




Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

September 25, 1991

EDE LTR #91-572

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #91-008-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).



E. D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/ade

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector's Office
File/NRC
File/Numerical

(ZDVR/311)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) <p style="text-align:center;">Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3</p>	Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	Page (3) 1 of 0 5
Title (4) Unplanned Primary Containment Group V Isolation Due to a Blown Bulb		

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)													
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)												
0	8	3	0	9	1	9	1	---	0	0	8	---	0	0	0	9	2	7	9	1	N/A	
N/A																						

OPERATING MODE (9) POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
Name Mark Blakemore, Technical Staff System Engineer								TELEPHONE NUMBER			
Ext. 2421								AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								Expected Submission Date (15)			
X Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)								NO			
								0 1 3 1 9 2			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 30, 1991, at 1503 hours with Unit 3 in the Run mode at 10% of rated core thermal power, while replacing a burned out light bulb on the Control Room position indication for Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System inboard manual isolation valve 3-1501-26A, the light bulb caused a short circuit and caused fuse 595-714B to open. Simultaneously, a Primary Containment Group V Isolation was received, and the appropriate Isolation Condenser isolation valves closed as designed. The cause of the event has not yet been determined. Work Request D03389 has been written to inspect the light socket. The safety significance of this event was minimal since the Isolation signal was reset and all active components of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system remained operable during the event. To prevent recurrence of this event, during the current Unit 3 refueling outage (D3R12) and the next Unit 2 refueling outage (D2R13) a minor plant modification will add two fuses in series to isolate the LPCI indication circuit from the isolation condenser isolation valve control circuitry. A previous event involving an unplanned Primary Containment Group V isolation was reported by LER 90-005 on Docket 0500239.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXXX)

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Unplanned Primary Containment Group V Isolation Due to a Blown Blub.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3	Event Date: August 30, 1991	Event Time: 1503 Hours
Reactor Mode: N	Mode Name: Run	Power Level: 10%
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 1004 psig		

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On August 30, 1991 at 1503 hours with Unit 3 in the Run mode at 10% of rated core thermal power, it was observed that the light bulb on the Control Room position indication [JL] for Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [B0] System inboard manual isolation valve 3-1501-26A was burned out. When the new bulb was inserted the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) observed it flash, then extinguish. The low resistance flash in the light bulb apparently caused the opening of fuse 595-714B. Simultaneously with the light indication flash, a Primary Containment Group V Isolation [JM] signal was received and the Isolation Condenser [BL] 3-1301-1, -2, and -4 motor-operated (MO) and 3-1301-17 and -20 air-operated (AO) valves repositioned to the close position as designed. Fuse 595-714B is the supply power fuse for both the 3-1501-26A position indication and the Isolation Condenser Primary Containment Group V Isolation circuitry.

As an immediate corrective action, the supply power fuse was replaced and the Primary Containment Group V Isolation signal was reset. No other safety systems or components were inoperable at the time of this event which could have contributed to the event.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that results in the manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) [JE].

The cause of the event has not yet been determined. Due to the probability of causing a Group V Isolation while inspecting the light socket, a work request was written to inspect the light socket.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The purpose of the Isolation Condenser is to control reactor pressure and/or remove decay heat from the reactor inventory during periods when the normal heat sink is unavailable. The Isolation Condenser can be manually or automatically initiated. An automatic initiation occurs when reactor pressure is sustained at greater than or equal to 1070 psig for 15 seconds. The primary Containment Group V isolation occurred with Unit 3 in the Run mode with reactor pressure at 1004 psig. Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.5.E.2 allows the Isolation Condenser to be inoperable for up to seven days provided that all active components of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] System remains operable. Throughout the entire evolution all active components of the HPCI system were operable. The Isolation Condenser was isolated for approximately 17 minutes. Had an event occurred at power with the Isolation Condenser in the isolated state, the consequences of a postulated accident could have been mitigated by the HPCI system or the Automatic Depressurization [SB] system in conjunction with LPCI and Core Spray [BM] systems.

Initiation of the Primary Containment Group V Isolation demonstrated proper operation of the Containment Isolation Valves. Therefore, the safety significance of this event was minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

As an immediate corrective action the light bulb and fuse were replaced. The Primary Containment Group V Isolation signal reset (249-200-91-00801).

The cause of the event has not yet been determined. Due to the probability of causing a Group V while inspecting the light socket, Work Request D03389 will be performed. Tech Staff will be notified after the inspection has been completed and a supplemental report will be issued at that time (249-200-91-00802).

Also during the current Unit 3 refueling outage (D3R12) and the next Unit 2 refueling outage (D2R13) a Minor Plant Modification will add two fuses in series (see attached Figure 1) to isolate the LPCI indication circuit from the isolation condenser isolation valve control circuitry. The fuses will be coordinated with the upstream circuit breaker such that a similiar short will not cause an unwanted Group V isolation (249-200-91-00803).

F. PREVIOUS OCCURENCES:

LER/Docket Numbers Title

90-005/050237 Unplanned Primary Containment Group V Isolation Due to Procedure Dificiency.

This event occurred while replacing a burned out light bulb on the Control Room position indication for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System manual isolation valve 2-1501-26A. As a corrective action, improvements to administrative controls for issuance of replacement bulbs were implemented, and the bulb change-out procedure was revised.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

LER/Docket Numbers Title

89-21/050237 Inadvertent Group V Primary Containment Isolation Due to Wire Lug Failure.

This event occurred as a result of breaking a wire lug connector while placing an Out-Of-Service Card. As a corrective action, the lug was replaced and relanded on the appropriate terminal.


G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

As this event was not precipitated by component failure, this section is not applicable.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]										



Proposed Changes

Figure 1