L-2017-123
June 29, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Special Report – Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps Inoperable

In accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) 3.7.1.6, Actions b.2 and d, and TS 6.9.2, Florida Power & Light Company provides the attached Special Report.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please contact the undersigned at 305-246-6698.

Sincerely,

Mitchell Guth
Turkey Point Licensing Manager

Attachment

cc: Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

SPECIAL REPORT

Purpose

This special report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.6, Standby Feedwater System, Actions b.2 and d, due to two Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SSGFPs) being inoperable for greater than 24 hours.

Required Action b of TS 3.7.1.6 states:

> "With both Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps inoperable, restore at least one pump to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or:
>
> 1. Notify the NRC within the following 4 hours, and provide cause for the inoperability and plans to restore pump(s) to OPERABLE status and,
>
> 2. Submit a SPECIAL REPORT per 3.7.1.6d."

Required Action d of TS 3.7.1.6 states:

> If a SPECIAL REPORT is required per the above specifications submit a report describing the cause of the inoperability, action taken and a schedule for restoration within 30 days in accordance with 6.9.2.

This special report is being transmitted in accordance with these requirements.

Event and Action Taken

The Standby Feedwater System consists of commercial grade components designed and constructed to industry and Florida Power & Light Company standards for outdoor service conditions. The Standby Feedwater System is a backup to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System in the event the AFW System does not function properly. The system is normally isolated and would be manually started, aligned, and controlled by an operator when needed.

Two SSGFPs are provided as a common system for Units 3 and 4. The 'A' pump is electric-driven and is powered from a non-safety related power source. In the event of a coincident loss of offsite power, the 'B' pump is diesel-driven and can be started and operated independent of the availability of on-site or off-site power. The Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) provides the makeup water inventory for the SSGFPs.

On June 5, 2017 at approximately 1751 hours, with Units 3 and 4 operating at approximately 100%

power, the two SSGFPs were removed from service for pre-planned valve repairs. The maintenance activity required isolating the common discharge piping from both pumps and the suction piping from the DWST until the repairs were completed. A repair to the radiator of the diesel-driven 'B' pump was also pre-planned for the outage. The valve and radiator repairs were scheduled to exceed 24 hours.

The four hour notification to the NRC required by TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 was made on June 6, 2017 in Event Notification 52791.

Cause

The primary cause of the SSGFPs being inoperable for greater than 24 hours was pre-planned maintenance on system valves that required isolation of the common discharge flow path from both pumps and the common suction flow path from the DWST, and repair to the 'B' pump radiator.

Schedule for Restoration

The 'A' SSGFP was restored to operable status on June 10, 2017 at approximately 1851 hours. The 'B' SSGFP was restored to operable status on June 17, 2017 at approximately 2250 hours.