

ATTACHMENT (1)

DRESDEN STATION UNIT (2) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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3.6 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

1. During all modes of operation except cold shutdown and refuel, all safety-related snubbers listed in Table 3.6.1 shall be operable except as noted in Specification 3.6.I.2 through 3.6.I.4.
2. From and after the time that a snubber is determined to be inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 72 hours unless the snubber is sooner made operable or replaced. Torus ring header snubbers may be inoperable in groups of up to three (3) pairs until September 1, 1980, to facilitate the installation of Mark I Torus Support Modifications.
3. If the requirements of 3.6.I.1 and 3.6.I.2 can not be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown or refuel condition within 36 hours.
4. If a snubber is determined to be inoperable while the reactor is in the cold shutdown or refuel mode, the snubber shall be made operable or replaced prior to reactor startup. This requirement does not apply to torus ring header snubbers for the period identified in paragraph 3.6.I.2 above.
5. Snubbers may be added to safety related systems without prior license amendment to Table 3.6.1 provided that a revision to Table 3.6.1 is included with the next license amendment request.

4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

The following surveillance requirements apply to all hydraulic snubbers listed in Table 3.6.1.

1. All hydraulic snubbers whose seal material has been demonstrated by operating experience, lab testing or analysis to be compatible with the operating environment shall be visually inspected. This inspection shall include, but not necessarily be limited to inspection of the hydraulic fluid reservoir, fluid connections, and linkage connection to the piping and anchor to verify snubber operability in accordance with the following schedule:

<u>No. of Snubbers Found Inoperable During In- spection Interval</u>	<u>Next Required Inspection Interval</u>
0	18 months \pm 25%
1	12 months \pm 25%
2	6 months \pm 25%
3, 4	124 days \pm 25%
5, 6, 7	62 days \pm 25%
≥ 8	31 days \pm 25%

The required inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

H. Recirculation Pump Flow Mismatch

The LPCI loop selection logic has been described in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 FSAR, Amendments 7 and 8. For some limited low probability accidents with the recirculation loop operating with large speed differences, it is possible for the logic to select the wrong loop for injection. For these limited conditions the core spray itself is adequate to prevent fuel temperatures from exceeding allowable limits. However, to limit the probability even further, a procedural limitation has been placed on the allowable variation in speed between the recirculation pumps.

The licensee's analyses indicate that above 80% power the loop select logic could not be expected to function at a speed differential of 15%. Below 80% power the loop select logic would not be expected to function at a speed differential of 20%. This specification provides a margin of 5% in pump speed differential before a problem could arise. If the reactor is operating on one pump, the loop select logic trips that pump before making the loop selection.

In addition, during the start-up of Dresden Unit 2 it was found that a flow mismatch between the two sets of jet pumps caused by a difference in recirculation loops could set up a vibration until a mismatch in speed of 27% occurred. The 10% and 15% speed mismatch restrictions provide additional margin before a pump vibration problem will occur.

ECCS performance during reactor operation with one recirculation loop out of service has not been analyzed. Therefore, sustained reactor operation under such conditions is not permitted.

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of

an inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. It is therefore required that all hydraulic snubbers required to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component be operable during reactor operation.

Because the snubber protection is required only during low probability events, a period of 72 hours is allowed for repairs or replacements. In case a shutdown is required, the allowance of 36 hours to reach a cold shutdown condition will permit an orderly shutdown consistent with standard operating procedures. Since plant startup should not commence with knowingly defective safety related equipment, Specification 3.6.I.4 prohibits startup with inoperable snubbers.

A re-analysis of the ring header design based upon acceleration response spectra derived from the original suction header analysis report demonstrates that for normal operation plus OBE, neither the header nor the torus penetrations are over-stressed with all snubbers inoperable. The limitation of a maximum of three pairs inoperable out of six pairs is considered conservative. Since the analysis shows that the plant can operate safely indefinitely with no snubbers on the ring header, the limitation on operation and startup with three inoperable pairs until September 1, 1980 is justified. This time frame is adequate to allow completion of Mark I external structural work.

All safety related hydraulic snubbers are visually inspected for overall integrity and operability. The inspection will include verification of proper orientation, adequate hydraulic fluid level and proper attachment of snubber to piping and structures.

ATTACHMENT (2)

DRESDEN STATION UNIT (3) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

PAGE CHANGES

APPENDIX A to DPR - (25) - Pages 91 b
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3.6 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

1. During all modes of operation except cold shutdown and refuel, all safety-related snubbers listed in Table 3.6.1 shall be operable except as noted in Specification 3.6.1.2 through 3.6.1.4.
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3. If the requirements of 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 can not be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown or refuel condition within 36 hours.
4. If a snubber is determined to be inoperable while the reactor is in the cold shutdown or refuel mode, the snubber shall be made operable or replaced prior to reactor startup. This requirement does not apply to torus ring header snubbers for the period identified in paragraph 3.6.1.2 above.
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