



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

BBS

March 25, 1980

BBS LTR #80-242.

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #80-8/03L-0, Docket #050-249, is being submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(a), reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conservative than those established by the technical specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.

R. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:lbg

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

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ENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I | L | D | R | S | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 9
60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During Unit 3 refueling outage, while performing temperature switch calibration
0 3 | surveillance, DIS 2300-7, three temperature switches failed to trip </= 200 degree F.
0 4 | as per tech. spec. table 3.2.1. Safety implications were minimal since at least two
0 5 | remaining switches in channels B and D were operable as were redundant channels A and
0 6 | C, and would have auto isolated the HPCI system at 180 degree F. Similar events: R.O.
0 7 | 50-237/74-63 and 50-249/80-11, I-3-73-4 and I-3-74-6.
0 8 | _____
8 9

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: S F (11) CAUSE CODE: E (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: B (13) COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U (14) COMP. SUBCODE: S (15) VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 8 0 (21) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 0 8 (24) OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 (28) REPORT TYPE: L (30) REVISION NO.: 0 (32)
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN: E (18) FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS: 0 0 0 0 (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: F 0 8 1 (26)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of failures were drift, excessive gap between actuator and switch plunger,
1 1 | or dirty contacts. The necessary adjustments were made to the switches, and they were
1 2 | recalibrated to 180 degrees F +/- 5 degrees. All HPCI area temperature switches shall
1 3 | continue to be tested during each refueling outage.
1 4 | _____
8 9

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: H (28) % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) OTHER STATUS: N/A (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Surveillance Test (32)
8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: N/A (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE: N/A (36)
8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) TYPE: _____ (38) DESCRIPTION: N/A (39)
8 9 11 12 13 80

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) DESCRIPTION: N/A (41)
8 9 11 12 13 80

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: TYPE: Z (42) DESCRIPTION: N/A (43)
8 9 11 12 80

2 0 | PUBLICITY: N (44) DESCRIPTION: N/A (45) NRC USE ONLY
8 9 10 80

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-008/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT (ILDRS-3)
DOCKET # 050-249

HPCI area high temperature switch TS 3-2371B tripped repeatedly at 204.8°F increasing. The failure can be attributed to instrument drift.

HPCI area high temperature switch TS3-2370D tripped repeatedly at 273.6°F increasing. The failure can be attributed to excessive gap between the actuator and switch plunger. The switch was found to have a gap of approximately 0.120 in., as compared to a proper gap setting of approximately .060 in. The gap was adjusted to .060 in.

HPCI area high temperature switch TS 3-2370B tripped repeatedly at 235.7°F increasing. The failure was attributed to loose mounting bolts on the micro-switch and dirty switch contacts. Bolts were tightened and switch contacts cleaned.

All switches were recalibrated to a setting of 180°F \pm 5° in compliance with Tech. Spec. Table 3.2.1. All HPCI area temperature switches shall continue to be tested during each refueling outage.