ATTACHMENT 1

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

Dresden Unit 2 - DPR - 19

Tech. Spec. Page:
Remove: Page 78
Insert: Revised Page 78

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

1. Except as specified in 3.5.D.2 and 3 below, the Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystem shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

2. From and after the date that one of the five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI Subsystem is operable.

   This specification shall not apply for the time period from January 24, 1980 through midnight, January 31, 1980.

3. From and after the date that more than one of five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 24 hours unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI Subsystem is operable.

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

D. Surveillance of the Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystem shall be performed as follows:

1. During each operating cycle the following shall be performed:

   a. A simulated automatic initiation which opens all pilot valves, and

   b. With the reactor at pressure each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure.

   c. A logic system functional test shall be performed each refueling outage.

2. When it is determined that one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter

3. When it is determined that more than one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately

ATTACHMENT 2

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

Dresden Unit 3 - DPR - 25

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Tech. Spec. Page:
Remove: Page 78
Insert: Revised Page 78

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

1. Except as specified in 3.5.D.2 and 3 below, the Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystem shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

2. From and after the date that one of the five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI Subsystem is operable.

   This specification shall not apply for the time period from January 24, 1980 through midnight, January 31, 1980.

3. From and after the date that more than one of five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 24 hours unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI Subsystem is operable.

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

D. Surveillance of the Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystem shall be performed as follows:

1. During each operating cycle the following shall be performed:

   a. A simulated automatic initiation which opens all pilot valves, and

   b. With the reactor at pressure each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure.

   c. A logic system functional test shall be performed each refueling outage.

2. When it is determined that one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter

3. When it is determined that more than one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately

ATTACHMENT 3

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

QUAD CITIES UNIT 1 - DPR - 29

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Tech. Spec. Page:
Remove: 3.5/4.5-5
Insert: Revised 3.5/4.5-5

provided that during such 7 days all active components of the automatic pressure relief subsystems, the core spray subsystems, LPCI mode of the RHR system, and the RCIC system are operable.

3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.C cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated, and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 90 psig within 24 hours.

D. **Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems**

1. The automatic pressure relief subsystem shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig, irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.

2. From and after the date that one of the five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI subsystem is operable.

This specification shall not apply for the time period from January 24, 1980 through midnight, January 31, 1980.

3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.D cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 90 psig within 24 hours.

operable immediately. The automatic pressure relief and RCIC systems shall be demonstrated to be operable daily thereafter.

D. **Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems**

Surveillance of the automatic pressure relief subsystems shall be performed as follows:

1. The following surveillance shall be carried out on a 6 month surrveillance interval:
   a. A simulated automatic initiation which opens all pilot valves.
   b. With the reactor at pressure each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure.
2. A logic system functional test shall be performed each refueling outage.
3. When it is determined that one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter.