Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
6500 North Dresden Road
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

January 12, 1994

GFSLTR 94-0018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington; D. C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 93-019, Docket 50249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 73(A)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

for 1-12-94

Gary F. Spedl
Station Manager
Dresden Station

GFS/cfq

Enclosure

cc: J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2)	Page (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	of 0 3

Title (4)

Auto Closure of the HPCI Isolation Valve 3-2301-4 Due to Personnel Error

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
1 2	1 4	9 3	9 3	--- 0 1 9	--- 0 0	0 1	1 3	9 4	N/A	
									N/A	

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIRMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 8 5		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii) (A)			
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Mark A. Persico, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor Ext. 2387	AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
	Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 14, 1993 at 2255 hours, with Unit 3 at 85% power an "A" Electrical Maintenance (EM) worker was reinstalling a cover on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] Auto Isolation Relay, (3-2330-124), located in the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) 903-39 panel and inadvertently operated the relay. After the cover was installed, the Unit Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) phoned the AEER to inform the Electrical Maintenance personnel that the high Pressure Coolant Injection Valve (3-2301-4) had closed. After discussion between the Shift Engineer, "A" EM worker and HPCI System Engineer the valve was reopened.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor-2527 MWt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Auto Closure of the HPCI Isolation Valve 3-2301-4 Due to Personnel Error

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3 Event Date: 12/14/93 Event Time: 2255

Reactor Mode: Mode Name: Run Power Level: 85%

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure:

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On December 14, 1993 at 2255 hours, with Unit 3 at 85% power an "A" Electrical Maintenance (EM) worker was reinstalling a cover on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] Auto Isolation Relay, (3-2330-124), located in the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) 903-39 panel and inadvertently operated the relay. After the cover was installed, the Unit Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) phoned the AEER to inform the Electrical Maintenance personnel that the high Pressure Coolant Injection Valve (3-2301-4) had closed. After discussion between the Shift Engineer, "A" EM worker and HPCI System Engineer the valve was reopened.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

An "A" Electrical Maintenance worker and HPCI System Engineer were installing a modification on the U-3 HPCI Logic. The negative wire on the coil of relay 2330-124, which goes to the negative side of the coil on the new relay TGE in panel 903-39, was taut. When the cover was being replaced it was hard to install the cover. When this was discovered the negative wire on the coil of relay 2330-124 was repositioned so that the cover could be reinstalled. When the cover was reinstalled on Relay 2330-124 the relay was inadvertently operated. The EM worker did not feel or hear the relay operate.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

In this event MO3-2301-4, HPCI Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve, automatically closed when relay 3-2330-124, HPCI Isolation relay was bumped in AEER Panel 903-39. At the time HPCI was OOS to install NWR 13236, HPCI Turning Gear Upgrade in AEER Panel 903-39. During the reinstallation of the relay cover for 3-2330-124 the cover contacted and closed isolation contacts for MO3-2301-4. The control room operator was aware of the work in the AEER and contacted the Electrical Maintenance Department to determine the validity of the signal. The valve was reopened and the HPCI Steam inlet piping was pressurized. Therefore, since the HPCI system was OOS for repairs and primary containment was unaffected by this event the safety significance is minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

This event will be tailgated to appropriate Electrical Maintenance Department personnel (craft and First Line Supervisor). The proper method for replacing any type of relay cover will be emphasized.

System Engineering and Operations will review the Out-of-Service to determine if a modification of the Out-of-Service can prevent recurrence during future HPCI logic work.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER/Docket Numbers	Title
2-92-33/05000237	Automatic Start of 2/3 Diesel Generator

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

None.