



Commonwealth Edison

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450

Telephone 815/942-2920

January 17, 1979

BBS Ltr. #79-49

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #79-02/01T-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.(e), failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-02/01T-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

With the unit operating at steady load, the HPCI turbine failed to start during performance of quarterly flow test surveillance DOS 2300-3. When the motor speed changer was run from the low speed stop to the high speed stop, the turbine control valves did not open. As a result the HPCI system was declared inoperable and the required ECCS surveillances (T.S. 3.5.C.2) commenced. At 1430 the HPCI surveillance was performed again and the HPCI turbine started on the second attempt. Six consecutive turbine startups were performed and the surveillance successfully completed. The HPCI system was declared operable. This event has minimal safety significance since the required ECCS surveillances with the exception of auto blowdown were completed. The auto blowdown surveillance was terminated when HPCI was declared operable.

On 1/4/79 at 1100 the HPCI turbine was operated with the General Electric Technical representative present. He noted that the pin on the motor speed changer linkage which actuates the interlock dump valve when the motor speed changer is on the low speed stop was not fully depressing the interlock dump valve operating lever. The purpose of the interlock dump valve is to prevent the control valves from opening during system startup with the turbine reset and the motor speed changer not on the low speed stop. The interlock dump valve actuating lever was adjusted to provide full engagement and HPCI pump and valve operability surveillance DOS 2300-1 successfully performed at 1400. No further action is planned.