



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

August 10, 1992

CWS LTR #92-517

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #92-18, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

L. J. Derner for 8/10/92

Charles W. Schroeder
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

CWS/jmt

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

(ZDVR/722)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 2 14 19 Page (3) 1 of 0 3

Title (4) Sample Not Analyzed Within Required Time Period Due to Personnel Error

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)																					
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)																				
0	7	2	4	9	2	9	2	---	0	1	8	---	0	1	0	0	8	1	0	9	2			0	5	10	10	10		

OPERATING MODE (9) N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 8 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name: George Vickery, Chemist Ext. 2915 TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 1 - 2 9 2 10

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) Month Day Year

Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 24, 1992 at 1545 hours, it was determined that Dresden Unit 3 Service Water had not been analyzed for beta/gamma activity for a nineteen hour and thirty-nine minute period. The events on July 23, 1992 are as follows: The Unit 3 Service Water monitor was inoperable. Grab samples are collected and analyzed once per twelve hours, when the monitor is inoperable, as required by Technical Specifications. After collection, the grab samples are evaporated to dryness prior to analysis. The Unit 3 Service Water sample was collected at 2000 hours on July 23, 1992. The sample had not completely evaporated to dryness prior to the end of shift at 2300 hours on July 23, 1992. Responsibility for completion of analysis of the sample was turned over to oncoming Chemistry Technician through both written and verbal turnover as required by procedure DAP 16-05. The Chemistry Technician on shift from 2300 hours July 23, 1992 through 0700 hours July 24, 1992 failed to perform the required analysis. Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the Chemistry Technician on shift from 2300 hours on July 23, 1992, to 0700 hours on July 24, 1992. Procedures DCS 6240-01, DCS 6280-01 and DCS 6290-01 will be revised to perform gamma isotopic analysis on Service Water samples whenever the appropriate unit's Service Water Gross Activity Monitor is inoperable. DAP 16-05 will be revised to record time and date the last Service Water sample was collected and the time and date the last Service Water sample was analyzed for each unit (when the Service Water Gross Activity Monitor for the appropriate unit is inoperable).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 2	-	0 1 8	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor -2527 Mwt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX).

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3 Event Date: July 24, 1992 Event Time: 1545 Hours
 Reactor Mode: N Mode Name: Run Power Level: 83%
 Reactor Coolant system (RCS) Pressure: 995 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On July 24, 1992 at 1545 hours, with Unit 3 at 83% rated core thermal power, it was determined that Dresden Unit 3 Service Water had not been analyzed for beta/gamma activity for a nineteen hour and thirty-nine minute period. The events on July 23, 1992 are as follows: The Unit 3 Service Water monitor was inoperable. Grab samples are collected and analyzed once per twelve hours, when the monitor is inoperable, as required by Technical Specifications. The samples are collected at 0800 and 2000 daily and analyzed following collection. After collection, the grab samples are evaporated from an initial volume of two hundred milliliters to dryness prior to analysis. The Unit 3 Service Water sample was collected at 2000 hours on July 23, 1992. The sample had not completely evaporated to dryness prior to the end of shift at 2300 hours on July 23, 1992. Responsibility for completion of analysis of the sample was turned over to oncoming Chemistry Technician through both written and verbal turnover as required by Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 16-05. The Chemistry Technician on shift from 2300 hours July 23, 1992 through 0700 hours July 24, 1992 failed to perform the required analysis. The sample was found by a Chemistry Technician at about 0730 hours on July 24, 1992 at the location normally used for drying samples. The sample was analyzed immediately.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which requires the reporting of any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications within 30 days of the event. The root cause was personnel error due to inattention to detail during turnover. The Chemistry Technician who accepted responsibility for completion of analysis of the Unit 3 Service Water sample failed to perform the required analysis. The sample is ordinarily completely evaporated to dryness and in the gas flow proportional counter (being analyzed) at the end of shift. The Chemistry Technician present from 2300 hours on July 23, 1992 to 0700 hours on July 24, 1992 did not look for the sample or results during the shift.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The purpose of the Service Water Gross Activity Monitor is to monitor for radioactive materials present in Service Water and ensure no unmonitored release of radioactive materials to unrestricted areas. The sample collected at 2000 hours on July 23, 1992 was analyzed and the beta/gamma activity was less than the lower limit of detection (LLD) for the instrument used. The samples collected at 0800 hours on July 23, 1992 and at 0800 hours on July 24, 1992 also were analyzed and the beta/gamma activity was less than the LLD for the instrument used. These sample results indicate that no unmonitored release of activity was occurring during the delay between sample collection and analysis. Therefore, the safety significance is minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The following corrective actions were initiated regarding this event.

1. The Chemistry Technician on shift from 2300 hours on July 23, 1992 to 0700 hours on July 24, 1992 was disciplined.
2. Procedure Changes will be made to Dresden Chemistry Surveillance Procedure (DCS) 6240-01, Shift 2 Surveillance Checklist, and DCS 6280-01, Shift 3 Surveillance Checklist, to provide for gamma isotopic analysis of the Service Water grab sample whenever the Service Water monitor for a particular unit is inoperable. This should facilitate more rapid analysis of the sample and reduce the likelihood of turnover of this requirement (NTS 249-200-92-09901).
3. A Procedure Change will be made to DCS 6290-01, Shift 1 Surveillance Checklist, to require collection and gamma isotopic analysis of Service Water samples when the Service Water Gross Activity Monitor is inoperable (NTS 249-200-92-09902).
4. A Procedure Change will be made to DAP 16-05 Attachment 2, Chemistry Shift turnover Sheet, to provide for gamma isotopic analysis of the appropriate unit's Service Water samples on a shiftly basis whenever the appropriate unit's Service Water Gross Activity Monitor is inoperable. The change to a shiftly frequency of sampling and analysis should further reduce the likelihood of future missed or delayed Service Water sample analysis (NTS 249-200-92-099903).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

A previous event involving a Chemistry Department Surveillance is listed below.

<u>LER/Docket Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
88-014-0	Unit 2/3 Chimney Tritium Sampling Surveillance Interval Exceeded Due to Personnel Error

While performing a review of the Chemistry Department surveillance performance dates, it was discovered that Dresden Chemistry Procedure 1400-3 had not been performed within the allowable Technical Specification interval. The root cause was attributed to personnel error. Corrective Actions included surveillance tracking administrative improvements.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There were no component failures involved, and therefore, an NPRDS data base search was not conducted.