



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

DSB

January 7, 1980

BBS LTR #80-1

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #79-067/03L-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:lbg

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | | | | | |

1 | I | E | D | R | S | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 0 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
1.2 | During surveillance testing of 2/3 D/G, pinion gears engaged, starting the D/G. At
1.3 | 200 RPM pinion gears remained engaged, but they eventually disengaged prior to D/G
1.4 | reaching full speed. Failure to start alarm was received. D/G was immediately de-
1.5 | clared inoperable to prevent the pinion gears from being damaged. Health and safety
1.6 | of public were not affected because redundant systems were verified operable by
1.7 | required testing. This event is the first of its kind.

SYSTEM CODE: E E (11) CAUSE CODE: L (12) CAUSE SURCODE: (13) COMPONENT CODE: X X X X X (14) COMP. SUBCODE: X (15) VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

17 | REPORT NUMBER: 7 9 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 3 6 7 | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: A (18) Z (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS: 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: N (23) NPRO-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1.0 | Probable cause was bad connection in speed sensing circuit, preventing deenergizing
1.1 | start solenoid and disengaging gears. A suspected bad capacitor was replaced,
1.2 | but removed capacitor subsequently tested satisfactorily. D/G was successfully
1.3 | started and loaded to full power. No further corrective action deemed necessary.

1.5 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) % POWER: 0 8 3 (29) OTHER STATUS: N/A (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Routine Surveillance Testing (32)

1.6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT: Z (33) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: N/A (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE: N/A (36)

1.7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) DESCRIPTION: N/A (39)

1.8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES: 0 0 0 (40) DESCRIPTION: N/A (41)

1.9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: Z (42) DESCRIPTION: N/A (43)

2.0 | ISSUED: N (44) DESCRIPTION: N/A (45)

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