



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

October 21, 1991

EDE LTR #91-651

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #91-010-00, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

E. D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/dwh

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

ZDVR/346

9110280299 911017
PDR ADOCK 05000249
S PDR

Handwritten initials/signature

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	Page (3) 1 of 0 7
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Title (4) Bus 38 Undervoltage Relay Actuation Due to Inadvertent Shorting of Relay Terminals

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)			
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)		
0 9	2 3	9 1	9 1	0 1 0	0 0	1 0	1 7	9 1	N/A				

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	in Abstract							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	below and in							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	Text)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Emory Johnson, Technical Staff System Engineer	Ext. 2603	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 1 9 2 0
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

X Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	Expected Submission Date (15) 0 4 1 6 9 2
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During performance of Dresden Electrical Surveillance (DES) 500-2, HFA Relay Electrical Maintenance Inspection, on September 23, 1991, with Unit 3 in cold shutdown for a refuel outage, 480V Bus 38 partially load shedded upon actuation of undervoltage relay #227-B38-X1 when an Electrician unintentionally shorted a tool across two terminals of the relay. This actuation caused trips of the Reactor Water Cleanup Auxiliary Pump; the 3C Reactor Building Vent Fan, the 3B Reactor Building Exhaust Fan, and the 3A South Turbine Building Vent Fan. DES 500-2 was immediately terminated and all affected equipment was restored to normal operation. The safety significance of this is event is considered minimal because the load shedding trips occurred properly when challenged by the undervoltage signal and there was no affect on redundant division equipment, nor was there any significant affect on normal plant status. Corrective actions included a review of the incident with the personnel involved and an investigation into procurement of insulated tools for this type of activity. A previous event involving an unplanned start of a Diesel Generator during use of a hand held voltage tester was reported by LER 90-01/050249.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 2 4 9	9 1	- 0 1 0	- 0 0			0 2	OF	0 7	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 MWT rated core thermal power

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Bus 38 [ED] Undervoltage Relay Actuation Due to Inadvertent Shorting of Relay Terminals

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3	Event Date: September 23, 1991	Event Time: 1715 Hours
Reactor Mode: N	Mode Name: Shutdown	Power Level: 0%
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 0 psig		

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During the performance of Dresden Electrical Surveillance (DES) 500-2 (HFA Relay Electrical Maintenance Inspection) at 1715 hours on September 23, 1991, with Unit 3 in cold shutdown for a refuel outage, 480V Bus 38 partially load shedded when undervoltage (UV) relay #227-B38-X1 actuated due to an Electrician accidentally shorting a tool across two terminals of the relay. The actuation caused trips of the power supply breakers to the Reactor Water Cleanup [CE] Auxiliary Pump, the 3C Reactor Building Vent Fan [VA], the 3B Reactor Building Exhaust Fan [VL], and the 3A South Turbine Building Ventilation Fan [VK]. DES 500-2 was terminated immediately and the affected equipment was returned to normal operation.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)[JE] actuation occurred.

The cause of this event is attributed to the Electrician's tool coming in contact with two terminals on the undervoltage relay (Refer to Figure 1). During a tightness check of a wire termination nut at the rear of relay #227-B38-X1, the Electrician had put a taped nut driver on terminal #10 when the exposed lower face of the nut driver contacted a non-insulated lug installed on terminal #8. Lug #8 was in close proximity to terminal #10. The short propagated through an installed resistor between terminals #7 and #8 from terminal #10. It is believed that the momentary short caused relay #227-B38-X1 to actuate, shedding all active equipment off of Bus 38 (Refer to Figure 2).

A work history review of previous work and surveillances on this relay did not reveal any other maintenance or surveillance activities that may have contributed to this event. However, upon further investigation, a potential discrepancy between the existing wiring configuration and the approved drawings was revealed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 1	-	0 1 0	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 7	

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It is currently suspected that terminals #9 and #10 may be electrically reversed; this potential discrepancy has no affect on proper operation of the circuitry. A check for circuit continuity utilizing approved drawings, with the fuses pulled and the Recirculation [AD] Motor Generator Set (MG-Set) Vent Fan 3A Out-Of-Service (OOS), confirmed a properly wired circuit between points BX5 to 382-BX8 and BX8 to BX9-382 (refer to Figure 3). However, with the blue indicator bulb removed (refer to Figure 3), checks from BX5 to terminal #10 and from BX8 to BX5 also indicated continuity. It is believed that the control switch for the MG-Set Vent Fan 3A on panel 903-4, which is presently in its pull-to-lock position, provides the route for continuity of the circuit between points BX5 to BX8. Work Request (WR) 04274 was written to further investigate the wiring to relay #227-B38-X1. Under WR 04274, the leads from points BX9-382 and BX8-382 will be lifted and continuity verified back to terminals #10 and #9 respectively. This work will be completed prior to Unit 3 startup. A supplemental report will be issued following the conclusion of the investigation.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Bus 38 is part of Unit 3's Division I 480V Switchgear, which is comprised of two redundant divisions of equipment. The purpose of the undervoltage relaying is to trip the associated loads upon receipt of an initiation signal indicative of a bus undervoltage condition in order to prevent equipment damage. During this event, Unit 3 was in a refuel outage with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel. The trips which occurred were proper upon receipt of the undervoltage signal. The redundant division of equipment remained operable during the event and there was no significant affect on plant status. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective actions were to terminate the surveillance and restore all affected equipment to normal operation. The event was reviewed with the personnel involved; it should be noted that the Electrician had taped the nut driver shaft and was using caution against accidental shorts. In order to help prevent future problems of this type, the System Engineer and the Master Electrician are investigating the possibility of procuring insulated tools for this type of activity (249-200-91-07501). WR 04274 was also written to further investigate the potential wiring discrepancy (249-200-91-07502). Upon completion of the investigation, a supplemental report will be issued (249-200-91-07503).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER/Docket Numbers Title

90-01/050249 Inadvertent Auto Start of Unit 3 Diesel Generator [EK] Due to Procedure Deficiency

With Unit 3 in a refuel outage, the Unit 3 Diesel Generator (DG) auto-started while undervoltage logic testing was in progress. An Electrician using a low resistance hand held voltage tester to check terminals on an undervoltage relay inadvertently completed the auto-start circuit of the DG. The DG was secured and the test procedure was revised to prohibit use of this type of voltage tester.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 1	- 0 1 0	- 0 0				0 4	OF	0 7

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Non-Reportable Event Numbers

12-3-86-15 480V Bus 36 Fire Caused by Phase Shorted to Ground

With Unit 3 in a refuel outage, arcing occurred when a racking wrench stored in a spare compartment in the bus shorted a bus breaker. The crank fell through when the door closed after a bus inspection. Sheet metal was installed in the back of the storage compartment to provide a barrier between the storage area and the bus bars.

12-3-89-55 Generator [EL] Core Monitor Fire Due to the Use of a Conductive Tool

With Unit 3 operating at 100% core rated thermal power while performing Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 6000-3, Generator Core Monitor Calibration and Functional Test, a small hydrogen ignition occurred when an Instrument Mechanic (IM) attempted to tighten a sample line fitting. When the conductive tool came in contact with an electrical connection an arc resulted and ignited a combustible mixture of hydrogen and air. The equipment was secured, and a revision of DIS 6000-3 was made to require only sparkless and insulated tools when working on the generator core monitor.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Model Number</u>	<u>Mfg. Part Number</u>
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

No component failure was identified with this event; therefore, this section is not applicable.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				Page (3)		
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 1	- 0 1 0	- 0 0	0 5	OF	0 7	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Back View of Relay 227-B38-X1 Terminals




Figure 1.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9 1	- 0 1 0	- 0 0	0 6	0 F	0 7			

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]





Figure 2

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)							
		Year	///	Sequential	///	Revision									
				Number		Number									
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	9	1	-	0	1	0	-	0	0	0	7	OF	0	7

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RECIRC. MG-SET VENT FAN 3A

Figure 3