



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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March 15, 1994

GFSLTR 94-0078

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 88-014, Docket 50-249.
This revised report is being submitted to provide an update on
the corrective action previously stated.

Gary P. Spedl
Station Manager
Dresden Station

GFS/cfq

Enclosure

cc: J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

210059

9403210248 940315
PDR ADOCK 05000249
S PDR

JEJ

DAP FORM 02-08C
 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO LER

DVR NO.				SYSTEM AFFECTED	
STA	UNIT	YEAR	NO.		
D - 12	- 3	- 88	- 014		
<u>PART 1</u>			<u>TITLE OF EVENT</u>		
Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolations Due to a Procedure Deficiency			<u>OCCURRED</u>		
			6/8/88	2135	
			DATE	TIME	
<u>REASON FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT</u>					
This revised report is being submitted to provide an update on the corrective action previously stated.					
<u>PART 2</u>					
ACCEPTANCE BY STATION REVIEW					
DATE					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION					
			<u>3/5/94</u>	<u>3/16/94</u>	<u>3-16-94</u>
			<u>Jimmy Spall</u>	<u>3-17-94</u>	
			STATION MANAGER	DATE	

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1)				Docket Number (2)				Page (3)			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3				0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9				1	of	0	5

Title (4)
Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolations Due to a Procedure Deficiency

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)													
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)													
0	6	0	8	8	8	0	1	4	0	1	0	7	0	5	8	8	N/A						
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIRMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					

POWER LEVEL (10)	0	0	0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
				20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii) (A)	
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii) (B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME						TELEPHONE NUMBER										
Ismael Rivera, System Engineering						Ext. 2549										
						AREA CODE										
						8	1	5	9	4	2	-	2	9	2	0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS										
X	E	C	M	C	B	D	G	O	B	O	Y								

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				Expected Submission Date (15)		Month	Day	Year
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				X	NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 8, 1988 at 2135 hours, with Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, while performing Dresden Operating Surveillance (DOS) 6600-3, Bus Undervoltage and ECCS Integrated Functional Test for 2/3 Diesel Generator (Unit 3 test only), an unplanned Primary Containment Group II and Group III Isolation signal occurred. The root cause has been determined to be a procedure deficiency. DOS 6600-3 did not state the a Group II and Group III Isolation would occur during the course of the procedure. The isolations occurred as designed; therefore, the event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance. DOS 6600-3 was revised to state that the isolation would be received, and the surveillance was successfully performed on June 9, 1988. The last unplanned Primary Containment Group II and III Isolation occurred on May 5, 1988 as reported by LER 88-009 on Docket 050-249.

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		Year		Sequential Number		Revision Number									
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	8	8	--	0	1	4	--	0	1	0	2	OF	0	5

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor-2527 Mwt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolations Due to a Procedure Deficiency

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3 Event Date: June 8, 1988 Event Time: 2135 hrs.

Reactor Mode: N Mode Name: Shutdown Power Level: 0%

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 0 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On June 8, 1988 at 2135 hours with Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, while performing Dresden Operating Surveillance (DOS) 6600-3, Bus Undervoltage and ECCS Integrated Functional Test for 2/3 Diesel Generator (Unit 3 test only), an unplanned Primary Containment Group II and Group III Isolation signal occurred. When the Transformer 32 to Bus 33 air circuit breaker [EA] was opened Bus 35 [ED] de-energized but was not automatically transferred to Bus 36 as designed (refer to Figure 1). The 3C Instrument Air Compressor [LD] also tripped. The Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) attempted to close the Bus 36 to Bus 35 breaker with the control switch but the breaker did not close. The control switch was taken to the open position and when allowed to spring return to normal, the Bus 36 to Bus 35 breaker automatically closed. In accordance with DOS 6600-3 Busses 33 and 33-1 were to be re-energized from Transformer 32 but when Bus 33-1 was energized, a breaker trip indication was received when the control switch was released. The breaker closed on the second attempt and Bus 33-1 was re-energized. At this time it was discovered that a full Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolation [JE] had occurred during the evolution. The A Drywell Radiation Monitor [IL] was found High High and the Channel 4, 5, and 6 Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) [IG] had also sealed in High High. The expected half scram of Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JE] channel B and the Group II and Group III isolations were reset and the 3C Instrument Air Compressor restarted. The execution of DOS 6600-3 was suspended and an investigation into the cause of the event was initiated. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of the event at 2328 hours in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50.72(b)(2)(ii).

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted to comply with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) which requires the reporting of any unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. The 3C Instrument Air Compressor trip was caused by the loss of control power when MCC 38-2 de-energized. The compressor power feed is from Bus 37, which remained energized during the event. When compressor control power was lost, a relay dropped out activating an electrical interlock which tripped the compressor's feed breaker at

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Bus 37. The Bus 36 to Bus 35 tie breaker failed to close due to dirty contacts on the control switch. When the switch was exercised the contacts were sufficiently cleaned enabling the breaker to automatically close through the undervoltage logic. The failure of the Bus 33 to Bus 33-1 breakers is believed to have been caused by the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) not holding the control switch in the close position for a sufficient length of time. Two breakers are required to close and the undervoltage relays have to reset prior to allowing the control switch to spring return to normal or the breakers will trip again. The Group II isolation was caused by the A Drywell Radiation Monitor. The monitor's power supply is MCC 38-2 which was de-energized. when the monitor was de-energized its trip contacts opened resulting in a group II isolation on Channel A which coupled with the expected Group II or Channel B resulted in the full isolation. The Group III Isolation was caused by the de-energization of the Instrument Bus which lost both its normal supply, MCC 38-2, and its reserve supply, MCC 35-2. This resulted in the de-energization of relays in the Group III logic, thereby resulting in the closure of all Group III valves. The APRM channels failed upscale high high when they lost their power supply, RPS Bus B which was being fed from MC 35-2. The root cause of the unplanned Group II and III Isolations has been determined to be a procedure deficiency as the Group II and Group III Isolations were not identified as occurring during the surveillance. The root cause of the failure of the Bus 36 to Bus 35 tie breaker to close was attributed to dirty control switch contacts.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The reactor was in cold shutdown and there was no work in progress with the capability of draining the reactor vessel. The Unit 3 Diesel Generator [EK] was operable and capable of supplying power to the Division II loads. The B Core Spray [BM] and the C and D LPCI pumps [BO] could have been utilized to inject water into the reactor vessel, had the need arose. The Group II and III Isolations occurred as designed and therefore this event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The control switch for the Bus 35 to Bus 36 breaker was cleaned and the contacts burnished. DOS 6600-3 was revised by a temporary procedure change to state that full Group II and Group III Isolations would be received during the course of the surveillance, and has since been implemented in a permanent procedure change. The surveillance was satisfactorily performed on June 9, 1988.

During the time of this event extensive modifications in the control room were underway per Dresden Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) (M12-2/3-86-06). This resulted in an increase of dust and dirt in the control room. Since the completion of the modification no other similar events have occurred. Furthermore, to ensure reliability of the equipment and maintain the control room clean, surveillances have since been in place to replace the ventilation intake air filters quarterly, and for Electrical Maintenance Department (EMD) to clean the control room panels every outage. Therefore, the station has determined that the installation of the passive air filters will not serve a useful purpose. Site Engineering concurs and recommends no further actions be implemented (Chron 0123126).

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER/Docket Numbers

Title

88-009-00/050249

Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolations Due to a Management Deficiency

With Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage an unplanned Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolation occurred while executing an out-of-service for the Analog Trip System (ATS) [JE] panel. The root cause was determined to be a management deficiency for failure to fully implement corrective actions from a previous event.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer

Nomenclature

Model Number

Mfg. Part Number

General Electric

480V Bus Tie 35-36
A.C.B. 252-3536

Type "SBM" Pistol
Grip Handle

N/A

An industry wide NPRDS data base search revealed 16 similar events involving this type of switch.

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


Figure 1

Unit 3 Electrical Distribution Diagram

- TR = transformer
- DG = diesel generator
- = circuit breaker