



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

December 29, 1992

CWS LTR #92-772

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #89-005-02, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). This revised report provides updated information concerning corrective action status.

L. F. Hermer for 12/30/92

Charles W. Schroeder
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

CWS/cfq

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	Docket Number (2) 0 15 10 10 10 12 14 19	Page (3) 1 of 1 3
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Title (4) HPCI System Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery of Cable Terminal

Blocks That Were Not Environmentally Qualified

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)						
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)						
0	4	12	8	9	8	9	0	15	10	10	10	12	14	19	N/A	0 15 10 10 10 12 14 19
															N/A	0 15 10 10 10 12 14 19

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c) Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Frank Petrusich, EQ Coordinator	Ext. 2928	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 -2 19 12 10
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 12, 1989 at 1130 hours with Unit 3 in the Run mode at 100% rated core thermal power, two cable terminal blocks that were not Environmentally Qualified (EQ) were discovered in a cable pull box for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System steam supply outboard isolation valve, M03-2301-5. As a result the HPCI System was conservatively declared inoperable to replace the unqualified terminal blocks with taped splices utilizing an approved EQ taping procedure. The cable repair was completed and the HPCI System declared operable on April 13, 1989 at 0330 hours. The root cause of this event was attributed to a management deficiency during the implementation of the initial EQ circuit walkdowns. During initial implementation only a sampling of cables outside Primary Containment were inspected. As long term corrective action, all junction boxes, pull boxes, conduit bodies, and pulling sleeves associated with equipment requiring Environmental Qualification were inspected to determine if any other unqualified conditions existed. Engineering evaluations were performed concerning each deficiency identified, and corrective actions were initiated. A previous occurrence was reported by LER 86-024-0 Docket 050249 which reported unqualified cable splices located in three Primary Containment penetrations.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Junction boxes outside of the containment for the Containment Atmosphere Pressure Transmitters [IK] contain Teledyne-Penn Union terminal blocks which were not addressed in the Station EQ program.

Two junction boxes for the Recirculation Loop Sample Isolation Valve [KN], Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valves [BO], Main Steam Line Drain Valve [SB], RBCCW Drywell Return Valve [CC], Hydrogen System Calibration Valve [CAM] and Suppression Chamber Wide Range Level Transmitter [BF] contain Marathon Model "6000" terminal blocks. These components were not addressed in the Station EQ program.

A pull box in the primary containment associated with the Electromatic Safety Relief Valve [ADS] circuitry contains Raychem splices with 1/2 inch overlap onto the cable insulation instead of the required 2 inch overlap.

Certain junction boxes for the Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer System [BB] contain cable splice configurations that are not addressed in the station EQ program.

Several junction boxes in the Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer System contain Marathon Series "200", "1500" and "1600" terminal blocks which are environmentally qualified but not specifically listed in the station EQ program.

Due to concern that performing the weep-hole drilling could cause spurious trips of operating equipment, certain junction boxes outside of the containment for the Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzers, RWCU Leak Detection System Temperature Elements [IM], Clean-Up Demineralizer Bypass Valve [CE] and the HPCI Steam Line Differential Pressure Transmitter were scheduled to have the weep-holes drilled in them during upcoming refuel outages.

Two black vinyl tape splices were identified in a pull box for the Recirculation Loop Outboard Sample Valve. No maintenance history was available to verify qualification.

Several black vinyl tape splices were identified in a pull box for the Reactor Head Cooling [AA] Inlet Valve. No maintenance history was available to verify qualification.

Six splices made of cloth tape wrapped over plastic insulation tape were found installed in the power and control circuits for the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valve.

Two stub splices with wire nuts were installed on the Reactor Coolant Post-Accident Sample Valve [AD].

Four three-point General Electric terminal blocks, Model #2960, were found in a junction box for the HPCI Pump Suction Isolation Valve. This type of terminal block is not addressed in the Station EQ program.

Marathon Series 1600 and Cinch Series 141 terminal blocks were found in junction boxes for the Suppression Chamber Wide Range Level Transmitters.

Two pull boxes for air operated valves in the Pressure Suppression System were found to contain undersized Raychem insulated splices which did not conform to Station EQ requirements.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) which requires a written reply for any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In this case the HPCI System was declared inoperable and the steam supply outboard isolation valve was taken out-of-service to correct the problem with the unqualified terminal blocks.

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The root cause of this event has been attributed to a management deficiency during the implementation of the initial EQ circuit walkdowns. The program was implemented by qualifying every identified EQ component type. A total walkdown and physical inspection of all electrical cables was not performed. Instead, the cable used in the plant was qualified and only a partial walkdown was performed. The initial walkdown included verification of various EQ equipment configurations both inside and outside Primary Containment. It is believed that the initial identification of EQ components was based on a review of electrical schematics and wiring diagrams. In the case of the HPCI steam supply outboard isolation valve the terminal blocks do not appear on any of the electrical drawings and since a complete physical walkdown was never performed these unqualified terminal blocks were not identified.

The root causes of the subsequently identified deficiencies are similar.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.C.2 states that from and after the date the HPCI System is made inoperable, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) [SB], the Core Spray System [BM], the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System [BO] and the Isolation Condenser System [BL] are operable. At the time of this event all four of these alternate safety systems were available and operability surveillances, to demonstrate this fact, were immediately initiated following the declaration of HPCI inoperability.

The function of the HPCI steam supply outboard isolation valve is to isolate the HPCI turbine steam line in the event of a High Energy Line Break (HELB) or a low reactor pressure condition following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). If a HELB occurred in the vicinity of the unqualified terminal blocks the failure mode probably would be a short to ground or a short between phases due to the condensing humidity or submergence. However, analysis has shown that M03-2301-5 will close within one minute. One minute of operation under a HELB environment will not result in the submergence of the Limitorque limit switch compartment or the associated junction box for M03-2301-5; therefore, the safety significance can be considered minimal. The closure of the HPCI steam supply outboard isolation during a LOCA is not required to mitigate the consequences of the LOCA event. In addition, the HPCI steam supply inboard isolation valve, M03-2301-4, was available to isolate the steam supply if required; therefore, the safety significance during a LOCA event can also be considered minimal.

Engineering evaluations were performed concerning deficiencies identified in the subsequent inspections; these evaluations concluded that there was no significant affect on operability.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

As immediate corrective actions the unqualified terminal blocks were removed from the circuit and replaced with taped splices under Work Request 84041 utilizing an approved EQ taping procedure. Following repairs the HPCI System was returned to service.

Due to the discovery of unqualified components in EQ equipment a long term corrective action plan has been developed and implemented. The action plan consisted of an inspection of all equipment terminations in junction boxes, pull boxes, and conduit bodies in order to perform a review of splices, terminal blocks, and weep holes.

In order to perform a systematic inspection, all the EQ equipment was grouped into four distinct categories as shown below:

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Category 1 - EQ equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of HELBs outside Primary Containment. This category of equipment would be exposed to a humidity/temperature/pressure environment and would be required to operate to close isolation valves in order to isolate the line break. Included in this category are the following systems:

- HPCI
- Automatic Depressurization (ADS)/Main Steam [SB]
- Reactor Water Cleanup [CE]
- Isolation Condenser

Category 2 - EQ equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a large break recirculation line LOCA. This category of equipment is outside Primary Containment and is exposed to a high radiation environment. Equipment would be required to allow operation of low pressure ECCSs. Included in this category are the following systems:

- Core Spray
- LPCI
- Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) [BH]

Category 3 - All other EQ equipment outside Primary Containment. This category of equipment includes monitoring equipment and equipment needed to operate following an accident scenario in order to safely shutdown the plant. Included in this category are the following systems:

- HPCI
- ADS/Main Steam
- Pressure Suppression [BF]
- Service Water [KG]
- Containment Isolation [JM]
- Reactor Isolation
- Process Radiation Monitoring [IL]
- Standby AC Power [EK]
- Containment Atmosphere Dilution/Containment
- Atmosphere Monitoring (ACAD/CAM) [BB]

Category 4 - All EQ equipment located inside Primary Containment. The EQ inspection consisted of a review of the circuit within Primary Containment in addition to a review of the circuit until it exits the Reactor Building. This category consists of the following systems:

- HPCI
- ADS/Main Steam
- Pressure Suppression
- Containment Isolation
- Reactor Isolation
- Reactor Recirculation [AD]
- Reactor Building HVAC [VA]
- Isolation Condenser

All circuits have been physically walked down starting at the EQ component, including its entire conduit run up to the point where the conduit either (1) exits all plant areas identified as Harsh Environmental Zones or (2) routes into the cable tray system.

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During the circuit walkdown, as potential EQ deficiencies were discovered, detailed engineering assessments were performed and, as required, were promptly corrected or dispositioned per the Nuclear Work Request System (237-100-90-02001).

See Attachment "A" for a list of all EQ deficiencies and corrective actions that were identified during the course of the EQ circuit walkdowns on both Units 2 and 3.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER/Docket Number

Title

86-024-0/050249

Unit Shutdown for Repairs of Environmentally Qualified Cable Splices in the Drywell Penetrations.

On December 5, 1986 at 1430 hours an "Unusual Event" was declared and a Unit shutdown was initiated due to a qualification deficiency involving EQ cable splices located in three Primary Containment penetrations. As corrective action a qualified tape and taping procedure was used to repair the deficient splices. This event was of minimal safety significance since all the splices were inspected, found acceptable, and were not subject to the environmental conditions experienced during the qualification test.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This supplemental report is being submitted as a final response for all EQ deficiencies that were identified on both Units 2 and 3. Since no equipment failures occurred as a result of this event, NPRDS reporting is not required.

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ATTACHMENT A

1. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
RE-2-2418A	0818, 1673	D96406
RE-2-2418B	0772, 1710, 1728	D96407
RE-3-2418A	0392, 0480, 1314	D99251
RE-3-2418B	0393, 0397	D99250

DEFICIENCY

Certain junction boxes and conduit bodies outside of the containment for the Drywell Radiation Monitors contain coax connectors and/or cable splice configurations that were not addressed in the Station EQ program.

RESOLUTION:

Connectors and/or splices have been replaced on both Units 2 & 3 by the Electrical Maintenance Department (249-180-89-03001S1). New qualified connectors have been upgraded for EQ applications through the CECO dedication process. No new EQ binders are required to be issued (249-180-89-03002S1). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following Engineering Documents:

- Chron #160672, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval# M0064-1
- Chron #160455, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval# M0064-2

2. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
RE-2-2418A	N/A	N/A
RE-2-2418B	N/A	N/A
RE-3-2418A	N/A	N/A
RE-3-2418B	N/A	N/A

DEFICIENCY

Circuits for the Drywell Radiation Monitors were found to contain a certain Boston Insulated Wire Co. coaxial cable which was not addressed in the Station EQ program.

RESOLUTION

The Nuclear Engineering Department will perform a QE-42 review and incorporate EQ Binder #EQ-72D for BIW coaxial cable into the Station EQ program. EQ Binder #EQ-72D will be issued to the station on or before February 28, 1993 (249-180-89-03003S1). Justification for Continued Operation and incorporation of the new cable into the Station EQ program is addressed by the following engineering documents:

- Chron #164637, Ref: S&L File #CQD-051102

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3. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
PT-2-2541-12B	0767	D99241
PT-3-2541-11B	0310	D99470
PT-3-2541-12B	0361	D99471
LT-3-1641-5A	0367	D88683

DEFICIENCY

Junction boxes outside of the containment for certain Containment Atmosphere Pressure Transmitters and a Torus Wide Range Level Transmitter contain Teledyne-Penn Union terminal blocks which were not addressed in the Station EQ program.

RESOLUTION

Terminal Blocks for the Torus Wide Range Level Transmitter in box #0367 were replaced with Qualified Raychem Splices per Work Request 88683.

All other Terminal blocks have been replaced with qualified Marathon blocks by the Electrical Maintenance Department (249-180-89-03004S1). NED will include junction box numbers 0767, 0310, and 0361 into EQ Binder #EQ-48D by February 28, 1993 (249-200-89-03005S1). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following Engineering Documents:

- Chron #164842, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #M0064-6
- Chron #165770, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-041-D-3-010

4. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
POS-2-220-44	1679	N/A
MO-2-1001-1A	1679	N/A
MO-2-1001-1B	1679	N/A
MO-2-220-1	1679	N/A
MO-2-3706	1679	N/A
SO-2-2499-1A	1680	N/A
LT-3-1641-5B	0358	D88682

DEFICIENCY

Two junction boxes for the Recirculation Loop Sample Isolation Valve, Shutdown Cooling [B0] Isolation Valves, Main Steam Line Drain Valve, RBCCW Drywell Return Valve, CAM System Hydrogen Calibration Valve and Suppression Chamber Wide Range Level Transmitter contain Marathon Model "6000" terminal blocks. Junction box #JB2RB163 (EQ TAG #1679) contains six twelve-point Marathon "6000" terminal blocks, junction box #JB2RB164 (EQ TAG #1680) contains three four-point Marathon "6000" terminal blocks and junction box EQ TAG #0358 contains one eight-point Marathon "6000" terminal block. These components were not addressed in the Station EQ program.

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RESOLUTION

NED will included junction box number 1680 into EQ Binder #EQ-48D by February 28, 1993. All other boxes have been previously incorporated into the program (249-180-89-03006S1). The terminal block for EQ TA #0358 was replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits. Justification for Continued Operation and incorporation of the Marathon Model "6000" terminal blocks into the Station EQ program is addressed by the following engineering documents:

Chron #164638, Ref: S&L File #049583
 Chron #165770, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-041-D-3-010

5. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
SO-2-203-3C	1593	D99472

DEFICIENCY

A pull box in the primary containment associated with the Electromatic Safety Relief Valve [ADS] circuitry contains Raychem splices with 1/2 inch overlap onto the cable insulation instead of the required 2 inch overlap.

RESOLUTION

The splices have been replaced by the Electrical Maintenance Department with properly qualified Raychem splices (249-180-89-03007S1). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed by the following engineering documents:

Chron #164838, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #M0064-7

6. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
HM-2-2252-81A	1756, 0692	D96790, D89882
HM-2-2252-81B	0720, 1754	D96405, D96791
HM-3-2253-81A	1761, 1762, 1768	D99249
HM-3-2253-81B	0583, 1764	D99247

DEFICIENCY

Certain junction boxes for the Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer System [CAM] contain cable splice configurations that are not addressed in the Station EQ program.

RESOLUTION

Qualified splices have been installed by the Electrical Maintenance Department (249-180-89-03008S1). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #164845, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #M0064-3

7. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
HM-2-2252-81A	0673	N/A
HM-2-2252-81B	0718, 0751	N/A
HM-3-2253-81A	0574, 1746, 1747	N/A
HM-3-2253-81B	0576, 0589, 1766	N/A

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DEFICIENCY

Several junction boxes in the [CAM] Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzer System contain Marathon Series "200", "1500" and "1600" terminal blocks which are environmentally qualified but not specifically listed in the Station EQ program.

RESOLUTION

These terminal blocks are required to be included in the Station Marathon Terminal Block EQ Binders #EQ-48D and #EQ-49D. NED will include junction box numbers 0673, 0718, 0574, and 0576 into EQ Binder #EQ-49D by February 28, 1993. All other boxes have been previously incorporated in the program (249-180-89-03009S1). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #164845, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #M0064-3

8. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
HM-3-2253-81B	1766	D99248
TE-3-1291-60J	1767	D99246
DTP-3-2352	1735	D99244

DEFICIENCY

Due to operation restrictions certain junction boxes outside of the containment for the Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzers, RWCU Leak Detection System Temperature Elements, Clean-Up Demineralizer Bypass Valve and the HPCI Steam Line Differential Pressure Transmitter were not allowed to have weepholes drilled in them during the course of EQ circuit walkdowns.

RESOLUTION

Weepholes have been drilled in all boxes by the Electrical Maintenance Department (249-180-89-03010S1). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

- Chron #165771, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-041-D-3-013
- Chron #165772, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-041-D-3-008
- Chron #164845, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #M0064-3

9. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
S0-2-220-45	1736	D96283

DEFICIENCY

Two black vinyl tape splices were identified in a pull box for the Recirculation Loop Outboard Sample Valve. No maintenance history was available to verify qualification.

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RESOLUTION

The splices were replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits. Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #165769, Ref: MLEA Report #M0064-5

10. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
MOV-2-205-2-4	1494	D96168

DEFICIENCY

Several black vinyl tape splices were identified in a pull box for the Reactor Head Cooling [AA] Inlet Valve. No maintenance history was available to verify qualification.

RESOLUTION

The splices were replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits at the Stations discretion. Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following Engineering Documents:

EQ Variation #90-10 (237-225-90-R12-90125),
Chron #167121, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #M0064-10

11. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
MO-2-2301-5	0835	D92513

DEFICIENCY

Six splices made of cloth tape wrapped over plastic insulation tape were found installed in the power and control circuits for the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valve.

RESOLUTION

The splices were replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits (237-225-90-R12-90085). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #164843, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-120-D-2-008

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12. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
S0-3-220-44	1244	D89488

DEFICIENCY

Two stub splices with wire nuts were installed on the Reactor Coolant Post-Accident Sample Valve.

RESOLUTION

The splices were replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits. Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #164844, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-081-D-3-019

13. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
M0-3-2301-35	0270	D88726

DEFICIENCY

Four three-point General Electric terminal blocks, Model #2960, were found in a junction box for the HPCI Pump Suction Isolation Valve. This type of terminal block is not addressed in the Station EQ program.

RESOLUTION

The terminal blocks were replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits. Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #164836 Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-041-D-3-011

14. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
LT-2-1641-5B	0823, 0824	D89781
LT-2-1641-5A	0846	D89782

DEFICIENCY

Marathon Series 1600 and Cinch Series 141 terminal blocks were found in junction boxes for the Suppression Chamber Wide Range Level Transmitters.

RESOLUTION

The terminal blocks were replaced with qualified Raychem splice kits. Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #164837, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-081-D-2-004
 Chron #165769, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-081-D-2-001

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				Page (3)			
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Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	8 9	- 0 0 5	- 0 2	1 3	OF	1 3		

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

15. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT ID	EQ TAG #	CORRECTIVE WORK REQUESTS
S0-2-1601-50A	0771	D94040
S0-2-1601-50B	0766	D94039

DEFICIENCY

Two pull boxes for air operated valves in the Pressure Suppression System were found to contain undersized Raychem insulated splices which did not conform to Station EQ requirements.

RESOLUTION

The undersized Raychem splices were replaced with proper diameter splices per EQ requirements (237-225-90-R12-90113). Justification for Continued Operation and corrective actions have been addressed per the following engineering documents:

Chron #165769, Ref: MLEA Tech Eval #89015-120-D-2-009