




Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

October 22, 1992

CWS LTR #92-639

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report 92-31, Docket 050237 is being submitted voluntarily to report the exceeding of an administrative limit for Primary Containment Leakage. This administrative limit was established as a condition of being granted a schedular exemption from the local rate testing surveillance interval required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. A courtesy ENS phone notification was also performed concerning this event.


Charles W. Schroeder
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

CWS/glt

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

300033

(ZDVR/770)

9210300075 921022
PDR ADDCK 05000237
S PDR

JE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 12 13 17 Page (3) 1 of 0 3

Title (4) Failure of the Outboard Drywell Air Sample Valve 2-8501-5B During its 24 Month Local Leak Rate Testing Surveillance Due to Improper Valve Seating

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)			
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)		
0 9	2 8	9 12	9 12	0 3 11	0 1 0	1 0	2 12	9 12	N/A		0 5 10 10 10 1 1		
									N/A		0 5 10 10 10 1 1		

OPERATING MODE (9) N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text) Voluntary
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER
M. Andjelic, Local Leak Rate Test Coordinator	AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 1 -2 9 12 10 Ext. 2366

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	I K	S M V -	S 2 1 2	YES					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

Expected Submission Date (15) 0 5 1 19 9 13

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1910 hours on September 28, 1992 with Unit 2 at 94% power, the performance of Special Procedure 92-9-115 revision 0 (Local Leak Rate Testing of Primary Containment Isolation Valves During Reactor Operation) identified the Outboard Drywell Air Sample Valve 2-8501-5B to be leaking 74.28 scfh. This leakage, when added to the total primary containment maximum pathway leakage rate, brought the total leakage for Type B and C testable penetrations to 435.64 scfh. This report is being submitted voluntarily as this value exceeded an administrative leakage limit of 85% of 0.6L_a (415.18 scfh) which was established as a condition of being granted a schedular exemption from the interval required by 10CFR 50, Appendix J. Inboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5A was immediately closed and challenged with a local leak rate test, which yielded a leakage rate of 2.20 scfh. Valve 2-8501-5B was declared inoperable and valve 2-8501-5A was taken Out of Service in the closed position. Maintenance was completed on October 2, 1992 and the valve was retested on October, 6 1992. This test yielded a leakage rate of 3.24 scfh. A supplement to this report will be submitted to identify the cause and corrective actions for this valve failure and any other valve failures which occur during the course of the Unit 2 exemption period.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	9 2	-	0 3 1	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Failure of The Outboard Drywell Air Sample [IK] Valve 2-8501-5B During its 24 Month Local Leak Rate Testing Surveillance Due to Improper Valve Seating

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT:

Dresden Unit: 2 Event Date: September 28, 1992 Event Time: 1910 hours
 Reactor Mode: N Mode Name: Run Power Level: 94%
 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 994.9 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At approximately 1910 hours on September 28, 1992 with Unit 2 at 94% power, the performance of Special Procedure 92-9-115 revision 0 (Local Leak Rate Testing of Primary Containment Isolation Valves [JM] During Reactor Operation) identified the Outboard Drywell Air Sample Valve 2-8501-5B to be leaking 74.28 scfh. This leakage, when added to the total primary containment maximum pathway leakage obtained through Type B and C local leak rate testing, did not exceed the Technical Specification maximum pathway leakage limit of 0.6L_a (488.45 scfh); however, an Administrative limit of 85% of 0.6 L_a (415.18 scfh) was exceeded since the sum of this new leakage rate caused the total type B and C leakage rate to be 435.64 scfh. This administrative limit was established as a condition of being granted a one time schedular exemption from the 24 month Unit 2 Type B and C local leak rate test interval required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

Upon identification of the excessive leakage, the Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) was notified of the event and the Inboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5A was requested to be closed. In order to verify that primary containment integrity could still be maintained, Outboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5B was opened and leakage past valve 2-8501-5A was quantified by performing an additional local leak rate test. The local leak rate test on Inboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5A yielded a leakage rate of 2.20 scfh. The new sum of this pathway's leakage rate, when added to the current sum of Type B and C leakage, caused the new total leakage rate to be 363.56 scfh. The SCRE was notified that with valve 2-8501-5A closed, primary containment integrity could be maintained. At 1910 hours on September 28, 1992 Outboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5B was declared inoperable and Inboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5A was administratively taken Out-Of-Service in the closed position. This ensured that primary containment integrity could be maintained by preventing the inadvertent opening of the inboard valve. A courtesy ENS red phone notification was made at 2006 hours on September 28, 1992 to provide notification that the administrative limit for maximum pathway primary containment leakage, established in the schedular exemption granted by NRR, had been exceeded.

Work Request (WR) 12542 was previously submitted on September 18, 1992 to reduce the leakage past valve 2-8501-5B since the as left leakage rate obtained during D2R12 was 4.0 scfh. This work request was originally assigned a B3 priority and was upgraded to B1 on September 28, 1992. A work analyst began preparing a package to repair valve 2-8501-5B that evening.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)			
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number					
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	9	2	-	0	3	1	-	0	0	0 3 OF 0 3

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

On October 2, 1992 maintenance was completed on valve 2-8501-5B. The valve actuator spring and diaphragm were replaced and the spring tension required to open the valve was reset. On October 6, 1992 an as left local leak rate test was performed. This local leak rate test yielded a successful leakage rate of 3.24 scfh. The valve was tested for proper stroke time and work package D-12542 was approved for completion. Valve 2-8501-5B was declared operable and returned to service at 1830 hours on October 6, 1992.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted voluntarily, as the administrative limit of 85% of 0.6 La was exceeded. This administrative limit was established as a condition of being granted a one time schedular exemption from the 24 month Type B & C local leak valve test interval required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

The root cause of the unsatisfactory leakage past Outboard Drywell Air Sample Valve 2-8501-5B is under investigation. Local leak rate testing records dating back to 1983 indicate no previous failures of valve 2-8501-5B. In addition, maintenance records indicate that no repairs have been performed on the valve or operator. A supplement to this report will be submitted to identify the cause of the failure of this valve and any additional valves which fail during the course of the Unit 2 exemption period. The supplement is expected to be submitted by May 19, 1993.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety significance of this event has been considered minimal since the Inboard Drywell Air Sample valve 2-8501-5A had a measured leakage rate of 2.20 scfh. Therefore, when adding the minimum pathway leakage rate of this pathway (2.20 scfh) to the current sum of Type B and C leakage, a combined leakage rate of 363.56 scfh would be obtained. This leakage rate is well below the leakage rate limits used in calculating the maximum off-site dose rates established in 10 CFR 100. In fact, if the maximum pathway leakage rate for this pathway (74.28 scfh) was added to the current sum of Type B and C leakage, a combined leakage rate of 435.64 scfh would be obtained. This leakage rate would also be well below the leakage rate limits used in calculating the maximum off-site dose rates established in 10 CFR 100.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective actions for the repair of this valve was to verify that the spring actuator provided the required closing force needed to isolate flow. This was accomplished by replacing and adjusting the actuator spring to the vendor's specification. The original spring will be tested to determine if there was any degradation. A supplement to this report will be submitted to identify the cause and long term corrective actions for this valve failure and any other valve failures which occur during the course of the Unit 2 exemption period.(237-180-92-26001)

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER NUMBER TITLE

LER 88-018-1 Leak Rate Limits Exceeded In Drywell Head Seal and MSIV 2-203-1D Tests Due To Misalignment and Seat Wear.

Valve 2-8501-5A was disassembled and inspected under work request D-80052. Upon disassembly, foreign material was found on the seating surface. The valve seat was lapped and the valve internals cleaned. Upon valve reassembly, a final LLRT was performed yielding a leakage rate of 0.20 scfh.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

If applicable, this information will be included in a supplemental report.