DRESDEN UNIT 2 CYCLE 15 STARTUP TEST REPORT

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9607250171 960716 PDR ADDCK 05000237 PDR Dresden Unit 2 resumed commercial operation for Cycle 15 on April 25, 1996, following an extended refueling and maintenance outage. The reload fuel for Cycle 15 is comprised of 224 Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) manufactured 9x9-2 fuel bundles and 8 SPC ATRIUM-9B Lead Assemblies. The D2C15 reload is the fifth reload of 9x9-2 fuel for Dresden Unit 2 and the tenth such reload at Dresden Station. Cycle 15 marks the second reload of liner fuel and the first introduction for the ATRIUM-9B fuel design as Lead Assemblies at Dresden.

The startup test program was similar to those performed for previous Unit 2 and Unit 3 beginning-ofcycle startups at Dresden. Various physics tests were performed (shutdown margin, critical eigenvalue comparison, etc.) as well as instrument calibrations (LPRM, TIP, flow instrumentation) as addressed by the Technical Specifications, the Rebaselined Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and previous commitments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As of July 12, 1996, full power operation has not been obtained. Thus the TIP System Symmetry and Total Uncertainty checks have not been completed and will be transmitted as soon as possible after reaching full power operation or within at least 90 days of this report. To date, no unusual conditions were noted during the performance of these tests and results were as expected.

Summaries of the startup tests identified in the Draft Regulatory Guide SC 521-4 on refueling and startup tests for LWR reloads are included per DPR-19 Technical Specification 6.6.A.1. Additional test results are available at the site.

Startup Test No. 1 - Core Verification and Audit

Purpose

The purpose of this test is to visually verify that the fuel is correctly positioned and oriented in the reactor core.

Acceptance Criteria

The as-loaded core must conform to the reference core design used in the licensing analyses. At least one independent party must either participate in the performance of the core verification or review a video recording of the core verification prior to unit startup. Any discrepancies discovered in the loading must be promptly corrected and the affected areas reverified to insure proper core loading prior to unit startup. Conformance to the reference core design will be documented by a permanent core serial number map signed by the audit participants.

Results and Discussion

The Cycle 15 core verification consisted of a core height check performed by the Fuel Handling Department and two video-taped passes over the core viewed by the Station Nuclear Group. The purpose of the height check was to verify proper seating of each fuel bundle in its fuel support piece. The video-taped passes over the core allowed verification of proper assembly orientation and location. On January 31, 1996, the final core verification was completed per DTS 8474¹. The core was verified as being properly loaded and consistent with the Unit 2 Cycle 15 core reload designed by the Nuclear Fuel Services Department of ComEd. This in turn insured that the as-loaded core configuration was consistent with that assumed in the evaluation of the Dresden Unit 2 Cycle 15 Reload Licensing Analyses.

Startup Test No. 2 - Control Rod Operability and Subcriticality Check

Purpose

The purpose of this test is three-fold. First, it insures that no gross local reactivity irregularities exist. Second, it allows verification that each control rod is latched to its control rod drive. Finally, it insures that all control rods and control rod drives are functioning properly.

Acceptance Criteria

The following conditions must be met:

- 1. After the core is fully loaded, the strongest worth control rod will be withdrawn to insure that criticality will not occur. As it is withdrawn, nuclear instrumentation will be monitored to verify subcriticality.
- 2. Each control rod drive will be withdrawn and then checked for overtravel to verify coupling. The control rod drive will then be reinserted. This check verifies that the mobility of the control rod drive is not impaired.
- During control blade movement the process computer or an alternate method will be utilized to time the travel of each control rod drive between notch positions to verify proper withdrawal and insertion times.

Results and Discussion

The single control rod subcriticality demonstration using the strongest worth control rod was successfully completed per DTS 8734 on January 30, 1996². All control rod drive functional tests to demonstrate mobility and proper insertion and withdrawal times were completed successfully.



Purpose

This test performs a gross symmetry check and a detailed statistical uncertainty analysis on the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System.

Acceptance Criteria

For the gross check, the maximum deviation between symmetrically located TIP pairs of LPRM strings should be less than 25%. For the statistical check, the calculated X^2 of the integrated TIP responses should be less than 34.81.

NOTE: One data set may be used to meet the above criteria. If either criteria is not met, the instrumentation and data processing system should be checked for any problems that could lead to asymmetries. If the problem persists, the core management organization should be consulted to provide assurance that the larger than expected TIP asymmetries do not significantly affect core monitoring calculations.

Results and Discussion

The results of the test will be transmitted as a supplement after full power operation is achieved.

Startup Test No. 4 - Initial Criticality Comparison

Purpose

This test is used to perform a critical eigenvalue comparison. This is accomplished by comparing the predicted critical control rod pattern to the actual control rod pattern at the point of initial criticality and adjusting for reactor period.

Acceptance Criteria

The actual cold critical rod pattern must be within 1.0% $\Delta k/k$ of the predicted control rod pattern. If the difference is greater than 1.0% $\Delta k/k$ then the Core Management Organization must be promptly notified to investigate the discrepancy. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must be notified within 24 hours.

Results and Discussion

Unit 2 was initially brought critical on April 15, 1996 at 0908 hours utilizing an A-2 sequence. The moderator temperature was 137 °F and the reactor period was 194 seconds. The critical prediction and rod worths were calculated by Nuclear Fuel Services using the MICROBURN code with an assumed moderator temperature of 170 °F³. After correcting for reactor period, the actual critical was found to be within 1.0% $\Delta k/k$ of the predicted critical.

 Table 4-1 Initial Criticality Comparison Calculations

Critical Information	Value
predicted critical k _{eff}	1.0090 ∆k/k ³
k _{eff} at time of criticality with 194 second period	1.0079 ∆k/k ⁴
correction to ∞ period from 194 second period	0.000340702 ∆k/k ³
actual k_{eff} with ∞ period	1.0076 ∆k/k ⁵
predicted k _{eff} - actual k _{eff}	0.0014 ∆k/k ⁵
percent difference	0.14 %∆k/k ⁵

1	Completed per DTS 8474, "Core Verification".
2	Completed per DTS 8734, "Unit 2(3) Single Control Rod
S	ubcriticality Demonstration".
3	Documented in "Dresden 2 Cycle 15 Cycle Management Report,
R	evision 1" NFS:BND:95-143.
4	Completed per DTS 8273, "Reactor Criticals".
5	Completed per DTS 8141, "Initial Criticality Comparison"