



**Commonwealth Edison**  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

February 4, 1979

**Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555**

**Subject: Dresden Station Unit 2  
Emergency Change to License DPR-19  
Appendix A, Technical Specifications  
NRC Docket No. 50-237**

Dear Sir:

On February 2, 1979 at 7:15 P.M., several of the Unit 2/3 Reactor Building blow-off panels became detached as a result of a ventilation system malfunction which pressurized the Reactor Building. This created a 22'x40' opening in the Reactor Building superstructure at the refueling floor breaching the secondary containment. At this time, Unit 2 was operating at 700 MWe and Unit 3 was in the cold shutdown condition.

Unit 2 was immediately brought to a cold shutdown condition in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. Repairs have been initiated but are not expected to be complete until late on February 4 or early February 5, 1979.

Our System Power Supply office forecasts a 600 megawatt shortfall in meeting our Monday, February 5, 1979 load without Dresden Unit 2. When the required reserve margin is taken into account the projected deficiency would be 1300 megawatts. A survey of surrounding utilities showed that the prospect of buying emergency power is not good because of weather related problems on other systems.

In order to have Unit 2 carrying sufficient load to prevent a system load emergency on February 5, startup of the unit must commence by 2:00 P.M. on February 4, 1979 -- at least several hours prior to the completion of the repairs to the blowout panels.

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\$4,000.00

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In an effort to establish a secondary containment boundary, the refueling floor (613' elev.) has been isolated from the remainder of the Reactor Building by sealing hatchways, doorways, and ventilation systems which penetrate to the floors below or connect Units 2 and 3. As a result of these efforts, the Standby Gas Treatment system has been demonstrated to be capable of maintaining a negative pressure of .2 inches of water in the Unit 2 secondary containment structure (exclusive of the refueling floor). In order to allow startup, a temporary Technical Specification change to allow operation under the above stated conditions is hereby requested. The changes appear as Attachment 1 to this letter. These changes have received on-site and off-site review and approval.

We believe that operation under these conditions does not create any undue hazard to the health and safety of the public for the following reasons:

1. The probability of the occurrence of a design basis event requiring the secondary containment boundary during the time the temporary change is in effect is very small.
2. With the exception of the refueling floor areas, a secondary containment boundary for Unit 2 will be in effect until total secondary containment is in effect; no fuel movements or operations involving the fuel pools will be performed.
3. Unit 3 is in cold shutdown and Unit 2 is limited to 84% power due to operation of the unit in the coastdown mode, making previous accident analyses performed at 100% power conservative.

Based on the above, we believe that operation under the temporary Technical Specification change causes no undue hazard to the health and safety of the public.


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Pursuant to 10 CFR 170, Commonwealth Edison has determined this to be a Class III Amendment, and a fee remittance of \$4,000.00 is enclosed.

Please direct any questions concerning this matter to this office.

Three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) copies of this letter are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

  
for Cordell Reed  
Assistant Vice-President

attachment

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to  
before me this 4th day  
of February, 1979.

  
Nancy M. Dasenzy  
Notary Public

### 3.7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

operation except when all of the following conditions are met.

- a. The reactor is subcritical and Specification 3.3.A is met.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
- b. The reactor water temperature is below 212°F and the reactor coolant system is vented.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
- c. No activity is being performed which can reduce the shutdown margin below that specified in Specification 3.3.A.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
- d. The fuel cask or irradiated fuel is not being moved in the reactor building.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2. The doors of the core spray and LPCI pump compartments shall be closed at all times

### 4.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

- a. A preoperational secondary containment capability test shall be conducted after isolating the reactor building and placing either standby gas treatment system filter train in operation. Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain a 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (<5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 cfm.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
- b. Additional tests shall be performed during the first operating cycle under an adequate number of different environmental wind conditions to enable valid extrapolation of the test results.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
- c. Secondary containment capability to maintain a 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (<5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
- d. For the 24 hour period commencing on February 4, 1979 at 1:00 P.M., secondary containment integrity shall be demonstrated by the ability to maintain 0.2 inches of water negative pressure in the Unit 2 Reactor Building areas below the refueling floor.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2. Whenever the LPCI and core spray sub-systems are required to be operable, the