



Commonwealth Edison

One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

August 3, 1979

Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors - Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactors
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Dresden Station Units 2 and 3
Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2
Additional Information in Response
to IE Bulletin 79-08
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237/249/254/265

Reference (a): T. A. Ippolito letter to C. Reed
dated July 20, 1979

Dear Mr. Ippolito:

Reference (a) requested additional information concerning our responses to IE Bulletin 79-08. The information which you requested is provided in the attachment to this letter.

Please address any additional questions you may have concerning this matter to this office.

Very truly yours,

Robert F. James
for Cordell Reed
Assistant Vice-President

attachment

7908080530

A001
5 1/1

ATTACHMENT

Item No. 1

- (1) The actions required by Item No. 1 were completed at Dresden Station by June 1, 1979 and Quad-Cities Station by July 25, 1979.

Item No. 2

- (1) Procedures relating to the initiation of containment isolation have been reviewed at both Dresden and Quad-Cities Stations. Procedure revisions resulting from these reviews will be completed by September 1, 1979.
- (2) It is preferable that Primary Containment Isolation Groups I and III not isolate on a high drywell pressure condition. This can be justified as follows:
 - a. With adequate water level inventory in the vessel (level greater than the low and low-low setpoints) as could be expected for small break LOCAs, the cleanup system and steam line drains may be used as a means to transfer reactor water and steam to the main condenser for depressurization and cooling. This would be the preferred mode of operation as opposed to relying on the suppression pool to accept the heat load of the reactor cooldown.
 - b. The recirculation sample valves must be available to provide coolant activity samples to ascertain the extent of any fuel damage following a LOCA once vessel water level is established above the low-low level setpoints. Thus, an isolation on high drywell pressure would be contrary to the intended use of this line following a LOCA.
- (3) The RBCCW is required to supply cooling to the reactor recirculation pumps and motors. Although these pumps trip during a LOCA (either from low-low reactor vessel water level or from LPCI loop-select logic), cooling water is needed for pump coastdown. Loss of RBCCW to these pumps and motor could possibly result in shaft seizure and may even cause pump destruction. The existing manual isolation of RBCCW meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Criterion 57.

- 2 -

- (4) a. It has been determined that an automatic isolation should be added to the torus to main condenser drain line at Dresden Station. This modification is scheduled for installation during the next refuelings of Units 2 and 3.
- b. The procedure change to manually close the torus to main condenser transfer line at Dresden Station, if isolation is necessary, has been implemented.
- c. At Quad-Cities Station, a procedure change has been initiated to provide operator actions necessary for a RBCCW line break inside the drywell. This change will be implemented by September 1, 1979. The existing Dresden procedure for isolation of RBCCW was found to be adequate.

Item No. 3

- (1) Procedure QOP 1300-4 provides those steps necessary to reset the RCIC turbine after a trip. Procedure QOP 1300-2 outlines the method to start up the RCIC System. In summary, QOP 1300-4 instructs the operator to do the following:
 - a. Close the steam supply valve to the RCIC turbine.
 - b. Manually close the trip throttle valve; this will reset the valve.
 - c. Slowly open the trip throttle valve.
 - d. The turbine is reset and may be restarted in accordance with the RCIC startup procedure, QOP 1300-2.

Procedure changes identified in the prior responses will be implemented by September 1, 1979.

Item No. 4

- (1) The control room operator has numerous alternate indications that can indirectly indicate a change in reactor vessel coolant inventory. Instrumentation is available in the control room to monitor:

Drywell Pressure
Drywell Temperature
Suppression Chamber Pressure
Suppression Chamber Temperature
Suppression Chamber Water Level
Feedwater Flow
Steam Flow
Reactor Pressure
Relief Valve Discharge Temperature
Drywell Floor and Equipment Sump
Discharge Flow
Reactor Building Closed Coding Water
Temperature

- (2) Operators have been instructed to utilize other available information as part of their training required by Item No. 1 of IE Bulletin 79-08. In addition, the use of multiple indications to identify abnormal conditions is an underlying philosophy of the station's abnormal and emergency procedures. All licensed operators are trained on these procedures annually as part of their requalification training.

Item No. 5

- (1) The review of operating procedures and training did include verification that operators are directed to use multiple symptoms in evaluating plant conditions and not to rely solely on vessel level indication when taking manual actions during transients.

- 4 -

- (2) Procedure changes resulting from the review of the Three Mile Island Incident and IE Bulletin 79-08 will be implemented by September 1, 1979.

Item No. 6

- (1) At Dresden and Quad-Cities Stations, both station personnel and the resident NRC Region III inspectors have verified the correct alignment for operation of all accessible valves in the emergency systems. Since shortly after the Three Mile Island Incident, the suction valves to ECCS pumps have been verified open daily. In addition, Dresden Station has implemented a procedure to verify daily that all accessible ECCS valves in the main flow paths are in their proper positions. A similar procedure will be implemented by September 1, 1979 at Quad-Cities Station.

Item No. 7

- (1) The procedure changes have been initiated and revisions will be implemented by September 1, 1979.

Item No. 8

- (1) At Quad-Cities Station, Procedure QAP 300-4, "Shift Change for Nuclear Station Operators" describes those actions to be taken upon shift turnover. Included in these actions is the review of the shift log by the incoming operator for equipment taken out of service. Other actions are verbally transferred at shift change, such as special conditions, current operational status, and useful information for future shifts. The incoming operator, by this procedure, is required to check control room panels for proper system line ups.

At Dresden Station, an administrative procedure has been prepared to govern shift turn-over practices. The procedure explicitly requires the on-coming operators to be informed of the status of equipment

taken out-of-service or returned to service, any off-normal equipment line ups, activities in progress or planned, the status of caution cards and jumpers, and surveillance in progress or planned. Following a review by the on-coming NSO of the High Radiation Area Entry log and a review of panel indications, the off-going NSO signs the surveillance log to indicate that he has properly turned over the shift operations. This procedure will be implemented by September 1, 1979.