



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

February 11, 1993

CWS PMLTR 93-0081

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 93-003, Docket 050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Charles W. Schroeder for 2-12-93

Charles W. Schroeder
Station Manager
Dresden Station

CWS/slb

enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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PDR ADOCK 05000249
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3
 Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 12 14 19
 Page (3) 1 of 0 4

Title (4) Isolation Condenser Group V Isolation Due to Spurious Flow Spikes.

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)				
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)				
0	1	17	9	3	9	3	0	2	0	5	9	3	N/A	

OPERATING MODE (9) N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Sang J. Rhee, Technical Staff System Engineer
 Ext. 2371
 TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 12 1 - 12 19 12 10

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

X Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
 Expected Submission Date (15) 0 6 3 0 9 3

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 17, 1992, at 0111 hours, with Unit 3 in shutdown with all control rods inserted, an unplanned Primary Containment Group V isolation occurred. All of the Isolation Condenser isolation valves automatically responded as required. The system was walked down following the event, and no line breaks, open fuses, or electrical problems were found. Calibration checks were performed, and all setpoints were verified to be within tolerance. The Group V Primary Containment Isolation signal was reset after it was determined to be spurious.

The cause of this event appears to be a flow spike in the annubar flow element. A similar event was reported by LER 90-004/050249.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor -2527 Mwt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX).

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Isolation Condenser Group V Isolation Due to Spurious Flow Spikes

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3 Event Date: January 17, 1993 Event Time: 0111
 Reactor Mode: N Mode Name: Shutdown Power Level 0%
 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 0 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On January 17, 1992, at 0111 hours, with Unit 3 in shutdown with all control rods inserted, an unplanned Primary Containment Group V isolation occurred. All of the Isolation Condenser isolation valves automatically responded as required. The system was walked down following the event, and no line breaks, open fuses, or electrical problems were found. Calibration checks were performed, and all setpoints were verified to be within tolerance. The Group V Primary Containment Isolation signal was reset after it was determined to be spurious.

The cause of this event appears to be a flow spike in the annubar flow element.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that results in the manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

Operations personnel took immediate action to determine the cause of the event by inspecting the circuitry, and by checking the possibility that personnel in the plant had inadvertently affected the equipment. No problems could be found, and the isolation signal was reset. Also, the Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) promptly performed Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 1300-2, Isolation Condenser Steam / Condensate Line High Flow Calibration. The test was successful and no problems were noted. The differential pressure switches are functionally tested and calibrated monthly per DIS 1300-2; no adverse trends were observed in the calibration records. A maintenance history review indicated that a spurious Unit 3 Primary Containment Group V isolation previously occurred on February 12, 1990.

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D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The purpose of the Isolation Condenser is to control reactor pressure and/or remove decay heat from the reactor inventory during periods when the normal heat sink is unavailable. The Isolation Condenser can be manually initiated. An automatic initiation occurs when reactor pressure is sustained at greater than or equal to 1070 psig for 15 seconds. Since Unit 3 was in the cold shutdown mode and reactor pressure was less than 150 psig, operability of the Isolation Condenser was not required.

Technical Specification Table 3.5.E.2 allows the Isolation Condenser to be inoperable for up to seven days provided that all active components of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] system remain operable. Had this event occurred at power, the consequences of a postulated accident would have been mitigated by the HPCI or Automatic Depressurization [SB] system in conjunction with the Low Pressure Coolant Injection [BO] and Core Spray [BM] system. The safety significance of this event was considered to be minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to check system parameters and inspect the relay circuitry prior to resetting the isolation signal. A visual observation was made in the plant to determine if any personnel or equipment in the area of the instruments could have caused the spurious isolation. To determine the cause of any future flow spikes, temporary instrumentation was installed to monitor the system. The system characteristic testing results will be evaluated by the System Engineer and Site Engineering Department. A supplemental report will be issued by June 30, 1993 upon completion of the investigation (249-180-93-00301).

F. PREVIOUS OCCURENCES:

LER/Docket Numbers	Title
90-004/050249	Spurious Group V Primary Containment Isolation While Shutdown Due to Design Deficiency. On February 12, 1990 with Unit 3 in cold shutdown, the Control Room received alarm H-2 on Panel 903-3, Isolation Condenser Line Break (Group V Isolation). The root cause of this event is unknown.
89-003/050249	Spurious Group V Primary Containment Isolation While Shutdown Due to Design Deficiency On May 6, 1989, at 1443 hours, with Unit 3 in cold shutdown and reactor water level at 35 inches, a Group V Primary Containment Isolation occurred. The cause of the event was believed to be differential pressure spikes and/or noise generated by an annubar flow instrument that was installed on the Isolation Condenser condensate return line during the 1985 Unit 3 refueling outage. As corrective action, a modification to install a time delay with a more accurate time delay scale was initiated.
87-013/050249	Manual Reactor Scram Due to Reactor Feedwater System Oscillations During Unit Shutdown Due to Failure of Air Operated Containment Isolation Valve A03-1601-63 to Close During Surveillance Testing.

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On August 7, 1987, a spurious Group V Primary Containment Isolation occurred while the Isolation Condenser was in use following a manual scram. The spurious isolation was reset and the Isolation Condenser was restarted satisfactorily.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

As no component failure occurred, this section is not applicable and an NPRDS data search was not performed.