Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

June 18, 1993

CWS PMLTR 93-0233

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Clerk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 93-015, Docket 050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 73(a)(2)(iv).

for 6-18-93
Charles W. Schroeder
Station Manager
Dresden Station

CWS/SS:slb

Enclosure

cc: J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

250070

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2)	Page (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	1 of 0 3

Title (4)

Unit 2 Reactor Scram, Group 2 and Group 3 Isolation, While Shutdown Due to Instrumentation Valving Error

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 5	2 7	9 3	9 3	0 1 5	0 0	0 6	1 8	9 3	N/A	
									N/A	

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIRMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)												
	0	0	0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
					20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
					20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)	
					20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii) (A)			
					20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
					20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Steven R. Stiles, Instrument Maintenance Staff Engineer Ext. 3528	AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
	Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0149 hours on May 27, 1993, with Unit 2 in Refuel, the Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) was completing Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 1500-01, Reactor Low Pressure (350 psig) ECCS Permissive (returning Pressure Switch 2-263-52A to service), when an inadvertent Reactor Scram, Group 2, and Group 3 occurred. All control rods were fully inserted before the Scram signal was received (no rod motion occurred. All Group 2 and Group 3 isolation valves functioned properly and Standby Gas Treatment started as expected. Reactor Water Cleanup System was restarted at 0153 and Shutdown Cooling was restarted at 0155. Reactor Building Ventilation was started and Standby Gas Treatment secured at 0207. There was no change in Reactor Coolant Temperature while Shutdown Cooling was isolated. PS 2-263-52A has a common sensing line with LT 2-263-57A and LT 2-263-57B, which are the level transmitters for Reactor Vessel Level Scram. Due to a valving error while returning PS 2-263-52A to service, a pressure spike was introduced into the common sensing line which activated LT 2-263-58A and LT-263-58B. Review of records indicates no adverse trend of events of this type while performing instrumentation valving.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor-2527 MWt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Unit 2 Reactor Scram, Group 2 and Group 3 Isolation, While Shutdown Due to Instrumentation Valving Error

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 2 Event Date: May 27, 1993 Event Time: 0149 Hours

Reactor Mode: Mode Name: Refuel Power Level: 0%

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 0149 hours on May 27, 1993, with Unit 2 in Refuel, the Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) was completing Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 1500-01, Reactor Low Pressure (350 PSIG) ECCS Permissive (returning Pressure Switch 2-263-52A to service), when an inadvertent Reactor Scram, Group 2, and Group 3 occurred. All control rods were fully inserted before the Scram signal was received (no rod motion occurred). All Group 2 and Group 3 isolation valves functioned properly and Standby Gas Treatment started as expected. Reactor Water Cleanup System was restarted at 0153 and Shutdown Cooling was restarted at 0155. Reactor Building Ventilation was started and Standby Gas Treatment secured at 0207. There was no change in Reactor Coolant Temperature while Shutdown Cooling was isolated. PS 2-263-52A has a common sensing line with LT 2-263-57A and LT 2-263-57B, which are the level transmitters for Reactor Vessel Level Scram. Due to a valving error while returning PS 2-263-52A to service, a pressure spike was introduced into the common sensing line which activated LT 2-263-58A and LT 2-263-58B.

An Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification was completed at 0300 hours.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires the reporting of any unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation.

The apparent cause of this event has been found to be personnel error. The inadvertent Scram, Group 2, and Group 3 occurred during the performance of DIS 1500-01. After successful calibration of Pressure Switch 2-263-52B, the IMD Technician was to return Pressure Switch 2-263-52A to service. The procedure specifies that the Pressure Switch input pressure (which was at approximately 450 psig) is to be adjusted to Reactor Vessel Pressure (which was at 0 psig) prior to opening the instrument valve. Contrary to this instruction, the IMD Technician attempted to adjust Pressure Switch input pressure to Reactor Vessel Pressure by slowly opening the instrument valve, thereby equalizing pressure via the instrument valve. This resulted in spiking the common sensing line as the instrument valve was opened.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

At the time of the event, Unit 2 was shutdown in the Refuel mode with all rods in. The Scram, Group 2, and Group 3 automatic actions functioned as expected. Reactor Water Cleanup system was restarted at 0153, Shutdown Cooling system was restarted at 0155 and, Reactor Building Ventilation system was restarted and Standby Gas Treatment system secured at 0207. There was no change in Reactor Coolant Temperature while the Shutdown Cooling system was isolated. For these reasons, this event had minimal safety significance.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. The Master Instrument Mechanic will review this event at an upcoming IMD tailgate meeting to emphasize the need for procedural adherence including the relationship of sensitive instruments and common sensing lines.

2. The involved IMD Technician was restricted from performing Control System Technician (CST) duties during the investigation.

3. The Master Instrument Mechanic has counseled the individual IMD Technician regarding this error.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER 12-2-91-142, Inadvertent Closure of Core Spray Minimum Flow Valve 2-1402-38A Due to Procedural Deficiency.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There was no component failure identified with this event; therefore, this section is not applicable.