




Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

March 25, 1993

CWS PMLTR 93-0127

U. S. NRC Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 93-008, Docket 050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).


Charles W. Schroeder
Station Manager
Dresden Station

CWS/GE:slb

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	Docket Number (2) 0 15 10 10 10 12 14 19	Page (3) 1 of 0 3
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Title (4) Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring Element Conduit Support Found Outside Design Criteria Allowables.

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)	
0 2	2 5	9 3	9 3	0 0 8	0 0					0 15 10 10 10 1 1 1	

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
				<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
				Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name George C. Eckert II, Nuclear Engineering Department	Ext. 2796	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 19 12 10
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1730 hours on February 25, 1993, with Unit 3 at 99% power, an engineering evaluation determined that a conduit for Unit 3 Torus Temperature Element TE-3-1641-211, which was missing a support, was operable but outside design criteria allowables. Several preceding events led to the determination that the conduit was outside design allowables. An engineering walkdown was being performed on February 23, 1993 for a modification to the Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring system. During the walkdown it was noticed that the conduit was approximately 7 inches away from the support. The two closest supports on either side of the missing support were a junction box mounted on 3 inch tube steel and the thermowell mounted to the Torus. A Problem Identification Form (PIF) was written by the Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) to document the discrepancy on February 23, 1993. On February 24, 1993, an operability determination was completed by NED which determined that the temperature element be declared operable. When it was determined that the Temperature element was outside design allowables, NED generated another PIF to document the finding and generated a work request to re-support the conduit. The safety significance of this event is minimal since the Temperature Element meets operability requirements. This event is the first occurrence where a Temperature Element conduit was found outside design allowables.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 3	-	0 0 8	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3	

TEXT: Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX).

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Torus Temperature Element Found Outside Design Criteria Allowables Due to Missing Conduit Support

A. Conditions Prior to Event:

Unit(s): 3 Event Date: February 25, 1993 Event Time: 1730 hrs.
 Reactor Mode(s): N Mode Name(s): Run Power Level(s): 99%
 Reactor Coolant System (RES) Pressure(s): 1006 psig.

B. Description of Event:

At 1730 hours on February 25, 1993, with Unit 2 at 0% power for refuel and Unit 3 at 99% power, an engineering evaluation determined that a conduit for Unit 3 Torus Temperature element TE-3-1641-211, which was missing a support, was operable but outside design criteria allowables. Several preceding events led to the determination that the conduit was outside design allowables. An engineering walkdown was being performed on February 23, 1993 for a modification to the Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System. During the walkdown it was noticed that the conduit was approximately 7 inches away from the support. The two closest supports on either side of the missing support were a junction box mounted on 3 inch tube steel and the thermowell mounted to the Torus. A Problem Identification Form (PIF) was written by the Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) to document the discrepancy on February 23, 1993. On February 24, 1993, an operability determination was completed by NED which determined that the Temperature Element be declared operable. When it was determined that the Temperature Element was outside design allowables, NED generated another PIF to document the finding and generated a work request to re-support the conduit. The safety significance of this event is minimal since the Temperature Element meets operability requirements. This event is the first occurrence where a Temperature Element conduit was found outside design allowables.

C. Apparent Cause of Event:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii), which requires the reporting of any condition that is outside the design basis of the plant, due to the temperature element being found outside design allowables.

The apparent cause of the Torus Temperature Element discrepancy was improper installation. The root cause of the improper installation is personnel error. The installation drawings showed the conduit installed properly within the support. However, in the as found condition, the conduit was outside of the support. This indicates that the conduit was never installed properly since no maintenance was needed which would have removed the conduit from this support.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 3	-	0 0 8	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. Safety Analysis of Event:

This Torus Temperature Element is part of the Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System. This system is used for post accident and normal monitoring of the suppression pool temperature. The existing conduit was missing a support. However, it was supported by a junction box on one end and a thermowell on the other. As such, although design stress allowables were exceeded, the conduit was considered operable. Had the temperature element been lost, another seven elements within that division would have been available. A second division of eight elements was also available to provide temperature indication. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is minimal.

E. Corrective Actions:

The immediate corrective actions taken were for NED to evaluate the temperature element for operability and determine if the unanalyzed as-built configuration fell within the design allowables. When the existing temperature element was found outside of the design allowables, additional corrective actions became necessary. NED initiated a work request and completed an Exempt Change package to re-support the conduit. This installation will be completed during the present Unit 3 outage prior to start-up (249-180-93-00801).

Additional corrective actions are not necessary to avoid this type of improper installation in the future. Since the time of this installation, measures have been implemented which have corrected this type of problem. Additional walkdowns are now required during design phases as well as a users walkdown after installation is complete. Critical dimensions are now shown and identified on installation drawings and inspected by qualified inspectors after installation is complete. The heightened level of awareness throughout the station organizations will prevent this type of obvious non-conformance from recurring.

F. Previous Occurrences:

No previous occurrences involving a Temperature element on SPTM being outside design allowables were found during a review of past reportable events on the SPTM.

G. Component Failure Data:

A component failure did not occur during this event.