.0 psig decreasing. This change was made to ensure the AOP operated continuously after increasing the HPCI lube oil low pressure header pressure. The setpoint changes for Unit 2's PS 2-2303-PS4 and Unit 3's PS 3-2303-PS4, although not the same, were incorporated into Revision 04 of DIS 2300-13 in January of 1993. The administrative oversight of not making another setpoint change to Unit 3's PS 3-2303-PS4 prior to revising DIS 2300-13 resulted in the difference in the setpoint of PS 2(3)-2303-PS4 between Unit 2 and Unit 3.

DIS 2300-13 has been revised to change the setpoint of Unit 3's PS 3-2303-PS4 to open at 93.0 to 97.0 psig increasing and to close at 84.0 to 88.0 psig decreasing, and PS 3-2303-PS4 has been reset to this new setpoint.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3		05000249	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
			96	-- 015 --	00
					5 OF 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Emergency Oil Pump Discussion

On October 2, 1996, at approximately 1630 following identification of the inability to start the EOP, the EOP local start/stop push buttons were exercised followed by opening, inspecting, and closing the EOP breaker, and again resetting the breaker thermal overload. The inspection revealed no problems. Following this the EOP was successfully started remotely from the control room several times to verify repeatability.

Additional inspections and troubleshooting were performed on the EOP breaker and documented on Engineering Operational Problem Response/Troubleshooting Plan (EOPR) #96-03-23-240. Based on a review of the EOP control schematics, the breaker timer relay contacts are the most likely components common to both the local and control room control circuits whose malfunction could have contributed to the failure to start the EOP. The EOP breaker timer relay, its contacts and connections were inspected with no problems noted and the EOP was operated while monitoring the motor current with a clamp ammeter to verify no motor overload condition existed. Since no definitive problem was identified following the inability to start the EOP, the EOP will be operated once a week for approximately 10 minutes for a one month period to ensure a problem does not still exist with the EOP. This operational surveillance of the EOP has been completed successfully twice since this event.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

- C.1 The HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) indication exceeding 120 degrees F and rendering the HPCI system inoperable was caused by (1) the detector being installed in a location not representative of true ambient conditions, and (2) the requirement in DOS 2300-03 to declare HPCI inoperable when "any" detector exceeds 120 degrees F not effectively meeting the requirements of the source document from which the requirement originated. These causes are classified as an installation deficiency (NRC Cause Code B) and a defective procedure (NRC Cause Code D).
- C.2 The AOP tripping off during the warm fast initiation test was caused by pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4 (HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Start Permissive and Trip) being set too low as a result of procedure DIS 2300-13 having an incorrect setpoint. The procedure contained the incorrect setpoint due to an administrative personnel error (NRC Cause Code A) during the implementation of a previous revision to the procedure.
- C.3 The inability to start the EOP is suspected to have been caused by a malfunction of the EOP breaker timer relay. Although this was not proven, steps have been taken to monitor operation of the EOP more frequently prior to the next HPCI surveillance. This cause is considered an equipment malfunction (NRC Cause Code X).
- C.4 The personnel error that led to procedure DIS 2300-13 being revised with an incorrect setpoint for pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4 was due to a breakdown in configuration management (NRC Cause Code E).

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3		05000249	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
			96	-- 015 --	00
					6 OF 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The HPCI Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) indication exceeding 120° F was not a true indication of HPCI room ambient temperature and therefore did not impact the HPCI room cooler or HPCI system operability. The AOP functioned as necessary upon HPCI automatic initiation during the warm fast initiation test. The fact that the AOP tripped off once the turbine was up to speed does not have any impact on the HPCI system meeting its functional requirements during an accident. Initially, the HPCI system was designed to have the AOP operate this way. Had the HPCI system been required to initiate repetitively during an accident, the AOP would have functioned properly as it did following completion of the initial HPCI surveillance on October 2, 1996. Failure of the EOP to start did not impair the capability of the HPCI system to operate during an accident or the ability to properly cool down the turbine following HPCI system operation since the AOP can be used during turning gear operation per DOP 2300-02. Considering all three problems that contributed to this event and their impact, the HPCI system remained functionally operable throughout this event and would have been capable of performing its safety function. If the event had occurred in a more limiting situation where initiation of HPCI was required, the HPCI system safety function would have been fulfilled.

The HPCI system having remained functionally operable along with the fact that all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems required by Technical Specification 3.5.C.2.a were operable throughout this event makes the safety significance of this event minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

- E.1. ER #9604426 has been initiated to relocate the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Turbine Inlet Area temperature detector (TE 3-2374D) to a more suitable and representative location. (C.1/2491809601501)
- E.2. DOS 2300-03 has been revised to require declaring HPCI inoperable if the "average" of the 4 monitored HPCI room temperature detectors exceeds 120 degrees F. (C.1/Complete)
- E.3. Setpoint Change (SPC) #3-96-102 was completed per Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 11-11 "Setpoint Change Control" to change the setpoint of Pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4 (HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Start Permissive and Trip). Pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4 has been reset to open at 93.0 to 97.0 psig increasing and to close at 84.0 to 88.0 psig decreasing. DIS 2300-13 has been revised to reflect the new setpoint requirement for Pressure switch PS 3-2303-PS4. (C.2/Complete)

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3		05000249	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
			96	-- 015 --	00
					7 OF 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

- E.4. Engineering Operational Problem Response/Troubleshooting Plan (EOPR) #96-03-23-240 was issued documenting the troubleshooting of the EOP. The station work schedule includes operating the Unit 3 HPCI EOP once a week for 10 minutes for a one month period to check the EOP's performance and reliability. Results of this study will be documented in the Nuclear Tracking System. (C.3/2491809601502)
- E.5 A review of the station's configuration management controls will be conducted to ensure that the breakdown in system configuration management that led to procedure DIS 2300-13 "HPCI Turbine Lubrication System Pressure Switches Calibration," being revised with an incorrect setpoint for the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Start Permissive and Trip pressure switch (PS 3-2303-PS4) no longer exists. (C.4/2491809601503)
- F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:
- There have been no previously recorded events similar to this event.
- G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:
- There is no component failure identified with this event; therefore, this section is not applicable.