



**Commonwealth Edison**


Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R.R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
Telephone 815/942-2920

November 6, 1992

CWS LTR #92-658

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 92-33, Docket 050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50-73(a)(2)(iv).

  
Charles W. Schroeder  
Station Manager  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

CWS/glt

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III  
NRC Resident Inspector's Office  
File/NRC  
File/Numerical

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(ZDVR/782)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 12 13 17 Page (3) 1 of 0 3

Title (4) Inadvertant Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator Auto Start

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)	
10	15	92	92	0313	00	11	06	92			

OPERATING MODE (9) N

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	in Abstract
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	below and in
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name T. Johnson, Operations Staff Ext. 3527 TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO Expected Submission Date (15) \_\_\_\_\_

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0625 on October 15, 1992, with Unit 2 at 95% power and Unit 3 in shutdown, the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Auto-Started on signal received from Bus 33-1 undervoltage relay 127B33-1X3. A High Voltage Operator (HVO) conducting independent verification actuated the relay while trying to close Cubicle 13 of Bus 33-1. The 2/3 Emergency Diesel responded correctly to the challenge. Therefore, the safety significance is considered minimal. Corrective Actions will include training, posting of warning signs, and fixing the affected doors.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0   5   0   0   0   2   3   7	9   2	-   0   3   3	-   0   0				0   2	0   F	0   3

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Auto-start.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3                                    Event Date: October 15, 1992                                    Event Time: 0625

Reactor Mode: N                                    Mode Name: Shutdown                                    Power Level: 0

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 0

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 0625 on October 15, 1992 with Unit 2 at 95% power and Unit 3 in shutdown, the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) auto-started on signal received from Bus 33-1 undervoltage relay 127B33-1X3.

A High Voltage Operator (HVO) was sent to independently verify outages hung in BUS 34-1 and BUS 33-1. After verifying the outage in BUS 34-1, the HVO proceeded to Cubicle 13 of BUS 33-1. He verified the outage and attempted to close the cubicle door. Unable to properly close and latch the door on his first two attempts, he tried to forcibly close the door on the third attempt. Upon closing the door with more force than used on the first two attempts, he heard and saw indications that the Unit 2/3 EDG had started.

The force used to close the cubicle door was apparently enough to cause the undervoltage relay to seal in. The EDG auto-started logic saw this as a loss of power to BUS 33-1 and commenced the autostart. The EDG responded properly to the challenge

The HVO was aware of the need to use caution while handling the doors. He felt no perceived personal or management pressure that would have distracted or precluded his ability to do a high quality independent verification. He did not feel the need to get the job done quickly to make the upcoming turnover.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(ii)(B), which requires the reporting of any condition outside the design basis.

Investigation revealed that the undervoltage relays are prone to seal in when handled in a rough manner. However, the material condition of the cubicle should not have been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition that special techniques and handling were required to close the door.

The root cause can be traced to Managerial Methods that allowed known plant material condition problems to exist without correction; and continued Plant Operation with a degraded subcomponent that contributed to failure.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety significance of the event during normal shutdown operations is minimal.

The ESF actuation was well recorded on the station event recorder and analysis of this record has allowed the station to identify some problems associated with events that are supposed to occur when an ESF actuation occurs.

The 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator started properly and assumed the proper loads when challenged by inadvertent actuator of the undervoltage relay.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The station has completed a number of corrective actions. The EDG auto-start was immediately dealt with on the plant floor and in the control room. Warning signs have been posted on the affected cubicle doors. The affected cubicle door was fixed on October 18, 1982 under WR 13279, and the event has been added to the HVO training syllabus industry events review.

Corrective Actions to be complete by February 28, 1993 are to tailgate the event to all operators on this known hazard to operation. Inspect and fix all affected cubicle doors. Establish a planned maintenance plan for the smooth operation of the doors.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER/Docket Numbers      Title

This is believed to be the first auto-start initiated by forcibly closing the cubicle door and sealing in the undervoltage relay. The three previous unplanned automatic DG start events are listed below:

- 90-001-050249      Inadvertent Auto-start of Unit 3 Diesel Generator Due to Procedure Deficiency
- 86-009-050249      Automatic Start of the Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator Due to Personnel Error
- 86-005-050249      Automatic Start of the Unit 3 Diesel Generator Due to Personnel Error

G: COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There were no component failures during this event: therefore, this section is not applicable.