Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
6500 North Dresden Road
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

April 19, 1994

GFSLTR 94-0133

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 94-009, Docket 50-237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(V).

Sincerely,

Gary F. Spedl
Station Manager
Dresden Station

GFS/cfq

Enclosure

cc: J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000237	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Manually Isolated Due To Operator Action.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	30	94	94	-- 009 --	00	04	22	94	None	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
T. Theesfeld Ext. 3572	(815) 942-2920

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 1355 on March 30, 1994, a report of a possible leak on the Unit 2 Isolation Condenser inlet line was received in the Unit 2 Control Room. Operations immediately isolated the Isolation Condenser [BL]. Further investigation revealed the Isolation Condenser was not the source of the leak and was capable of performing its design function. The removal of the Isolation Condenser from service is reportable per the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) statement "Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat". The Operators acted in a prudent and conservative manner during the conduct of this event and an error or malfunction of a safety system did not occur.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Manually Isolated Due To Operator Action.

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 2 Event Date: March 30, 1994 Event Time: 1355

Reactor Mode: OPERATING Mode Name: RUN Power Level: 100

Reactor Coolant System Pressure: 0995 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 1355 on March 30, 1994, the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor while making his rounds discovered a possible water leak on the Unit 2 Isolation Condenser [BL], he notified the Unit 2 Control Room and recommended isolating the Isolation Condenser. The Control Room Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) isolated the Isolation Condenser by placing the 1301-1 valve Control Switch in Pull-To-Lock (PTL) and entered Technical Specification (TS) 7 day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.5.E.2. Operations personnel were dispatched to the scene to determine the exact source and severity of the leak. Investigation proved the leak to be coming from a leaking Shield Water Tank on the floor above and not from the Isolation Condenser. The Isolation Condenser was returned to service at 1413 and the LCO was exited. The source of the leakage was stopped and cleanup efforts were initiated. It was determined that placing the 1301-1 valve Control Switch in PTL and removing the automatic actuation feature from the Isolation Condenser is reportable.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) which requires the reporting of any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (B) Remove residual heat.

This was conservative action taken in response to a possible safety system failure and is considered a proper response to a potential safety significant event.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The purpose of the Isolation Condenser is to control reactor pressure and/or remove decay heat from the reactor inventory during periods when the normal heat sink is unavailable. The Isolation Condenser can be manually or automatically initiated. Technical Specification allows the Isolation Condenser to be inoperable for up to seven days provided that all active components of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system remain operable. HPCI was available and its status remained unchanged during the short period of time the Isolation Condenser was unavailable. In addition, the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) in conjunction with the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray (CS) systems were available. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Source of leak was discovered, leak isolated and cleanup initiated.

Isolation Condenser was restored to normal lineup at 1413 and Technical Specification LCO 3.5.E.2 was exited.

This action was deemed appropriate and conservative, operator error was not considered to have occurred.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

A computer search did not reveal any previous applicable occurrences.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable