

ATTACHMENT 4

DEVIATION REPORT D-12-3-79-52  
OVERFLOWING OF DRESDEN UNIT 3 FUEL POOL  
INTO VENT DUCTS

8011100661



# DEVIATION REPORT

*file*

Commonwealth Edison

DVR NO.	STA	UNIT	YEAR	NO.
	0-12	- 3	- 79	- 52

<b>1</b> TITLE OF DEVIATION	OVERFLOWING OF UNIT 3 FUEL POOL INTO VENT DUCTS	OCURRED DATE	10/25/79	20
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SYSTEM AFFECTED	1900	PLANT CONDITIONS	MODE	Run	PWR (MWT)	1743	LOAD (MWE)	550	TESTING	<input type="checkbox"/>
Fuel Pool									YES	<input type="checkbox"/>

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT  
 Fuel Pool overflowed into vent ducts carrying contaminated water down the stairs and to all floors on elevation 613'.

DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE  
 At approximately 2045 on 10-25-79 an equipment attendant and an Equipment Attendant

Trainee were attempting to precoat 2/3 B Waste Filter. The trainee went to 2/3 (OVER)

OTHER APPLICABLE INFORMATION  
 Received hi level alarm. Unit operator & foreman went to Refueling Floor and started draining Fuel Pool to storage. Radwaste operator closed condensate water (OVER)

EQUIPMENT FAILURE	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	DR NO.	WR NO. Blanket #	00105	K. L. Tupman	10/25/79
					RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR	DATE

PART 2 OPERATING ENGINEERS COMMENTS  
 Contamination surveys were immediately initiated. Only low level contamination was noted on west half of 1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th floors of D3 Rx Bldg. Cont. area was roped off. A Pro Investigation has been initiated.

TYPE OF DEVIATION REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE	EVENT OF POTENTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST	TECH SPEC VIOLATION	NON-REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE	ANNUAL REPORTING	SAFETY RELATED WR ISSU
<input type="checkbox"/> 14 DAY <input type="checkbox"/> 30 DAY NOTIFICATION	<input type="checkbox"/> 10CFR21	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NUMBER	ACTION ITEM NO.	PROMPT ON-SITE NOTIFICATION
<del>82</del> - N/A		R. M. Ragan 10/29/79 8:4
		TITLE DATE
		TITLE DATE

24-HOUR NRC NOTIFICATION (Courtesy)	PROMPT OFF-SITE NOTIFICATION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TPH J. Barker 10-25-79 10:00 PM	F. Palmer 10/30/79 12:
REGION III DATE TIME	TITLE DATE TIME
<input type="checkbox"/> TGM REGION III & DOL DATE TIME	J. Gilliom 10/30/79 12:
	TITLE DATE

RESPONSIBLE COMPANY OFFICER INFORMED OF 10CFR21 CONDITIONS AND THEIR REPORT TO NRC

REVIEW AND COMPLETED	M. Wright	10/29/79
	OPERATING ENGINEER	DATE

ACCEPTANCE BY STATION REVIEW AS REQUIRED

DATE

RESOLUTION APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION

*J. Brunner* 9/5/80  
*Tom Palmer* 9/11/80  
*Douglas J. Scott* 9/14/80  
 STATION SUPERINTENDENT DATE

### DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE

radwaste mezzanine to open the precoat valve to "B" filter. The trainee thought he had the proper valve. He checked the valve number and after he opened the valve, and had returned to the 2/3 Control Room, he noticed that the valve number he had opened did not correspond to the radwaste system number. He started to look on the P&ID's. By this time the Fuel Pool High Level Alarm was up. The valve he had opened was the condensate water to the U-3 Fuel Pool. (3-1904-5-27). The valve was open for approximately 35 minutes. It was secured by an Equipment Attendant and the Radwaste Foreman. An operator had pinpointed the problem. The area in which these valves are located is poorly lighted.

### OTHER APPLICABLE INFORMATION

to Fuel Pool valve. Level was returned to normal by 2110 hrs. RCT was called and areas in Rx Bldg. were roped off. All floors and equipment in Rx Bldg. were checked and no apparent damage was caused. Several cable trays were flooded with water.

# SUPPLEMENTAL DVR

D-112-3-179-052 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 11LDRS 2 00-000000-000 3 XXXXXX 4 XX 5  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

01 X 6 XXXXXX 7 102579 8 022880 9  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During normal operation, the Unit 3 Fuel Pool overflowed into the Fuel Pool vent  
03 ducts. This resulted in contaminated water spilling to all levels of the Reactor  
04 Building through the ventilation system. Safety significance was minimal since the  
05 contamination was very low level and the contaminated areas were immediately isolated.  
06 This is the first deviation report of this type.  
07  
08

09 F B 11 A 12 B 13 V A L V E X 14 E 15 D 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

17 DVR REPORT NUMBER 7 9 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 NO.  
X 18 H 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 N 23 X 24 A 25 C 6 6 5 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The Fuel Pool overflowed due to a radwaste equipment attendant in training inadver-  
11 tantly opening the condensate fill valve to the Unit 3 Fuel Pool (3-1904-5-27). Once  
12 the error was identified, the valve was immediately closed. A managerial investigation  
13 conducted within the guidelines of the CECO. Professionalism Program was initiated to  
14 review the event. As a result, the lighting in the area of the valves was (OVER)  
15 E 28 0 6 9 29 N/A 30 A 31 Operator Observation 32  
16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 N/A 36  
17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39  
18 0 0 0 40 N/A 41  
19 Z 42 N/A 43  
20 N 44 N/A 45

15 E 28 0 6 9 29 N/A 30 A 31 Operator Observation 32  
16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 N/A 36  
17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39  
18 0 0 0 40 N/A 41  
19 Z 42 N/A 43  
20 N 44 N/A 45

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

improved, new valve nameplates were hung, and DAP 7-2 was revised to delineate the conduct of students performing on-the-job training. No further corrective action is deemed necessary at this time.