

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 0 | 1 | I | L  | D  | R  | S  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 0  | -  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 4  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 4  | 5  |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 |

LICENSEE CODE: \_\_\_\_\_ LICENSE NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ LICENSE TYPE: \_\_\_\_\_ CAT: \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 0 | 1 | L | 6  | 0  | 5  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 7  | 7  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 4  | 8  | 0  | 8  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 5  | 8  | 0  | 9  |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 |

REPORT SOURCE: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCKET NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ EVENT DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ REPORT DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal operation, the 2A Target Rock Safety-Relief Valve Inoperable Pressure

0 3 | Alarm, annunciated, indicating that the Target Rock was not operable in the safety

0 4 | mode. There were no adverse effects to public health and safety. The High Pressure

0 5 | Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was proven operable.

0 6 | \_\_\_\_\_

0 7 | \_\_\_\_\_

0 8 | \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 0 | 9 | C | C  | 11 | X  | 12 | Z  | 13 | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | 14 | Z  | 15 | Z  | 16 | 17 | 8  | 0  | 21 | 22 | -  | 23 | 0  | 4  | 4  | 24 | 25 | 0  | 3  | 26 | 27 | 0  | 3  | 28 | 29 | L  | 30 | -  | 31 | 0  | 32 | Z  | 9  | 9  | 9  | 28 |    |    |    |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 |

SYSTEM CODE: \_\_\_\_\_ CAUSE CODE: \_\_\_\_\_ CAUSE SUBCODE: \_\_\_\_\_ COMPONENT CODE: \_\_\_\_\_ COMP. SUBCODE: \_\_\_\_\_ VALVE SUBCODE: \_\_\_\_\_

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ EVENT YEAR: \_\_\_\_\_ SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_ OCCURRENCE CODE: \_\_\_\_\_ REPORT TYPE: \_\_\_\_\_ REVISION NO.: \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION TAKEN: \_\_\_\_\_ FUTURE ACTION: \_\_\_\_\_ EFFECT ON PLANT: \_\_\_\_\_ SHUTDOWN METHOD: \_\_\_\_\_ HOURS: \_\_\_\_\_ ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: \_\_\_\_\_ NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: \_\_\_\_\_ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: \_\_\_\_\_ COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: \_\_\_\_\_

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Cause of the alarm is unknown at this time. It was determined that continued operation

1 1 | was permissible due to an overpressurization analysis conducted with one inoperable

1 2 | safety valve and no overpressurization limits were exceeded. Work Request issued to in-

1 3 | vestigate and repair. The results of the investigation will be submitted in a

1 4 | supplemental LER.

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |                      |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----------------------|----|
| 1 | 5 | E | 28 | 0  | 5  | 1  | 29 | NA | 30 | A  | 31 | Operator Observation | 32 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19                   | 20 |

FACILITY STATUS: \_\_\_\_\_ % POWER: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER STATUS: \_\_\_\_\_ METHOD OF DISCOVERY: \_\_\_\_\_ DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 6 | Z | 33 | Z  | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: \_\_\_\_\_ AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOCATION OF RELEASE: \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0  | 0  | 37 | Z  | 38 | NA | 39 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ TYPE: \_\_\_\_\_ DESCRIPTION: \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 8 | 0 | 0  | 0  | 40 | NA | 41 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ DESCRIPTION: \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|
| 1 | 9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: \_\_\_\_\_ DESCRIPTION: \_\_\_\_\_

|   |   |   |    |    |    |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|
| 2 | 0 | Z | 44 | NA | 45 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |

PUBLICITY ISSUED: \_\_\_\_\_ DESCRIPTION: \_\_\_\_\_

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NRC USE ONLY

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-44/03L-0  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT ILDRS-2  
DOCKET #050-237

Dresden Station Unit 2 reactor was under normal operation when the 2A Target Rock Safety-Relief Valve Inoperable Pressure Relief Alarm annunciated, indicating that the Target Rock was not operable in safety mode. There were no adverse effects to public health and safety, and the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was demonstrated to be operable. The cause of the alarm is unknown until a drywell entry is made during the refueling outage beginning in January of 1981. Continued operation with the safety mode of the valve inoperable was judged to be permissible based on the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the G.E. Generic Reload License Document for the current cycle. This SER stated that with one safety valve inoperable, the vessel would not be overpressurized in the event of a vessel isolation signal followed by an APRM Hi Flux scram. The Technical Specification requirement of 8 operable safety valves is met also. A supplemental report will be submitted when the cause of failure is determined.